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Summary 
The role of sub-national governments in promoting economic development has 
increased in salience in an era of increased political decentralisation, advancing 
globalisation and, particularly, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Despite 
this, the deployment of the specific policy instruments used to promote development 
by such entities continues to be relatively under-examined and subject to 
considerable data constraints. 
In order to more effectively probe publicly-directed efforts to revitalise the 
economies of particularly distressed regions pursued by sub-national governments, 
this dissertation engages in the first comparative overview of economic 
development initiatives employed within the Valleys region of South Wales and the 
U.S. city of Detroit. Given broadly comparable economic trajectories; characterised 
by the deindustrialisation of a hegemonic industry, yet initially divergent political 
settlements, this provides it with a unique analytical vantage point from which to 
consider  such programmes, their structure, assumptions, objectives and, when 
possible, effects.  
The dissertation therefore reviews and synthesises the relevant, programme-
specific, literature while grounding it in the appropriate historical and political context 
to provide an overview - and conduct an initial analysis of - the primary development 
initiatives pursued in both areas. In the process of doing so, it investigates, 
categorises and identifies specific trends which are observable within the city, the 
region and both. 
It particularly identifies variable levels of programme-level data and evaluation, a 
tendency towards firm-oriented or “supply-side” initiatives, operational confusion 
regarding  the regional and urban scale at which efforts can be directed, 
distributional and directional issues within their funding and an inconsistent 
recognition of economic theory and developments within it. It recommends a greater 
empiricism with regard to programme monitoring and evaluation and a more 
frequent engagement with academic research and theory by relevant policymakers: 
especially relating to conditions which these indicate as prerequisites for long-term 
economic growth. 
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Speramus Meliora; resurget Cineribus : “We hope for better things; it will rise from 
the ashes” 
-Official motto of the city of Detroit. 
“There’s still plenty of work to do, but you can feel the difference.  You can feel 
something special happening in Detroit.” 
-Remarks by President Barack Obama at the UAW-GM Center for Human 
Resources, January 20th, 2016 
“A choir voice cries it shatters the silence. Where's the future in this place? The 
question hangs unanswered” 
-The Alarm, “New South Wales” 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1: Development and devolution 
 
The growing significance of sub-national regions within the global economy has 
increasingly amplified the roles and responsibilities of local and regional 
governments within their respective economic spheres (Jones, 2012:10) (Huggins et 
al, 2014:2). The simultaneous advance of globalisation has similarly intensified the 
notion of regional economic competitiveness. This has resulted in a correspondingly 
increased focus upon the public policies intended to promote it (Hunt, 2011:8). This 
emphasis reflects a realisation that “many of the essential determinants of economic 
performance are to be found at the regional level” (Porter, 2003:550), and is often 
manifested politically in frequent advocacy for powers to assist economic 
development (Jones, 2012:10) (Pike & Tomaney, 2010:97). This advocacy has 
proven particularly vocal in regions of pervasive and longstanding economic decline, 
particularly within those areas contending with industrial restructuring and the large-
scale unemployment which often accompanies it (Jones, 2012:5).  
 
What has therefore emerged in recent decades is something approximating a 
political consensus on the desirability of regional and local control over efforts to 
revitalise areas significantly below national economic norms (Jones, 2012:3;11). 
This notion of an “economic dividend” (Morgan, 2002:797) arising from devolved 
control is seen to hold significant intuitive power, and is widely promoted as a 
solution for economic underperformance (Pike et al, 2012:10). Yet there remains 
stubbornly little analytical consensus on whether such moves carry real, quantifiable 
benefits (Jeffery, 2006:1) (Jones, 2012:14), and, especially, regarding the precise 
mechanism through which political devolution is translated into advances in 
economic performance (Pike et al, 2012:15).  
 
Public domain efforts to promote economic development, defined for the purposes 
of this dissertation as “government subsidized program[me]s that provide 
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customized assistance” (Bartik, 1993:1) for the purposes of increasing employment, 
productivity or performance  (as opposed to the broader powers of fiscal and 
monetary policy (Bartik & Erickcek, 2012:3)), have an established track record in 
Wales and the United States (U.S.)  (Eisinger, 1988:15) (Lind, 2013:40) (Morgan, 
2008:19). Given the recent advent of Welsh devolution, control over such initiatives 
rested outside of Wales until the late 20th Century, whereas development schemes 
in U.S. states were often undertaken by regional or local governments, with certain 
exceptions (LaFaive & Hicks, 2005:109) (Bartik, 2012:1). The concept of an 
economic benefit accruing from political devolution featured prominently in debates 
surrounding the creation of the National Assembly for Wales (Jones, 2012:5) 
(Danson et al, 2012:1) (Rawlings, 2007:37), while research into the economic 
benefits of regional governance have long used U.S.-based models to probe the 
existence of such a dividend, but have drawn mixed conclusions (Jones, 2012:14) 
(Rodriguez-Pose & Bwire, 2003:27).  
 
In order to examine these issues in sufficient and penetrable depth, case studies of 
distressed regions within both countries can be employed.  While it remains 
imperative to qualify any conclusions with the unique characteristics of individual 
regions, and to specify that inferences drawn from one region are often not readily 
transferable to another, such “comparisons can serve a useful purpose in …. 
call[ing] for explanations of why regions and cities differ in economic prosperity” 
(Kitson et al, 2004:997). These comparisons can be similarly illustrative when 
analysing regions which have experienced comparable economic and industrial 
shocks, and which have since proven unable to adequately regenerate. The 
academic literature on public policy transfers and “lesson drawing” (Stone, 2001:1) 
(Rose, 1993) has progressed away from identifying and replicating cases of best 
practice, and increasingly recognises that interregional policy transpositions are not 
feasible; given that two regions are “never exactly identical” (Rose, 1993:22) 
(Huggins et al, 2014:184). It has therefore increasingly opted to search for “good 
practices” (Huggins et al, 2014:184), or merely better ones. Through this, it is 
possible to better understand the likely impact of implementing similar policies in 
comparable, though distinct areas (Rose, 1993:22). 
 
Both the South Wales Valleys (hereafter defined in administrative terms synthesised 
from the Unitary Authority (UA) boundaries utilised by Beatty & Fothergill (2014:14), 
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Osmond (2008:77) and Foden et al1  (2014:12)) (Figure 1.1) and the city of Detroit 
in the U.S. state of Michigan hold strong claims to representing the most acute and 
highest magnitude instances of economic decline within their respective nations. 
Home to 29.7% of the Welsh population (Office for National Statistics, 2012), the 
Valleys stretch westwards from the western regions of Newport to the eastern 
periphery of Swansea, and extend from the northern suburbs of Cardiff to the 
Brecon Beacons.  They consistently rank below Welsh and United Kingdom (UK) 
averages across a wide variety of social and economic indicators and their more 
disconnected northern reaches are viewed as having “the most intractable 
development problems” (Fothergill, 2008:3;4-5) of any UK region. Detroit and its 
home state are likewise seen as constituting a “worst case scenario” (Reese, 
2014:635) of U.S. deindustrialisation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Consisting of the UAs of Blaenau Gwent, Bridgend, Caerphilly, Merthyr Tydfil, Neath Port Talbot, 
Rhondda Cynon Taf and Torfaen 
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Figure 1.1: Location of the South Wales Valleys region within Wales 
 
National Assembly for Wales Research Service (2016) 
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Both regions share certain fundamental commonalities, although are distinguished 
by key differences in both their historical trajectories and their contemporary 
difficulties. Central to the development of both was a reliance on a hegemonic 
industry: the automotive and allied industries in Detroit and extractive processes in 
the Valleys. Both regions experienced the same pattern of initial exponential growth 
that this brought, riding them through cyclical fluctuations and ultimately to a near-
catastrophic decline. Both industries were vulnerable to forces beyond their control 
and were ultimately convulsed by developments they exerted increasingly little 
influence over. Decline was punctuated by reprieves, interventions and stays of 
industrial execution, but the downward trajectory of employment and investment in 
both industry groups in both areas became progressively undeniable and 
irrevocable.  Realisations of the extent of these economic difficulties came earlier in 
Wales than in Detroit, and the roots of its decline extend further back. The economic 
deterioration of both areas has, similarly, been most pronounced over the last 40 
years: culminating in the largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history in the case of 
Detroit and the withdrawal of nearly all remaining industry from the Valleys.  
 
Figure 1.2: Map of the city of Detroit 
 
Google Maps (2016) 
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Responses to economic decline in South Wales as well as Detroit eventuated into a 
drive for greater regional control, especially over incentives and powers intended to 
reverse it. The capacity which devolved governance was seen to hold for the 
economic development of Wales and of its struggling regions in particular was a 
frequent justification for Welsh devolution (Goodwin et al, 2003:5) (Danson et al, 
2012:1). The drive for more localised control over powers to bolster its ailing 
economy was equally pertinent in Detroit: becoming one of the first Michigan cities 
to be granted income tax powers (Skidmore and Scorsone, 2015:22), and 
successive city leaders sought, received and wielded powers to abate or offset 
taxes to provide the city with as much of a comparative advantage as possible in the 
face of economic dislocation and municipal crisis (Hill, 1986:110) (Skidmore & 
Scorsone, 2015:21;23). The variety of economic incentives employed within the 
Detroit area over the last three decades has generated a “rich laboratory” (Anderson 
and Wassmer, 2000:3) for a real world experiment into their effectiveness: a 
question for which, at least until the last two decades, the “jury [was] still out” 
(McGuire, 1992:457) on. 
 
Most recently, the 2015-16 crisis in the remainder of the Welsh steel industry has 
prompted comparisons between the policy responses of the Federal Government to 
earlier crises in Detroit’s automotive industry and those of UK and Welsh 
Governments to the ongoing turbulence in Welsh steel production (Sandbu, 2016). 
There are distinctions of resources, inclination, history and geography between 
Detroit and the Valleys. However, the ways through which policymakers in both 
regions have responded to and aimed to address industrial decline and its 
accompanying pathologies may be of continuing, and increasing, relevance for 
future restorative efforts in both areas and beyond.  
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1.2: South Wales and Detroit: Similar roads, different destinations 
 
The Valleys, as with Wales in general, were industrialised “comparatively late” 
(Williams, 1995:1) relative to the remainder of the UK (Hunt, 2011:5). Following 
centuries of agricultural dominance, the arrival of heavy industry ensured that the 
industrial revolution arrived later, yet proceeded at a near breakneck pace once it 
did (Williams. 1995:14). The coal industry saw exponential growth within the final 
decades of the nineteenth century, with record increases in both employment and 
output by the outbreak of the First World War (Williams, 1995:20;40). 
 
Despite this record growth, the seeds of the coal industry’s and, with it, the area's 
decline were soon evident by the commencement of hostilities (Williams, 1995:40). 
Driven by changing export and consumption trends, the demand for Welsh coal 
declined precipitously during the post-war years, with Welsh coal exports registering 
year-on-year declines by the mid-1920s (Lawrence, 2005:12). With its primary 
industry facing an unprecedented drop in its market share, unemployment in the 
coalfields rocketed to 36% in 1931, before surging to 47% the following year 
(Lawrence, 2005:13) and establishing an explicit impetus for government action.  
 
Despite its national, if not global origins, the Depression hit the Valleys particularly 
forcefully (Wanhill, 1980:4). The extremity of the situation in the Valleys heightened 
calls for intervention, including the now famous utterance that “something must be 
done” (Davies, 2007:585) by then King Edward VIII during a visit to one of the 
hardest hit towns. Government intervention arrived in the form of two Acts of 
Parliament in 1934 and 1937. Both of these promoted factory construction and 
incentivised firms to locate, employ and invest in South Wales. Interrupted by the 
Second World War, their broad provisions persisted, with some variations in 
individual incentives for decades, as political control underwent a process of gradual 
devolution (Morgan, 1981:225) (Rowlands, 1972:334) (Hunt, 2011:6).   
 
As with the industrial decline of the Valleys, Detroit’s downward spiral has emerged 
as a longstanding metaphor for the “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 2010:73) of 
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economic transitions (Hill, 1986:80). While traditionally a “poster child for 
deindustrialisation” (Reese & Sands, 2013:1), it has more recently devolved into an 
illustration of “paranoid dystopian fears” (Borden, 2013:135). The principal drivers of 
the city’s decline have been the deindustrialisation of its signature automotive 
industry and its consequent depopulation. The city lost 60% of its population 
between 1950 and 2010, as the size of its manufacturing workforce decreased by 
more than 90% (Neill, 2015:1) (Green & Clothier, 2013). Both processes became 
increasingly marked from the late 1960s onwards although, as with the industrial 
vulnerabilities of the Valleys, their acute presentation belied chronic issues which 
had been germinating for decades. 
 
Whereas the Welsh Valleys evolved into the preeminent industrial area of Wales 
due to the abundance of “king coal” (Jenkins, 2007:177) beneath them, Detroit's 
development from a mid-sized city on the Canadian border to a major industrial 
metropolis owed as much to the car industry and its ebbs and flows. Detroit had 
seen the similarly rapid expansion of industrial South Wales; beginning with a 
burgeoning steel industry during the 1840s and soon establishing itself as a 
production hub for carriages, ships and other forms of transportation by the late 
nineteenth century (Hill, 1986:83). Within 50 years, it channelled this cluster into a 
global hub of automotive manufacturing. The gravitational pull of its exponential 
growth would draw hundreds of thousands to the city’s workplaces and 
neighbourhoods during the early decades of the 20th century (Martelle, 2014:71) 
(Nye, 2013:2;20). This decisive comparative advantage then began to erode over 
time, as U.S. automakers began to economise and relocate in the face of sustained 
competition from competitively priced German and then Japanese imports from the 
late 1950s onwards; with the market share of foreign car manufacturers nearly 
doubling between 1962 and 1970 (Klier, 2009:5). A confluence of escalating racial 
tensions between residents and African American newcomers, and the growing 
difficulties faced by the city’s manufacturing base formed a near “perfect storm” 
(Vicino, 2013) of depopulation and industrial retrenchment. The outbreak of a 
widespread riot in July 1967 crystallised the scale of the Motor City’s troubles, and 
is often, though disputably, viewed as the inception of its descent and, more 
categorically, as the spark which galvanised a handful of municipal and corporate 
leaders into “doing something” (Hill, 1986:96) (Maraniss, 2015:91) to revitalise it.  
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Reflecting the more extended nature of its industrial difficulties, the recognition that 
“something must be done” (Morgan, 1981:230) (Rowlands, 2000:83) had come 
earlier in Wales: becoming “one of the first [UK] areas” (Pickernell, 2011:3) to 
benefit from regional development policies. Given the centrality of the Valleys to 
Welsh industry, policies to boost the Welsh economy in subsequent decades 
remained “largely bound up with” (Wanhill, 1980:17), if not inseparable, from 
reviving the economic fortunes of the Valleys. Redevelopment efforts for Detroit 
would begin in earnest only following the 1967 riot, and appearing to escalate 
commensurate with the growing difficulties of the city and its home state. 
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1.3: Regional development: from theory to practice 
 
Initiatives to spur the development of underperforming, below-average or 
economically distressed regions and cities encompass a range of distinct, yet 
overlapping approaches, theories and disciplines. Detroit’s decline, and the 
programmes pursued to counteract it, span the fields of urban studies and, 
somewhat more contentiously, theories regarding the influence of political regimes 
in determining urban policy (Reese & Sands, 2013:17) (Orr & Stoker, 1994:48) (Di 
Gaetano & Klemanski, 1993:367;382) Davies, 2002:1). The Valleys, the transition 
from centralised to devolved government within the UK and the simultaneous rise in 
funding from supranational bodies situates its economic development efforts 
squarely in the intersection between competing institutional approaches towards the 
study of policymaking and questions of governance (Asare-Donkoh, 2010:12) 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2001:85) (Bristow & Blewitt, 2001:1083) (Cole & Stafford, 
2015:85). Overarching these fields is the theoretical and empirical body of work 
pertaining to economic growth, its determinants and hindrances. The objective of 
this section is not an extensive summary of the literature in each of these corollary 
fields, but rather to outline the central tenets of the most applicable approaches as 
they relate to the regions under consideration; with a specific emphasis on the latter. 
 
A contested term within the context of public policy, and one which can cover 
“virtually everything” (Porter, 1997:33), definitions of economic development range 
from broader wealth-creation efforts (AEDC, 1984:18) to a more restrictive measure 
relating to the creation of employment and business activity (Porter, 1997:33). As a 
matter of academic inquiry, the extent to which the field of economic development 
itself contains a cohesive, dedicated theoretical component is contested (Rowe, 
2009:3;4), while the study of economic development is conventionally recognised as 
a highly multidisciplinary one (Shaffer et al, 2006:59;72). The literature relating to 
the process of development itself, however, emerges in considerable part from 
theories regarding  international and inter-regional differences in rates of economic 
growth (Jones, 2015:6) (Thissen et al, 2013:34). The relevant literature has 
therefore traditionally centred on national economies in works such as Solow 
(1956), Koopmans (1963) and, at a more preliminary level, Ricardo (1817) (Barro, 
1991:407).  
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Identifying the underlying causes of why certain regions yield sustained growth rates 
while others enter into or persist in states of stagnation and decline remains a focus 
both of economic theory and applied policymaking. The juncture of globalisation and 
a “global devolutionary trend” (Rodriguez-Pose & Gill, 2003:10) (Pike et al, 2006:3) 
has, paradoxically, heightened awareness of disparities between different regions 
(Rodriguez-Pose & Gill, 2003:3). This has, in conjunction with recent cyclical and 
systemic shocks, placed an additional focus on the diversity of economic conditions 
found within a nation’s borders (Sensier et al, 2016:129).  
 
 
The specific mechanisms of regional development, and its reversal, are explicated 
by Myrdal (1957). These place a particular emphasis upon the role of spatial 
interdependence, and the “vicious circle” (Myrdal, 1957:23) and downward multiplier 
effects which can be induced by adverse shifts in other, often nearby, regions. 
Cyclical expansions in the traditional business cycle will see their “most powerful 
effects” (Myrdal, 1957:37) concentrated in economically advanced regions and, 
while more peripheral regions may yield returns from the “spread effects” (Myrdal, 
1957:31) emanating from a thriving core, these are prone to rapid erosion. The latter 
regions are therefore likely to be the most vulnerable to inevitable downturns 
(Myrdal, 1957:37). It is this concentration of activity within the core regions of a 
nation which untrammelled “market forces” (Myrdal, 1957:26) can be perceived as 
exacerbating which appears to have informed regional development efforts targeted 
at distressed regions, and their increasingly widespread adoption following the 
Second World War (Pike et al, 2006:123).  
 
 
As the “nucleus of an atom” (Lucas, 2002:59), cities are distinguished from regions 
not simply by their size, but also in the spatially condensed economic activity which 
occurs within them and the conventional advantages that this has been seen to 
confer on them over more geographically sprawling alternatives (Glaeser, 2000:83). 
Their compact scale traditionally made them more conducive to a “pooling” 
(Glaeser, 2000:84) of specialist workers and knowledge; a process which was 
historically expedited by reduced transport costs, although the advent of mass 
transportation networks is considered to have lessened this particular advantage 
(Glaeser, 2008:34;156). The primary drivers of differential growth between cities are 
traditionally comprised of the “predetermined attributes” (Kodrzycki & Munoz, 
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2013:8) of their geographic location, economic and industrial history and climatic 
features. The causes of urban decline in particular are generally wide-ranging, 
though often include the decline of its traditional industry; particularly in cities whose 
growth was dependent upon a hegemonic sector - and the often ensuing 
decentralisation of employment to outlying areas and depopulation (Beauregard, 
2003:87) (Cunningham-Sabot, 2014:15). These can then be compounded by often 
accompanying pathologies such as rates of property and violent crime, and further 
aggravated  by misjudged redevelopment efforts and by lower initial levels of skills 
and education (Kodrzycki & Munoz, 2013:7) (Glaeser, 2011:42) (Glaeser, 
2008:40;186;195). These city-specific properties have been seen to shape not only 
the economic progress of urban areas, but also the more tailored approaches to 
redevelop those cities which, like Detroit, have seen their progress stall or head into 
reverse (McCann, 2001:244). 
 
 
Theories of economic development have expanded, though in a far from linear 
manner, from Keynesian approaches; which generally include a greater role for 
public bodies in stimulating demand for a region’s goods and services, and 
neoclassical approaches; which emphasise the contribution of increases in inputs 
such as a region’s stock of capital, its labour force and levels of technology (Pike et 
al, 2006:70:76) (Armstrong & Taylor, 2000:72) to growth trajectories, and which are 
traditionally consistent with a more discriminating role for public regional 
development efforts (Pike et al, 2006:68) (Nafziger, 2006:149). Subsequent 
theoretical developments include the rise of endogenous growth approaches such 
as those outlined by Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986). These highlight the 
importance of resources which they defined as endogenous to the economies of the 
relevant unit and, particularly, its reserves of human capital; often operationalised, 
though not exclusively, as its “general skill level” (Lucas, 1988:17) in influencing 
growth rates (Stimson & Stough, 2011:113) (Huggins et al, 2014:13). Out of 
endogenous growth theories and additional research regarding the linkages 
between human capital levels and economic growth such as Glaeser (1994), has 
emerged a greater engagement with the concept of economic competitiveness; with 
a number of more applied theories stemming from this engagement (Huggins et al, 
2014:2). 
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As a close corollary of development, the notion of regional competitiveness has 
undergone significant research and refinement from the 1980s onwards (Huggins et 
al, 2014:1). Despite representing a longstanding “preoccupation” (Porter, 1998:1) of 
national governments, there was, until the final decade of the 20th century, close to 
“no accepted definition” (Porter, 1998:xii) of a nation’s and, therefore, a region’s 
competitiveness. To date, regional competiveness remains a disputed concept 
(Huggins et al, 2014:1;10) (Kitson et al, 2004:992) which is difficult to define 
operationally and to measure empirically (Huggins, 2014:1). “The capability of a 
particular region to attract and maintain firms with stable or rising market shares” 
(Huggins et al, 2014:10) represents one of the most recent attempts at its 
categorisation, however earlier disputes regarding the viability of its measures and 
its conceptual ambiguity are unlikely to be conclusively resolved (Bristow, 
2005:285;294;300). In spite of a degree of conceptual and empirical ambiguity, a 
series of proposed causal processes behind the competitiveness and, given its 
linkages, the development of regions have been introduced.  
 
 
The competitiveness of a given region is said to stem from both its “traditional 
factors of production, infrastructure and location [and] economic structure” (Malecki, 
2004:1108) and the more “ethereal” (Malecki, 2004:1108), less tangible and less 
quantifiable conditions relating to its social and physical environment.  
Concentrating upon the former to a greater extent, Porter (1998) identified the four 
conditions seen to be most determinative of competiveness. These included its 
stock of skillsets, human capital, labour and hard infrastructure or “factor conditions” 
(Porter, 1998:71); the level of demand for its primary goods and services or 
“demand conditions” (Porter, 1998:71); the presence of competitive, subsidiary 
industries to its primary industrial units and the normative framework which 
effectively governs the “strategy, structure and rivalry” (Porter, 1998:71) of resident 
firms. Regions which perform strongly across all four prerequisites were conducive 
to the formation of industrial “clusters”: “groups of interconnected firms, suppliers, 
related industries” (Porter, 1998:xxii) concentrated within a specific area and closely 
linked to the more formal notion of agglomeration economies explored initially by 
Marshall (1920) (McDonald &McMillen, 2011:46) (McCann, 2001:55). 
Agglomeration emphasises the advantages to firms of residence in a proximate and 
“constant market” (Marshall, 1920:225) of workers and resources and remains “the 
catchall explanation” (Glaeser, 2008:5) for urban success in particular.  
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Given the theoretical overlap, cluster-based theories of growth became increasingly 
identified with more endogenous assumptions regarding human capital and 
innovation levels with the advance of the 1990s “knowledge economy” (Martin & 
Sunley, 2001:4-5) (Goldstein, 2009:242) (Amin, 1999:368). The “creative class” 
theory formulated by Florida (2005) (2012) drew upon elements of endogenous 
theory, although it stressed the significance of the more “intangible” (Malecki, 
2004:1109) social and environmental conditions to a greater extent (Pratt & Jeffcutt, 
2009:10). This posits that it is the attraction and retention of human capital and, 
specifically, a subsection of skilled workers engaged in “creative” industries; defined 
as those which generate new output (Florida, 2005:34), “that creates regional 
advantage” (Florida, 2005:50). The key to the attraction of this class to a given 
region lies partly in its level of amenities and facilities, but more so on less tangible 
attributes such as its level of social diversity and “tolerance” (Florida, 2005:3;88); 
emphases which, despite its endogenous lineage, render it operationally closer to 
“an exogenous [theory]” (Pratt & Jeffcutt, 2009:10). It has been similarly challenged 
for its overly expansive definition of “creative” activity and for overstating the causal 
influence of attractive amenities, diversity and other factors it proposes as the 
primary draws for this class (Markusen, 2006:1921;1924;1938). These 
methodological critiques have not, however, impeded the adoption of its 
assumptions by urban policymakers from the U.S. and Europe to Australasia 
(Stolarick,2014:243) (Marlet & Van Woerkens, 2014:138) 
 
 
While regions’ and cities’ competitiveness relative to others correlates considerably 
with their economic development, they are distinct concepts (Huggins et al, 
2014:67; 68). Regional competiveness, to the extent it can be operationalised, may 
represent a necessary condition and an intermediary means to an end for its 
sustained, long-term prosperity, however regional and urban policymakers have, at 
least traditionally, viewed economic development policy as holding specific and 
more immediate goals such as improving its labour market indicators and 
influencing the movement of industry and employment to it (Armstrong & Taylor, 
2000:232).  
 
 
There are, additionally, a number of distinctions between economic development 
policies pursued for regions and those pursued for cities (Table 1.1). Regional and 
- 15 - 
 
urban development policies are distinguished most explicitly by the level at which 
they are directed; with the former distributed “over a much greater” (McCann, 
2001:243-244) area than the latter, but also by the goals and formats of the 
programmes employed. Urban initiatives conventionally focus upon making 
urbanised areas more receptive to investment  (McCann, 2001:245), whereas 
regional efforts hold the geographically more extensive goal of accomplishing this 
for regions, often economically distressed ones, as well as for reducing inter-
regional economic disparities (Armstrong & Taylor, 2000:166)(McCann, 2001:257). 
Targeted incentives to induce migration to specific downtown areas or gentrification 
will, if successful, realise impacts too “localised” (McCann, 2001:244) to be practical 
over a wider region such as the Valleys (McCann, 2001:244). Major incentives to 
attract firms to a region, similarly, may not be as effectively deployed within a 
narrowly delimited space such as the city of Detroit: as their impact would likely 
extend significantly beyond the city limits (McCann, 2001:244). A further implication 
of this seemingly granular, though functionally significant, distinction is therefore an 
institutional one. Regional efforts are likely to span multiple administrative units, 
whereas urban equivalents would, conventionally, be the preserve “of a single urban 
municipal” (McCann, 2001:244) government.  
 
Table 1.1: Urban and regional development policy 
Regional Urban 
Scale: wider geographic regions. 
Potentially encompassing multiple sub-
regional units.  
Scale: cities or surrounding suburbs.  
Objectives:  increasing the incentives 
for investment and employment across 
specific regions.  
Objectives: attraction of investment and 
employment to urban areas.  
Sectors: manufacturing Sectors: real-estate and other property 
related industries. The service sector 
and those most responsive to locality-
specific costs and tax rates.  
Programmes: grants for capital 
expenditure. Subsidies. Incentives to 
offset national tax rates.   
Programmes: physical regeneration of 
downtown areas. Targeted incentives 
to offset local tax rates. 
 
(McCann, 2001:243-5;250;257;258) 
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Attempts to categorise disparate economic development initiatives into a 
programmatic typology include Eisinger (1988), who distinguished “supply side” 
(1988:10) incentives which aim to attract and incentivise business location, from 
“demand” ones which try to proactively shape and facilitate the emergence of new 
markets, residents, businesses and employers (Eisinger, 1988:10). Demand-side 
policies involve “discover[ing] or point[ing] out” (Eisinger, 1988:299) the advantages 
of a region for investors, whereas supply-side efforts aim to directly “establish a 
comparative cost advantage” (Eisinger, 1988:201) for prospective employers and 
investors over other regions. At a more fundamental level, supply-side efforts seek 
to attract exogenous activity, while demand-side initiatives explore bolstering 
endogenous factors (Huggins et al, 2014:13). The tenability of this binary distinction 
has been scrutinised; particularly regarding the crossover between initiatives such 
as publicly-funded training schemes, and the boundary between promoting business 
creation on the demand-side and incentivising its location on the supply-side 
(Wolman & Spitzley, 1996:122). It, however, remains a parsimonious and frequently 
employed binary distinction for categorising development policies according to their 
underlying assumptions and modes of operation (Reese, 1997:28). A more general 
segmentation can similarly be extracted from Malecki’s (2004) distinction of “low 
road” (2004:1104) approaches; wherein a region’s attractiveness depends on its 
lower labour costs, from the more operationally challenging “high road” (Malecki, 
2004:1108) policies of promoting entrepreneurship, upskilling and technological 
progress. Regional development efforts are conventionally drawn from the supply-
side of the equation (McCann, 2001:258) and, while efforts in both Detroit and 
South Wales have either attempted, or sought to attempt initiatives drawn from both 
sides, it is these approaches have tended to represent the most frequently 
employed in both regions.  
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Table 1.2: Eisinger’s typology of development policies  
 
Supply-side Demand-side 
Assumptions  
Regions compete for investment and 
location decisions 
Assumptions 
Regional development stems from 
harnessing and capitalising upon 
existing advantages and resources 
Strategy 
Reduce business costs through 
financial inducements and lower tax 
rates 
Strategy  
Spur the creation and development of 
new and expanding markets for 
regional products 
Financial assistance 
Expansive eligibility. No sectoral 
discrimination.   
Financial assistance 
Restricted by predetermined conditions. 
Role of government 
Reactive: respond to and support the 
activities and preferences of existing 
firms 
Role of government 
Proactive: pursue and expand markets, 
product lines and sectors. 
 
(Eisinger, 1988:12) 
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Table 1.3: Principal theories of economic growth relative to primary policy 
instruments 
Keynesian Neoclassical Endogenous  
 “Automatic” 
regionally-
based 
subsidies.  
 Discretionary 
business 
support 
grants. 
 Targeted 
financial 
support for 
businesses 
and 
funding for 
innovation. 
 Restrictions 
on 
developments 
outside of 
distressed 
regions. 
 Selected 
local and 
regional tax 
incentives.  
 Investment 
in skills 
and 
education 
 Major public 
works or 
infrastructure 
projects. 
  Initiatives 
to attract 
and retain 
skilled 
workers.  
 
Pike & Tomaney (2010:98) 
 
The impact of economic theory upon economic development policy is, absent 
explicit tie-ins, harder to ascertain. This is partly due to a general 
compartmentalisation between the, by definition, academic pursuit of theory to unify 
and elucidate real-world phenomena and the resolutely applied pursuit of 
development initiatives by policymakers (Rowe, 2009:3) (Pike et al, 2006:61). The 
latter are, by contrast, more often informed by experiential considerations or 
“fashionable ideas or recent successes” (Koo, 2005:100) (Pike et al, 2006:61) 
(Rowe, 2009:3). Regional and urban development initiatives in the U.S. and Wales 
have, however, been consistent with, if not always been intentionally instructed by, 
multiple theories of economic development. Initial efforts within the UK coincided 
with the rise of Keynesian theory, and the parameters of UK regional efforts for 
decades reflected, with certain revisions, the basic interventionist precepts of the 
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post-war consensus (Amin, 1999:365). Subsequent regional aid efforts, with certain 
specific exceptions, have not featured linkages to economic theory which are this 
explicit, although the rise of discretionary tax incentives across the U.S., and of 
selective grant assistance to businesses in the UK would be consistent with 
neoclassical assumptions (Pike et al, 2010:5) (Table 1.3). Later urban regeneration 
schemes would bear varying genealogical connections to endogenous growth and 
its applied variants; with the strength of this tie-in depending on their emphasis on 
local skillsets and human capital, as well as the specific policy instruments used to 
pursue their objectives.   
 
 
In addition to the geographic level at which they are directed, the basic structure of 
their operations and the underlying theory behind them, the final variable likely to 
appreciably influence the impact  of development programmes relates to institutional 
factors. The composite effects of devolution and governance arrangements, as well 
as the level of resources available to the relevant regional or local units and the 
specific attributes and industrial history of the region involved are therefore all likely 
to affect programme effectiveness (Ascani et al, 2012:18). The capacity of sub-
national governments across specific levers of public policy within historically unified 
and centralised nation-states will be more constrained, while lower government 
units in states with a historical degree of decentralisation will be greater. The 
centralised nature of UK regional financing, with funds to the constituent nations still 
largely distributed by means of formula-based grant allocations rather than through 
the exercise of their own revenue-raising powers, militates against the exposure of 
less prosperous regions to the depletion of revenues, though it simultaneously 
raises its own issues of distributional equity (Rawlings, 2003:74; 78) (Rodriguez-
Pose & Gill, 2003:31) (Independent Commission on Funding & Finance for Wales, 
2009:15) (Cole & Stafford, 2015:62).  
 
 
Effective sub-national institutions are, irrespective of the design of individual 
programmes, seen to be something of a prerequisite for effective economic 
development policies (Rodriguez-Pose, 2010:9) (Woolcock, 1998:153). In their 
absence, any successes are likely to hinge significantly upon the deployment of 
economic incentives (Rodriguez-Pose, 2010:13): an approach which can, when 
pursued without adequate constraints, lead to an endemic deficiency of trust and 
legitimacy in political institutions, “high transaction costs [and] widespread rent-
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seeking” (Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2006:14) (Rodriguez-Pose, 2010: 13; 14).  
One of the primary theoretical outlines of the advantages of decentralised over 
centralised policymaking is represented by Oates’ “decentralisation theorem” 
(2006:3). This proposed that the optimal provision of public goods is delivered as, or 
more efficiently by sub-national governments for their populations than by a central 
government across the nation as a whole (Oates, 1972:35). Notably, however, this 
theorem related explicitly to the devolution of fiscal, rather than simply political 
powers, and its more sweeping conclusions have since been qualified by the author 
(Oates, 2006:2).  
 
 
The hypothetical benefits which sub-national control are said to hold for economic 
development specifically are the proximity of legislators to taxpayers, exclusivity of 
focus and the capacity for specialisation due to the localised knowledge  of 
policymakers (Rodriguez-Pose & Gill, 2003:25). These are, however, by necessity, 
informed and endogenously shaped by the region’s overall level of economic 
development, the extent of sub-national powers and the level of resources 
committed to sub-national authorities (Rodrik, 2004:2) (Rodriguez-Pose & Gill, 
2003:7;8). In the most problematic instances, regional and local governments are 
provided with “increasing expenditure responsibilities on a static and often 
narrowing financial base” (Bennett, 1997:330) and with inadequate resources 
relative to their responsibilities (Ascani et al, 2012:15) (Rodriguez-Pose & Gill, 
2003:26). As the benefits of devolved control are considered to be more widely 
understood than its costs and limitations (Rodriguez-Pose & Gill, 2003:24), these 
circumstances can create a tendency towards reduced transparency and repetitive, 
costly “zero-sum” (Malecki, 2004:1112) and low-road “territorial competition” 
(Rodriguez-Pose & Gill, 2003:28;34) against other regions: trends which can be 
intensified by the usage of financial incentives (Rodriguez-Pose & Gill, 2003:28). 
 
 
Wales and the U.S. differ considerably in the configuration of these arrangements. 
The former is a constituent nation of a historically highly centralised, unified and 
politically and legally assimilated state (Bradbury & Le Gales, 2007:203) (Armstrong 
& Taylor, 2000:336) (Mitchell, 2009:8). Since the move towards devolution in all 
devolved nations during the late-1990s, the structure of British public administration 
has been “fundamentally recast” (Cole & Stafford, 2015:2). Despite this, the 
clarification of Wales’ devolved institutions and the gradual accretion of greater 
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powers to them, Welsh devolution remains “relatively weak” (Cole & Stafford, 
2015:10), particularly relative to its Scottish counterpart (Cole & Stafford, 2015:6). 
The U.S. is, by contrast, a historically highly decentralised system (Armstrong & 
Taylor, 2000:336) which has experienced a renewed drive towards state-level policy 
experimentation since the 1970s (Rodriguez-Pose & Gill, 2003:12). These have 
influenced the progression of economic development programmes for both regions 
accordingly: making them insightful counterpoints from an institutional perspective, 
as well as from one of industrial and economic history.  
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1.4 The state of sub-state level economic development  
 
Whereas the Valleys experienced a period of protracted deindustrialisation, with 
roots as early as the 1920s, Detroit saw a restructuring and retrenchment of its 
primary industry occur later but with a greater rapidity, as it struggled to sustain a 
competitive footing in an increasingly competitive market. Demographic and 
socioeconomic challenges which had been simmering for several decades exploded 
virtually simultaneously, added greater strain to the city’s ailing public finances by 
leaving a depopulated city and a depleted tax base. Correspondingly, these 
somewhat divergent trajectories of socio-economic decline have manifested 
themselves in modestly differing approaches to economic development in South 
Wales and Detroit. 
 
Reflecting the “first wave” (Table 1.4) generally recognisable in U.S. economic 
development policy, efforts in Detroit progressed from limited tax incentives to 
encourage redevelopment, to a series of costly public investments in the 1970s and 
1980s and a number of expanded tax incentives in the mid-1990s, before heading 
to a more targeted range of incentives within recent years. While varying somewhat 
over the previous two decades, Detroit’s redevelopment efforts have tilted towards 
the supply-side in programmatic terms, and neoclassical theory in theoretical ones. 
Redevelopment initiatives in the Valleys commenced earlier and largely paralleled 
the rise of theoretically Keynesian and programmatically supply-side approaches, 
experimenting with grants and other incentives to encourage investment and job 
creation within demarcated areas since the 1930s. These saw reforms in the 1970s, 
retrenchment during the 1980s and the devolution of many of the remaining 
programmes to the National Assembly for Wales with its creation in 1999 (Godfrey, 
2012:156;158). The administratively “hierarchical”(Rawlings, 2003:361) approach to 
regional development prior to devolution and the traditional “grants culture” (BBC 
Wales, 2010) of the assistance itself have since been modified by successive 
Governments, as they progressively sought to craft an indigenous, Welsh approach 
to economic development: transitioning towards repayable loans and regionally-
targeted tax incentives and integrating their administration into the apparatus of 
devolved government (Rawlings, 2003:361) (BBC Wales, 2010) (Goodwin et al, 
- 23 - 
 
2003:5-6). Given that the latter initiatives in particular structurally resemble those 
attempted in Detroit for two decades, the proposal for the devolution of further tax 
powers and the ability to exercise them for development purposes (Cole & Stafford, 
2015:8), a comparative overview of redevelopment approaches across both regions 
will likely be of increasing relevance during the coming years and ongoing debates. 
 
Table 1.4: Trends in U.S. economic development policy 
 First Wave Second Wave Third Wave 
Period 1930s-
1980s
  
1980s-1990s  1990s - 
Theory Neoclassical Endogenous Endogenous and 
applied variants 
Supply/demand-
side 
Supply Demand Demand 
Policies  Tax 
incentives  
 Loans 
 Job training 
 Subsidised 
sites and 
facilities 
 
 Specialised 
investment 
for existing 
businesses 
 Business 
incubators 
 Increased 
venture 
capital funds 
 Investments 
in education 
 More of a 
broad “policy 
direction” 
(Bradshaw & 
Blakely, 
1999:243) 
than a 
collection of 
specific 
instruments 
 
Objectives  Attract firms, 
investment 
and 
employment 
 Construction 
of major 
facilities 
 
 Increasing 
indigenous 
economic 
activity and 
strengthening 
existing firms 
and sectors 
 Facilitate the 
development 
of industrial 
clusters.  
 Promote 
sectors with 
significant 
growth 
potential  
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Shaffer et al (2006:61); Shuttleworth (1993:91); Bradshaw & Blakely, 
(1999:236;241). 
 
The task of actually evaluating the impact of development initiatives such as these 
is, however, a complex one. While multiple means of assessing a programme’s 
impact exist, they vary widely in their scale, sophistication and reliability. The 
primary approaches, as outlined by Bartik & Bingham (1995:1), consist of “process” 
oriented evaluations and “impact” evaluations. The former focus on the manner of a 
programme’s delivery and enumerate outcomes, while the latter seek to ascertain 
the programme’s impact on the public policy challenge at hand (Bartik & Bingham, 
1995:2). Process evaluations are logistically tractable, yet their analytical advantage 
is more restrictive. Their effectiveness lies in determining strengths or weaknesses 
within programme administration or delivery rather than in evaluating the causal 
relationship between initiatives and changes in economic outcomes or concluding 
whether such interventions were cost-effective (Bartik & Bingham, 1995:2;3). The 
most detailed investigations, capable of addressing causality and gauging cost-
effectiveness, are often costly to undertake and time-consuming to pursue; 
generally resulting in lower levels of usage (Bartik & Bingham, 1995:3).  
 
The results, particularly in the U.S., are conclusions such as “in spite of billions 
spent annually, states prefer not to evaluate tax incentive program[me]s in any way” 
(Buss, 2001:93). There are, however, a multitude of practical as well as political 
factors which explain this disinclination (Imbroscio, 2004:77). Such evaluations 
require a level of data which is often simply unavailable. A suitable indicator or 
proxy must first be identified for assessing the programme’s impact. This represents 
a “difficult art” (Bartik & Bingham, 1995:7) in most circumstances, yet one which is 
notably harder when the intervention itself is relatively limited and the outcome it 
aims to remedy is measured at a wider geographic level (Mossberger, 2000:380) 
(Bartik & Bingham, 1995:7). Indeed, there is little consensus academically or 
politically “on the appropriate definition of success for economic development 
policies” (Reese, 2014:628) and a multiplicity of data constraints when one is 
identified.  
 
- 25 - 
 
To a significant extent, robust evaluations are simply “not possible” (Bartik & 
Bingham, 1995:16) for many initiatives given the disparity between expenditure 
relative to geographic scale (Bartik & Bingham, 1995:16). Nor are interventions in 
more demarcated regions such as individual cities immune from these and 
additional statistical impediments.  While an online database for Federal funds to all 
U.S. states is available for the years 2008 onwards, this is disaggregated by 
government agency or department, rather than by function, and while breakdowns 
by recipient are available, the database is less readily searchable by city 
(USASPending.Gov, 2016). Detroit’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports, 
published online from 2002 onwards, do provide figures for municipal expenditure 
economic development (Table 1.5), although it is less immediately apparent how 
this expenditure is classified, nor does it, apparently, include funding from state-
wide authorities (City of Detroit, 2015:12).  
 
State of Michigan budgets itemise expenditure for its economic development 
agencies, though these figures contain funds dedicated to functions other than 
development and do not identify allocations to individual municipalities (State of 
Michigan, 2015:B-57). Both the New York Times and the public interest group Good 
Jobs First have attempted to establish databases for state and local government 
economic development funding: reaching respective estimates of $6.65 billion state-
wide as of 2012 (New York Times, 2012) and $14.2 billion to date (Good Jobs First, 
2016). Details of the individual city to which specific awards were granted are also 
not listed regularly within the latter database until 2009, and only consistently after 
2012. While data on Federal expenditure to Michigan more generally, and state and 
local expenditure on economic incentives is therefore available, there remain 
notable gaps in both the extent and detail of this coverage: gaps which this project 
will aim to address.  
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Table 1.5: Expenditure on economic development functions by the City of Detroit, 
2002-2015 
Year Economic development expenditure ($) 
2002 82,327,000 
2003 102,939,000 
2004 102,680,000 
2005 114,865,000 
2006 95,462,000 
2007 93,706,000 
2008 87,717,000 
2009 73,307,000 
2010 61,907,000 
2011 87,938,000 
2012 73,600,000 
2013 81,455,000 
2014 59,702,000 
2015 70,890,000 
Total 1,188,495,000 
 
(City of Detroit Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports; various years) 
A combination of cost, time and data constraints may explain the relative absence of 
detailed studies for such initiatives in Wales, let alone the Valleys. This results in an 
evaluative footprint which is substantially lighter in Wales than in many U.S. states 
or even other devolved nations. The last exclusive, independent and econometric 
evaluation of a Welsh economic development initiative appears to have been 
completed in 2008 (Criscuolo & Martin, 2008b), while the most recent study of this 
kind within Scotland was published in 2013 (Bonner & Hart, 2013). Scotland’s 
primary development agency additionally runs a freely accessible website 
exclusively focused on evaluations of its initiatives (Scottish Enterprise, 2016b). 
Wales, at present, lacks a comparable website.  
 
Many studies of UK regional policy are aggregated up to the national level (Taylor, 
2002:177), however a number of Wales-specific studies have been conducted. 
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Assessments of initial UK regional policy across Wales have included Wanhill 
(1980), while the role of economic development expenditure with regard to Wales’ 
post-devolution economic performance is considered by Godfrey (2012) and an 
overview of development efforts within Wales since the 1930s is provided by 
Pickernell (2011). Analyses of Valleys specific programmes, as well as the impact of 
national development policies upon the area are largely drawn from academic 
dissertations (Owens, 2012) (Todd-Jones, 2010), with the notable exception of 
Victor Hausner & Associates (1993).  
 
Whereas studies of Michigan’s economic development initiatives have been more 
frequent, more sustained and rigorous evaluations focused on their strategic 
efficacy and cost effectiveness remain under-represented, especially with regard to 
city of Detroit itself. Despite their frequency relative to the number of pertinent 
studies for Wales, (Bartik & Erickcek (2010), LaFaive & Hicks (2005), LaFaive & 
Hohman (2009) Anderson et al (2010), only three detailed studies of Michigan’s 
initiatives appear to specifically address their effects upon the city of Detroit at 
length (Wassmer, 1992) (Clark, 2013) (Wolkoff, 1985), and only two of these involve 
an exclusive focus (Clark, 2013) (Wolkoff, 1985). Broader studies regarding 
economic development within the city have tended to be project-specific (Bachelor, 
1985), focused on one individual initiative (Schuring, 2006) (Dewar, 2003) or 
concentrated upon earlier decades (Hill, 1986) (Jones & Bachelor, 1993). The 
primary exceptions are represented by Thomas’ (2013) and Darden et al’s (1987) 
historical overviews of its redevelopment efforts.  
 
Annual expenditure on economic development by U.S. states and localities has 
been estimated between $40 and $80 billion. (Peters & Fisher, 2004:32) (New York 
Times, 2012), while the level of scrutiny, oversight and evaluation towards it might 
most accurately be considered variable (Buss, 2001:92-93). While the amount of 
expenditure itself, according to the available measures, is appreciably lower than 
this within Wales (Table 1.6), considerable limitations in the accessible data has 
resulted in what appears to be an even more variable volume of empirical scrutiny 
within the Principality. This is a more specific function of a far broader gap in Welsh 
public spending figures; namely, the “glaring absence of official government 
publications that quantify Welsh public expenditures and revenues” (Wales 
Governance Centre, 2016:7) since devolution. This, along with a broader lack of 
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“economic intelligence” (Crawley, 2015:3), makes Wales a clear outlier in terms of 
its compilation of economic and financial data: both nationally and internationally 
(Crawley, 2015:4).  
 
These omissions present an inevitable obstacle to further analysis of economic 
development initiatives and one which has been partially, though not entirely offset 
by more recent research.  An initiative by Cardiff University’s Wales Governance 
Centre which aimed to quantify levels of expenditure within Wales arrived at a figure 
of £534 million for economic development expenditure during the 2014-15 financial 
year (Table 1.6). This amounted to 1.4% of Wales’ total managed expenditure for 
that year and 2.3% of Welsh and local government expenditure (Wales Governance 
Centre, 2016:49). As a devolved field under the Government of Wales Act 2006 
(Assembly Research Service, 2008:1), the Welsh Government and Welsh local 
authorities have accounted for the vast majority of this expenditure. The proportion 
met by UK Government sources has however increased in recent years, from 10% 
in 2011/12 to 21% in 2014/15 (Wales Governance Centre, 2016:60).  
 
Table 1.6: Public expenditure on enterprise and economic development within 
Wales, 2010-2015 
Year 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 
Total (£ 
millions) 
703 431 455 552 534 
 
(Wales Governance Centre, 2016:49) 
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Table 1.7: Public expenditure on enterprise and economic development within 
Wales, 2010-2015, by institution. 
 
Year 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 
Welsh 
Government 
and Local 
Government 
712 386 329 411 420 
UK 
Government 
-9 45 125 141 114 
Total 703 431 455 552 534 
 
(Wales Governance Centre, 2016:60) 
 
The figures calculated and collated by Government Expenditure and Revenue 
Wales (GERW) provide a clear and rigorous overview of the amount of expenditure 
dedicated to the field of economic development within Wales, however a 
disaggregation of this spending at the level of individual regions or local authorities 
is unavailable. In the absence of a more detailed regional breakdown, the task of 
analysing efforts for the Valleys is rendered commensurately harder. It is attempting 
to close this deficit on expenditure-related data, in addition to scrutinising the 
programmes upon which it was spent, to which a considerable proportion of the 
Welsh component of this project will therefore be dedicated.  
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1.5: The rationale 
 
The responses of the relevant public actors in relation to the increasingly post-
industrial malaise of Detroit and South Wales merit consideration in greater depth 
on a number of different analytical fronts. Primarily, they permit us to analyse the 
role sub-national governments serve in setting and implementing economic 
development policies. With a sizeable degree of political and fiscal devolution the 
norm in the U.S., individual state and local governments have traditionally held 
greater latitude in the areas of fiscal policy, while political devolution of any decision-
making capacity to Wales itself did not occur until 1999. While the debate over 
further devolution of tax and other fiscal powers to Wales continues (HM 
Government, 2014:3), Detroit offers an instructive comparison for considering how 
effectively a greater degree of local and regional autonomy can address economic 
decline. The Welsh Government, whose most senior officials have identified 
economic development as its “most important task” (Goodwin et al, 2006:480) 
(Jones et al, 2016:2), is experimenting with differential tax rates in certain areas in 
order to stimulate investment and recent proposals for fiscal devolution explicitly 
identify the importance of incentives for economic growth (Silk Commission, 
2012:40) (Welsh Government, 2016).  
 
The extent to which the difficulties which continue to haunt both regions result from 
the magnitude of their economic decline or reflect more programmatic issues, 
wherein inadequate and misjudged responses compounded the already uphill 
struggle to redevelop them is, expectedly, a point of contention. Regarding Detroit, 
the dispute remains whether “the political response to the city’s decline only made 
things worse” (Glaeser, 2011:58) or whether its economic troubles were of an order 
which may not have been politically remediable. The analytical debate surrounding  
eight decades of assistance aimed at remedying the maladies of the Valleys has 
been marked by more understated assessments; with the responsibility for sluggish 
economic progress often attributed to their dependence on now obsolete industries, 
their geographic isolation and a shortage of viable transport links (Fothergill, 
2008:4).While this project will not purport to resolve these debates with any degree 
of finality, it does aim to inform them, and to consider in greater and appropriate 
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detail the role policymakers have played in counteracting, or attempting to 
counteract their further economic decline. 
 
Whereas development initiatives targeted towards the Valleys have been longer in 
duration, Detroit and its home state offer an apposite case study regarding how a 
sub-national government should, or should not pursue the business of redeveloping 
its distressed areas. Detroit and the Valleys, in addition to their similar trajectories 
and increasingly convergent approaches to economic development, offer further 
insights into economic development policies at the sub-national level. Efforts in 
Wales had to emanate from central government, whereas the Federal Government 
was one of several actions among Detroit’s redevelopment efforts. Detroit also 
benefited from significant tax devolution and control over policy levers which Wales’ 
devolved authorities did not (Pickernell, 2011:14) (Scorse & Skidmore, 2015:21). 
The drawback of this was that Detroit’s local government would often be charged 
with overall responsibility for revitalising the city, although the level of resources 
provided to it for doing so may not always have been proportionate to the task. 
 
Exploring the background to these programmes, considering their basic structure 
relative to the aforementioned theoretical and structural classifications and 
estimating, to the extent which is practicable, the amounts dedicated to their primary 
redevelopment initiatives will constitute some of the central objectives of this 
research. Its primary aim is to contribute to the wider understanding of an “important 
but understudied” (Busso & Kline, 2007:1) area of public policy and of devolved 
governance. One with clear ramifications for public and fiscal accountability, while 
also providing more tentative conclusions regarding individual programme efficacy. 
Through this joint review of the academic literature on initiatives to revitalise both 
regions, consideration of the relevant political and policymaking context and the 
compilation and initial analysis of programme-level data, this dissertation seeks to 
augment an ongoing discussion regarding economic development, the role and 
responsibility of regional and local governments in addressing economic decline, 
and their powers and capacity to do so in one of the most longstanding Federal 
political unions in the world and one particularly evolving one. 
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1.6: The road map:  
 
The remainder of this project will combine a review of the literature for both regions 
supplemented and informed by academic writing within the field of economic 
development whenever necessary. The applicability of the aforementioned 
programmatic frameworks, and of selected economic theories to the initiatives 
undertaken in Detroit and South Wales will also be considered, as it will aim to 
broadly categorise the initiatives undertaken within both regions and identify general 
trends in regional and urban development policy. It will incorporate programme-level 
data gained through individual inquiry, Freedom of Information (FOI) requests to 
relevant public bodies or synthesised from existing research and then scrutinise it 
light of the conclusions of its review of the literature.  As with the city of Detroit, the 
project will aim to ascertain, identify and itemise the amount of spending within the 
Valleys area whenever practicable. Its objective will be to have collected a sufficient 
body of data for individual programmes from which certain conclusions can be 
rendered regarding their design, funding, distribution and implementation. More 
definitive judgements regarding their overall effectiveness will, however, lie beyond 
the parameters of its research.  
 
Chapter 2 will briefly outline the progress of the South Wales Valleys, from 
representing the industrial epicentre of Wales to being one of the nation’s most 
emergent cases of economic deprivation through several decades of intermediate 
and evolving development policies. It will also consider the parallel trajectory of 
Welsh political devolution: culminating in the eventual granting of legislative - and 
economic development - powers to Wales. The remaining sections of this chapter 
will summarise and provisionally assess the strategies which devolved Welsh 
governments have sought to employ to tackle the economic isolation of the Valleys.  
 
Chapter 3 will accomplish comparable goals for the city of Detroit. Though, 
reflecting the complexity of the city’s demographic and economic challenges, as well 
as its recent financial difficulties, it will engage at further length with the background 
to the city’s redevelopment efforts. It will review the appropriate literature regarding 
its tumultuous transformation from Motor City to “Zombie City” (Neill, 2016:11-12), 
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and assess the implications of this transition for initiatives employed to revive it.  
Finally, it will provide a chronological overview of these redevelopment 
programmes, informed by the available data and appropriate programmatic and 
theoretical taxonomies, to reach tentative conclusions regarding their operation.  
 
These judgements will be synthesised and summarised in Chapter 4, which 
concludes this project, with a particular emphasis on areas of commonality between 
redevelopment efforts in both areas, instances of better practice in either, along with 
trends or aspects which may serve to complicate future efforts.  It will conclude with 
a consideration of the future in the post-industrial heartlands of South Wales and the 
largely deindustrialised Motor City, and will address how the conclusions of this 
project may benefit future research, policy and decision-making with regards to the 
economic development of both regions. 
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Chapter 2: The South Wales Valleys 
 
2.1: 1930-1972: “Something must be done” 
 
An analysis of development efforts in the Valleys must begin with an overview of the 
pathologies which necessitated them in the first instance: a series of economic 
difficulties stemming from a dependence on heavy industry and the tumult which 
ensued from its restructuring (Harris, 2012:87). As such, the challenges facing the 
Valleys are closely related to the economic changes which have engulfed Wales in 
recent decades. These have left the Valleys as the poorest region of one of the 
poorest nations of the United Kingdom: “an industrialized region which has lost 
much of its industrial base” (Mackay, 1992:97). Economic development initiatives in 
the region originated with the advent of government assistance to distressed areas 
in the UK itself, making it the “largest long-lasting” (Osmond, 2008:1) such 
intervention in the country. This came with the classification of regions as Special 
Areas under the Special Areas Act of 1934: “the first official attempt by central 
government” (Alden, 2013:129) to combat unemployment and regional economic 
disparities. Wales was one of four initial areas given this designation (Alden, 
2013:129), with the range of incentives provided to businesses locating within these 
areas soon expanded by a supplementary second Special Areas Act in 1937 (Pope, 
1989:165).  
 
The factors leading up to and precipitating these interventions had their roots in the 
inbuilt vulnerabilities of the region’s extractive economy, with these resulting in the 
differential impact of the marked downturn of the 1930s upon it. Industrialisation 
would commence later west of Offa’s Dyke, yet its arrival was sudden, disruptive 
and voluminous (Williams, 1995:1) as Wales entered the “take-off” (Rostow, 
1991:36) phase of economic growth. During the 60 years between 1851 and 1911, 
the number of men working in Welsh mines and quarries increased by 200,000; 
taking the sector's share of the workforce from less than a fifth to almost a third 
(Williams, 1995:20). 30% of employed Welsh men were engaged in coal mining by 
1911 and the coalfield would produce its highest ever level of output 2 years later: 
56.8 million tons (Williams, 1995:40). The sheer volume of production prompted 
speculation that output and demand would grow virtually exponentially to “about 100 
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million tons” (Williams, 1995:40) over the coming decades. Neither would match 
these expectations, nor even come close to matching the peak output of 1913. As 
with Detroit's carmakers 30 years later, the return of peace did exert a momentary, 
though ameliorative effect on Welsh heavy industry. The peacetime demand for coal 
however exerted major strain on the declining infrastructure of Welsh coal mines, 
with their annual output by 1920 more than 11 million tons below 1913 levels 
(Williams, 1995:40). 
 
Costly to extract, Welsh coal was historically expensive and “overwhelmingly” 
(Williams, 1995:50) dependent on demand from overseas markets. King coal was, 
however, rapidly losing its ability to command these regal prices, as oil began to 
replace coal-powered ships and foreign buyers began to search for more affordable 
providers (Williams, 1995:49).  There were glimmers of revival visible by the early 
1920s, buoyed by the disruption of overseas markets in France and North America 
(Lawrence, 2005:12), yet these were too fleeting, and the competitive disadvantage 
at which the Valleys found themselves was increasingly too great to generate a 
sustained industrial recovery. The development of alternative forms of fuel and the 
rise of global competitors during the 1920s amounted to something close to a death 
knell for the region’s industrial prosperity, with the effects felt almost immediately 
(Lawrence, 2005:12) (Williams, 1995:45). Exports fell from 4.18 million tons in April 
of 1924 to 3.43 million in June of the same year to just 1.08 million by 1938 
(Lawrence, 2005:12). The impact of this decline upon the Valleys was similarly 
immediate. Its effects were observable both in terms of depopulation; with an 
estimated 50,000 migrating out of the Rhondda between 1924 and 1939 (Welsh 
Academy Encyclopaedia, 2008:748) and the labour market; with Wales registering 
the highest unemployment rates of any UK region by 1934 (Alden, 2013:129) 
(Wanhill, 1980:4). The criticality of the situation soon amplified calls for government 
intervention.  
 
As pronounced as unemployment was across Wales by the early 1930s, the 
situation amounted to a “chronic depression” (Wanhill, 1980:4) in the Valleys.  The 
number of miners across the South Wales coalfields fell by 140,000 between 1921 
and 1936, as 241 mines ended their operations (Hunt, 2011:6). The unemployment 
rate across the coalfield was estimated at 47% in 1932 (Lawrence, 2005:13:14). 
The overall rate however obscured disparities of impact within South Wales itself, 
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with the emergence of unemployment “blackspots”, particularly in Brynmawr and 
Dowlais, with rates of 62% and 51% respectively (Second Industrial Survey of South 
Wales, 1937:39).  Edward VIII summarised the overriding pressure which gave rise 
to the government’s efforts with the simple statement that “something must be done” 
(Morgan, 1981:230), reportedly uttered during his visit to Dowlais in 1936. In 
sentiments which would be reiterated in differing, at times more tactful forms, over 
the coming decades, a Board of Trade commissioned survey of the Valleys 
diagnosed the region’s central difficulty as an absence of “any people with the 
capital or business experience to start any new industry” (Second Industrial Survey 
of South Wales, 1937:207). 
 
Faced with such a precipitous decline in employment, the challenge the Special 
Areas legislation were charged with addressing was immense. Assistance provided 
to the area under the remit of the Acts enabled the construction of major industrial 
complexes such as the Ebbw Vale steelworks, factory complexes in Dowlais, Dinas, 
Brynmawr and Cyfarthfa, and the Treforest Trading Estate (Wanhill, 1980:5). While 
retrospectively seen as insufficient and halting, they did represent the embers of a 
new, proactive approach of “taking work to the workers” (Howell & Baber, 1990:309) 
in areas of especially high unemployment. The immediate impacts of the initial 1934 
Act were considered “modest” (Morgan, 1981:225) though positive, with a fall of 
14,000 in the region’s unemployment numbers between 1934 and 1935 (Morgan, 
1981:225). The overall commitment of funds however remained slight in volume 
compared to the region’s difficulties: the Act’s provisions were largely restricted to 
distributing grants to select human service organisations, while generally prohibiting 
direct aid to private firms (Stevenson & Cook, 2013:75-76). While the Act did 
encourage select developments such as the Ebbw Vale steelworks, its stringent 
conditions lent themselves to at times vehement criticism. Aneurin Bevan declared it 
to be an “empty farce” (Stevenson & Cook, 2013:76) and the scheme’s 
commissioner conceded in late 1936 that “no appreciable reduction” (Stevenson & 
Cook, 2013:76) in unemployment across any of the assisted areas had occurred.  
 
The apparently limited effect of the 1934 Act would prompt the passage of a more 
wide-ranging set of incentives in the form of the 1937 Special Areas (Amendment) 
Act. This permitted tax remittances and other reimbursements to enterprises 
locating within the assisted areas and specifically promoted the creation of 
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designated trading estates (Pope, 1989:165) (Stevenson & Cook, 1937:76). The 
new estate at Treforest near Pontypridd would be a particular beneficiary of this 
promotion, with more than 60 firms employing 2,500 workers on the estate by 
Autumn 1939 (Morgan, 1981:226). Theoretically, the provisions of these initial Acts 
complied to a considerable extent with still-crystallising Keynesian theories of 
economic growth, and, particularly the role of governments in substituting for a 
robust private sector and stimulating demand  for the purposes of equilibrating and 
increasing employment levels (Higgins & Savoie, 2009:254) (Lloyd-Jones & Lewis, 
2003:148). Embryonic development policies across the region aimed to generate 
employment and investment within the Valleys: developments which, effectively by 
default, would be derived through their attraction away from other UK regions 
(Wanhill, 1980:18). The Acts therefore helped to establish a redistributionist supply-
side approach to regional development efforts which would persist for decades.  
 
The construction of new sites of industry outside of the main trading estates had, 
however, proceeded slowly, if at all during the mid-1930s (Morgan, 1981:226). 
When they did occur, there were initial imbalances between government-supported 
developments and regional unemployment which resulted in the concentration of 
employment growth along the coastal corridor (Morgan, 1981:226) (Rowlands, 
2000:151). The impending collapse of Europe’s fragile peace heightened the drive 
for rearmament, and overrode the ingrained scepticism of Whitehall officials 
regarding South Wales’ compatibility with the government’s needs. In economic 
terms, war brought “salvation” (Rowlands, 2000:152) to the upper reaches of the 
Valleys, with the construction of a methanol production plant in Dowlais approved 
the day prior to the UK’s declaration of war (Rowlands, 2000:152). The war 
generated an intense demand for mass production and the necessary mobilisation 
of manpower that required, with the result that Welsh “unemployment practically 
disappeared” (Wanhill, 1980:6), as production facilities were built throughout the 
coalfield (Rowlands, 2000:156-157.  
 
The continuing need for regional development efforts had been strengthened by the 
publication of the 1940 Barlow Report, which had noted the growing disparity 
between areas of concentrated traditional industry and the more modern and 
diversified base of Greater London (Daniels, 2005:210). These conclusions would 
find some implementation during peacetime, particularly with the Distribution of 
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Industry Act of 1945 (Daniels, 2005:210). Further establishing the Keynesian 
contours of UK Government policy for the development of distressed regions, this 
Act expanded the remit of the Treasury to subsidise construction in Assisted Areas 
and tightened requirements for developments nationwide: providing inducements for 
construction in the former and light sanctions for developments outside of them  
(Higgins & Savoie, 2009:254-255) (Daniels, 2005:210) (Wanhill, 1980:8) (Pike et al, 
2010:4) (Rowlands, 2000:169-170).While the war had granted temporary, though 
costly relief, employment in the region’s core extractive industry remained in 
decline; contracting by 24,000 between 1938 and 1944 (Morgan, 1981:307). The 
demand for an effective regional development policy had not subsided with its 
conclusion. 
 
Over the next decade and a half, government grants and loans were provided to 
businesses relocating to or expanding within designated Assisted Areas and  112 
factories were constructed with government assistance across South Wales 
between 1945 and 1949 (Morgan, 1981:312) (Davies, 2007:597). The level of 
assistance to which the Valleys were entitled, and the severity of its classification, 
would vary. Between 1945 and 1960, South Wales was classed as a Development 
Area, before being redefined as a Development District under the 1960 Local 
Employment Act (Hall & Tewdwr-Jones, 2011:88). Districts were defined as regions 
which had averaged an unemployment rate of 4.5% or higher for a sustained period 
- a threshold which much of South Wales easily cleared - even during the relative 
abundance of the early 1960s (Hall & Tewdwr-Jones, 2011:88). The boundaries of 
Wales’ Assisted Areas would undergo further revision in 1966; expanding to include 
all of Wales with the exception of Cardiff, Newport and Flintshire (Hall & Tewdwr-
Jones, 2011:94). Firms investing within the Development Districts of Wales were 
eligible for a grant to cover 40% of the value of their investment (Hall & Tewdwr-
Jones, 2011:94). While gauging the success of these initiatives and incentives is 
difficult, Wales did benefit from a series of “inward moves” (Daniels, 2005:212), with 
around a third of the overall increase in manufacturing jobs in Wales attributed to 
relocation from regions of England (Daniels, 2005:212). The momentum of this 
progress would slow by the 1970s, with initiatives in the Assisted Areas ceasing to 
“exert a measurable impact” (Keeble, 1980:955) on the geographical makeup of 
manufacturing employment, and 41,000 people would migrate out of the coalfields 
region between 1951 and 1966 (Glamorgan County Council, 1970:35) 
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In spite of these shortcomings, the 1960s would see one of the most significant 
developments in UK Government regional policy towards Wales through the 
establishment of the Welsh Office in 1964 (Hunt, 2011:6). While opinion in Whitehall 
favoured a “guard-dog” position with minimal resources or autonomy, incoming 
Secretary James Griffiths threatened resignation unless the new office was provided 
with more substantive resources and responsibilities (Davies, 2007:641). A month 
after his appointment, Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that the new office 
would bear responsibility for local government, housing and roads within Wales 
(Davies, 2007:641) - areas with close linkages to economic development. This 
contested start provided Wales with Cabinet level representation, with the office 
assuming responsibilities for the administration of urban assistance, higher 
education and agriculture by the mid-1970s and responsibilities for regional 
assistance evolving with the programmes themselves (Davies, 2007:641). 
 
While economic development initiatives in Wales began with the former coalfield, 
the territory covered by an ever-expanding assisted area status soon encompassed 
“over half the country” (Wanhill, 1980:16). With simulations estimating the number of 
jobs created or retained due to regional assistance across Wales at between 90,000 
and 110,000, the economic development initiatives of successive UK governments 
between the 1930s and 1970s were judged to have broadly succeeded in their most 
basic goal of creating and retaining employment (Wanhill, 1980:146;39). In the 
absence of these interventions, the Welsh economy would have struggled if not 
failed to retain employment at 1950s levels following the conclusion of the boom 
(Wanhill, 1980:146), while actively increasing employment beyond these levels 
would “not have been possible” (Wanhill, 1980:146) without direct government 
assistance. 
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2.2 1972-1999: RSA to WDA to WAG 
 
Regional policy during the 1960s could be justifiably considered “active” (Moore & 
Rhodes, 1973:88) (Mackay, 1992:101); with estimates of the number of jobs created 
by such policies across the UK ranging from 90,000 to 300,000 (Hall & Tewdwr-
Jones, 2011:85). This trend towards greater activity would largely persist throughout 
the following decade. The early 1970s saw the creation of one of the most 
substantial regional assistance programmes since the inception of regional aid in 
the form of Regional Selective Assistance (RSA). The Heath Government (1970-
1974) had attempted to reform the existing assistance programmes within the 
Assisted Areas by abolishing grants for investment and reorienting towards targeted 
tax relief for participating firms in 1971: a reform which the Government estimated 
would yield £400 million in savings (Hall & Tewdwr-Jones, 2011:94). This brief 
experiment met with a sharp increase in the cost of administering the programmes 
and, with unemployment in the eligible areas increasing, the change was abruptly 
cancelled (Hall & Tewdwr-Jones, 2011:94). Largely in response to the difficulties 
faced in phasing out the grants for investment the year before, RSA was authorised 
by the Industry Act of 1972. This focused on supporting capital investment and job 
creation by providing eligible companies with grants for expenditure on capital 
projects (Hill & Munday, 1994:68). Its specific remit was to distribute assistance to 
“provide, maintain or safeguard employment in any part of the Assisted Areas” 
(Industry Act of 1972, Part II, 7.1.a). These would, as expected, encompass notable 
swathes of Wales. Given the more discretionary nature of RSA awards, the 
incentive has often been categorised as adhering to neoclassical assumptions of 
economic growth in its aim of reducing costs for specific activities undertaken by 
specific firms, rather than the more expansive form and automatic eligibility which 
Keynesian-inflected grants would take (Pike & Tomaney, 2010:98) (Begg, 1993:85). 
It therefore remained squarely on the supply-side of Eisinger’s typology outlined in 
Table 1.2. 
 
 
A drive to encourage inward investment within Wales specifically would also soon 
be underway, beginning in earnest with the Labour Government of 1974-1979 and 
represented most notably by the formation of the Welsh Development Agency 
(WDA) in 1975. The WDA was an executive body or quasi-autonomous non-
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governmental organisation (QUANGO) dedicated to attracting inward investment to 
Wales and one of the first such development agencies in Europe (Morgan, 
1998:231). Its establishment coincided with a strengthening of the powers of the 
Welsh Office, and its respective Secretary; a position then held by John Morris. The 
Secretary was granted control over the WDA and its corollary agencies, namely the 
Development Board for Rural Wales (DBRW) and the Welsh Land Authority (WLA). 
A very limited though significant form of fiscal devolution occurred with the 
Government’s decision, in response to extensive lobbying by Morris, to provide the 
office with a block grant (Davies, 2007:641). This “wholly crucial” (Davies, 2007:641) 
development ensured that control over these funds rested with the Secretary of 
State for Wales himself and, by 1979, the office bore responsibility for some £1.5 
billion in funds (Davies, 2007:641). 
 
 
That these powers and resources were sorely needed was undeniable, as Wales 
and the Valleys region in particular were contending with the full-blown effects of 
deindustrialisation: a process which would be more pronounced there than arguably 
anywhere else in the UK. Wales and its primary industrial areas were especially 
vulnerable to the decline in competitiveness and employment within its traditional 
industrial sectors; with productivity in the South Wales coalfields consistently below 
their English counterparts (Johnes, 2012:248). Almost 100 collieries would close 
over the course of the 1960s, with the number of coal miners falling by 53,000 
(Johnes, 2012:248). A 1967 Government White Paper on the Welsh economy 
intended to address the coming decline in its traditional industries was arguably not 
hyperbolic in describing the changes enveloping the Welsh economy as proceeding 
at a rapid and historically unprecedented pace (Alden, 2013:129). Sites which had 
produced a fifth of the UK’s total coal output prior to the First World War were 
producing output at levels close to those of the 1850s by the mid-1970s (Thomas, 
1976:3). The South Wales coalfields, which had employed more than 232,000 men 
over 620 mines in 1913, employed just over 31,000 across 122 sites 60 years later 
(Thomas, 1976:3). The pace of this decline led some to conclude that in no other 
UK region had the industry’s decline “been so keenly felt” (Williams & Jones, 
1990:92) as in South Wales. The Education Director of Mid-Glamorgan County 
Council would summarise this trend in four words in a letter written to the Welsh 
Secretary in 1974: “the Valleys are dying” (Johnes, 2012:127).  
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These difficulties became especially embedded from the 1970s onwards, as a “far-
reaching restructuring of the economic base” (Mackay, 1992:98) occurred. The 
depth and pace of change in sectoral employment; a symptom of Wales’ reliance on 
the traditional industries of coal and steel, was virtually unparalleled within Europe 
(Mackay, 1992:98). Figures on the sharp decline in employment are stark, with an 
estimated half of all jobs in the Welsh steel industry ending between 1977 and 1980 
alone (Mackay, 1992:98). The total number of individuals in employment in Wales 
fell by 16% between 1979 and 1987 (Mackay, 1992:98). The number of men in 
employment had fallen by 22% between 1979 and 1987, while the number of 
women in full-time employment had decreased by 19%. More significant than the 
direct job losses, however, was the loss of major employers themselves. The 
number of manufacturing enterprises employing more than 1,000 workers fell by 
64% between 1979 and 1986 (Mackay, 1992:99). This downward trend was 
similarly observable in levels of Welsh industrial output, which remained below 1979 
levels as late as 1987 (Mackay, 1992:98).  
 
 
Occurring simultaneously with the cataclysmic impact of deindustrialisation, the 
1980s saw considerable reductions in the primary public policies intended to 
ameliorate its impact. Expenditure on regional assistance fell from £842 million in 
1979 to £540 million in 1983 (Hall, 2007:15). The period from the late 1970s to late 
1980s has therefore been categorised as one of “reduced regional policy” (Mackay, 
1992:101), with the value of regional aid falling by two-thirds in real-terms between 
1975 and 1985 (Mackay, 1992:101). Regional assistance to Welsh industries 
declined by 58% during the 1980s (Johnes, 2012:321). This was in line with a 
conscious evolution in government policy “away from automatic capital grants 
towards a more selective, discretionary, system” (Harrison & Mason, 1993:194): a 
trend initiated by the formation of RSA during the previous decade and which was 
solidified with the 1988 abolition of automatic grants for regional development 
purposes (Hill & Munday, 1994:68).  This was undertaken with the broader goal of a 
further “regionalisation” (Harrison & Mason, 1993:194) of regional policy and 
developing the “indigenous potential” (HM Government, 1988:29) of assisted 
regions for the purposes of spurring their sustainable growth. This indicated an, at 
least rhetorical, openness towards a demand-side approach to regional 
development, even as the primary instruments of regional policy remained 
resolutely, if not increasingly, supply-side oriented. The period also witnessed the 
reorientation of development policy towards urban areas through initiatives such as 
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the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation (CBDC) (Hall & Tewdwr-Jones, 2011:95) 
(Hall, 2007:14). The shift in responsibility from the UK Government to the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and its successor was equally stark.  
 
UK Government spending on regional policy was £287 million by 1993-4 and, while 
this represented a substantial decline from previous decades, UK regions were 
receiving £980 million from the European Community’s Regional Funds (Hall, 
2007:15). The amount of RSA distributed to Wales and its percentage of the 
declining regional assistance budget fluctuated considerably in the decade prior to 
devolution, ranging from £131 million or 24% of total UK RSA expenditure in 1989, 
to £98 million or 28% of the UK total in 1995, before rising to £172 million or 40% of 
the UK total in 1997/8 (Hall & Tewdwr-Jones, 2011:87). The Thatcher and Major 
Governments did not, however, disengage from Welsh economic development 
efforts as much as this downward funding trend could imply. A number of major 
infrastructure investments would take place within Wales during the late-1980s and 
into the following decade, including the upgrading of the A55 and A470 roads, the 
extension of the M4 and the opening of the second Severn Bridge (Johnes, 
2012:318).  
 
This period of, at least nationally, reduced regional policy expenditure coincided with 
one of atypically robust growth rates in Welsh manufacturing productivity 
(Armstrong & Taylor, 2000:75). The Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of the Welsh 
manufacturing sector grew by 5.3% between 1979 and 1991: the highest rate of 
growth of any UK region, and a significant increase upon the 0.2% growth rate it 
yielded between 1969 and 1978 (Harris & Trainor, 1997:493). The causal influence 
of reductions in regional policy spend, if any, as with so many interventions within 
periods of substantial economic change, remains difficult to disaggregate from 
simultaneous trends such as the sizeable contraction of the Welsh manufacturing 
labour force and increases in the number of foreign-owned plants: with both trends 
holding intuitive and empirically plausible claims to causality (Armstrong & Taylor, 
2000:75).  
 
The Valleys would also be the subject of a Welsh Office regeneration initiative, the 
Programme for the Valleys (PFV), which was launched in 1988. With a price tag 
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approaching £800 million, it could be identified, with some justification, as “the most 
extensive programme of social, economic and urban regeneration undertaken in 
Wales” (Central Office of Information, 1995:65) (House of Commons, 
1993:228;c448W) (Waddington et al, 2001:164). Reflecting sentiments expressed in 
the Second Industrial Survey  five decades earlier, and in the Welsh Government’s 
strategy for the area itself two decades later, former  Welsh Secretary Lord 
Crickhowell identified the scheme’s imperative as “creat[ing] the conditions which 
would attract successful businesses and entrepreneurs” (Crickhowell, 1999:83). The 
Catch-22 of the Valleys’ economic redevelopment was a feedback loop between 
their deep challenges and the negative perceptions held by those most needed to 
invest and employ within it. By the late 1980s, the region as a whole appeared 
economically depressed and physically dilapidated. This deterred the activity 
needed for economic revitalisation, however this “activity was dependent upon them 
being cheerful attractive places” (Crickhowell, 1999:84).  
 
In a bid to break the political inertia and economic malaise, the initial regenerative 
impetus - along with some funding - would come from the Welsh Office. The 
aspiration would be that, in turn, local councils and groups would soon seize the 
initiative and assume responsibility for regeneration (Crickhowell, 1999:84). In a 
similar vein to subsequent regeneration efforts, the initial tranche of funding was 
aimed at remediating town centres such as Aberdare, Maesteg and Tonypandy 
(Crickhowell, 1999:84). A modest commitment of £7 million was authorised for the 
Programme’s initial year, with the principle that every pound of public funds would 
“generate a multiplier from the private sector” (Crickhowell, 1999:84). Cultural 
issues, such as “parochial jealousies” (Crickhowell, 1999:85) and resentment of the 
perceived preferential treatment granted to the more notable CBDC were cited as 
the largest obstacles to the Programme by its political progenitor (Crickhowell, 
1999:85), however ex post, independent, analyses have faulted systemic issues 
relating to  its design and delivery. 
 
Victor Hausner & Associates’ investigation (1993) represents one of the most 
localised assessments of regional assistance to the Valleys region for much of the 
preceding 80 years. Commissioned by the Welsh Office, this most closely 
resembled the process evaluations identified in Bartik & Bingham’s typology and 
focused on listing the definable and measurable outputs of the scheme relative to its 
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own targets. It was constrained by a number of acknowledged data omissions and 
qualified its conclusions accordingly (Adamson et al, 2012:32). In spite of optimistic 
assertions of “record levels” (Welsh Office, 1991:2) of investment and construction 
in the area, question marks were placed not only on the scheme’s success, but also 
on the validity of the figures cited in defence of government claims and the level of 
public resources dedicated to the programme. The latter conclusions echoed earlier 
assertions by Mid Glamorgan Council that much of the eventual £772 million 
consisted of repackaged or redirected funds, rather than de novo funding streams 
from Whitehall (Mid Glamorgan Council, 1990:1). 
 
In eschewing “Welsh Office solutions” (Crickhowell, 1999:84), the Welsh Office may 
have underestimated the public commitment needed, and overstated the capacity of 
these local entities to address challenges that had been consolidating for more than 
half a century. Its intentionally decentralised structure placed the onus upon local 
government partnerships which proved inadequately equipped for the tasks 
expected (Victor Hausner & Associates, 1993:iii). Responsibilities between 
authorities were unclearly codified, intra-departmental and intra-authority 
communication was seen to be insufficient, while the primary objectives of the 
Programme were often found to be ambiguous (Victor Hausner & Associates, 
1993:iii). Deficient monitoring would become an overriding and crosscutting 
limitation, with the data needed to gauge progress against occasionally vague 
objectives collected infrequently and of variable quality (Victor Hausner & 
Associates, 1993:iii;64). Data limitations may have been less consequential 
however, than the way in which this data was utilised by policymakers; being  “used 
predominantly” (Victor Hausner & Associates, 1993:iii) to modify expenditure and 
specific targets, rather than for adjusting, recalibrating or terminating poorly 
performing projects (Victor Hausner & Associates, 1993:iii).  
 
While the disparity between unemployment in the Valleys and the UK average did 
close somewhat over the course of the scheme, driven by a 1.0% increase in UK 
wide unemployment, and a fractional 0.2% decrease in the Valleys rate, this was 
accompanied by an increase in male unemployment and a slide in wage rates from 
99.7% of the UK average to 88.8%: ensuring that “overall improvements in 
prosperity remain[ed] elusive” (Victor Hausner & Associates, 1993:iii:77). The 
Programme’s more apparent strengths lay in the diversification of industry, along 
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with the attraction of around £700 million in private investment and the creation of 
4,500 jobs at 70 new manufacturing sites (Victor Hausner & Associates, 
1993:91:33). The skewing towards overseas firms, with a 20% increase in the 
number of foreign-owned manufacturing sites was seen as an asset at the time, 
though one which has since been viewed in a more sceptical light (Victor Hausner & 
Associates, 1993:75) (Hunt, 2011:7).  
 
While economic development as a distinct function did not receive the highest level 
of expenditure; with 26% of total spending dedicated to it, this obscures the clear 
crossover between environmental and economic development efforts (Victor 
Hausner & Associates, 1993:40). The former encompassed both land reclamation 
and remediation for factory construction, as well as town centre regeneration: 
central facets of the scheme’s redevelopment goals. The aggregate percentage 
dedicated to both functions amounted to 55% of total expenditure (Victor Hausner & 
Associates, 1993:40). Other functional areas with clear linkages to economic 
development, and of particular relevance for the region, were less extensively 
funded. The level of expenditure on road improvements and other transport projects 
was viewed as too modest for the region’s needs, with many local and regional 
stakeholders noting the need for further development of transport links in the upper 
Valleys and expressing “continuing frustration at the delay in dualling the A465” 
(Victor Hausner & Associates, 1993:51;91). While the initial target for expenditure 
on the A465 Glynneath to Aberdulais section was set at £28 million, only £5.8 
million would be expended over its lifetime, and while the aspiration was to have 
modernised 9km of the road, activity did not commence during the Programme 
(Victor Hausner & Associates, 1993:87).  
 
Table 2.1: Expenditure on the Programme for the Valleys, 1988-1992 
Financial 
year 
1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 Total 
Target 
expenditure 
(£ millions) 
162.00 167.00 169.69 180.76 146.59 826.04 
Expenditure 
(£ millions) 
139.33 137.44 148.81 171.03 176.27 772.88 
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(Victor Hausner & Associates, 1993:28) 
Table 2.2: Expenditure on the Programme for the Valleys by functional area  
Field Expenditure 
(£ millions) 
Economic 
development 
200.382 
Education and 
training 
242.87 
Transport 111.117 
Environment 218.696 
Total 773.0652 
 
Figure 2.1: Chart of expenditure on the Programme for the Valleys by functional 
area 
 
(Victor Hausner & Associates, 1993:29) 
More broadly, many of the Programme’s primary initiatives more closely resembled, 
and the scheme itself would be described as an, at least partly, urban strategy 
(Central Office of Information, 1995:65), more so than a regional one. It sought to 
attract and make the region attractive to entrepreneurs; representing, in that sense, 
a demand-side undertaking. It did, however, preserve a considerable emphasis on 
                                                          
2 Disparity due to the use of an earlier Welsh Office management report to calculate funding by 
function area (1993:28;40) 
26%
31%
14%
28%
Economic development Education and training Transport Environment
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direct financial inducements to firms, especially foreign-owned ones, whose 
integration into local economies is often seen as more transient and whose 
attraction can depend on considerable, if not unnecessary “deadweight” costs (Pike 
et al, 2006:186) to public bodies. Its investments within the region were not 
channelled as readily into primary infrastructure projects such as the expansion of 
road links: leaving its primary outputs as the regeneration of specific urban centres 
and the attraction of foreign firms. The PFV’s remit sought to combine urban and 
regional policy as well as supply and demand-sides, however it would, in practice, 
default and trend considerably towards the former in both cases. The theoretical 
basis of the Programme proves similarly difficult to categorise. It held certain, 
though likely unintentional, linkages to nascent endogenous theories of growth, 
while its usage of financial inducements to offset costs of firms relocating or 
expanding across the region retained the broadly neoclassical assumptions which 
underlay much of 1980s regional policy within the UK.  
 
The state of the Valleys and that of the broader Welsh economy by the 1990s did 
have some achievements to demonstrate for these investments. The socioeconomic 
picture was somewhat, if not dramatically brighter than the nadir of the previous 
decade: with the final decade of the 20th Century marking the first time since the 
establishment of unemployment records that Wales registered a lower rate than the 
UK average (Alden, 2013:132). Wales’ primary labour market indicator did 
demonstrate continued improvement throughout the early 1990s, with its 
unemployment rate ranking below the UK’s and the European Community’s by 1993 
(Alden, 2013:137). Its traditional reliance on manufacturing had also continued, with 
manufacturing GDP as a percentage of the total continuing to rank above 25%, 
although below its 1990 level of 29.5% (Alden, 2013:141). Boosted by unit labour 
costs which were below UK and European averages, Welsh manufacturing was 
again able to yield substantially higher growth rates than its counterparts in other 
UK regions; increasing by 11.6% between 1992 and 1993 alone (Waddington et al, 
2001:164) (Alden, 2013:142;143). This likely contributed to one of the primary 
success stories of the Welsh economy, and, arguably, of regional policy in Wales: 
its achievement in attracting significant quantities of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
(Alden, 2013:143). Wales succeeded in attracting a notably higher percentage of 
FDI projects and employment than its share of the UK labour force would suggest 
(Hill & Munday, 1994:94) (Alden, 2013:143). Wales had attracted 13.3% of overseas 
investment between 1979 and 1989, rising to 22% of the total between 1987 and 
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1990 (Johnes, 2012:318). The number of foreign companies in Wales expanded 
from 18 in the 1950s to 278 by 1993, while the number employed by them increased 
from 14,000 to 68,000, respectively (Alden, 2013:143). This figure amounted to 
almost 30% of total employment in Welsh manufacturing (Alden, 2013:143). 
 
Yet despite noted improvements in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth during 
the early 1990s, (Alden, 2013:138;140), the Welsh economy continued to be 
plagued by a “prosperity gap” (Harris, 2012:93) between itself and developed 
regions of the UK. While the successes in FDI and other fields were considerable, 
they had not generated an appreciable increase in Welsh Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) (Harris, 2012:94). Wales had entered “the 1990s, as it had the 1980s as the 
poorest region” (Brand et al, 1997:219) across many key indicators - with little sign 
of dramatic improvements pending. The situation in the Valleys was, expectedly, 
more severe than for Wales as a whole. The successes of the early 1990s were 
considered to be largely a “mirage” (Johnes, 2012:320) for the region, with real 
unemployment in Merthyr at 33% in 1997 and a quarter of men of working age in 
Mid Glamorgan classed as economically inactive (Johnes, 2012:320).  
 
The difficulties faced by an incoming Welsh Assembly in terms of regional 
performance were therefore voluminous (Harris, 2012:93). Despite progress along 
the lines of inward investment, Welsh economic performance remained sufficiently 
weak relative to the European average that 60% of the Welsh landmass became 
eligible for substantial European Union (EU) Structural Funds on the eve of 
devolution. This “mixed blessing” (Morgan & Mungham, 2000:7) was both a 
recognition of the failure of existing policy to effectively close the gap between the 
poorest areas of Wales and their European counterparts and, conversely, an 
opportunity to pursue Welsh strategies for Welsh challenges (Harris, 2012:94) 
(Armstrong & Taylor, 2000:353)(Ascani et al, 2012:3). 
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2.3 1999-2007: “A process not an event” 
 
This very mixed baseline provides an essential context for both understanding and 
analysing the actions of the newly formed National Assembly for Wales when it 
came to development assistance for deprived areas of Wales. The established 
structural difficulties facing the Welsh economy was said to present incoming Welsh 
Ministers with the choice of deciding between “quick wins” or rectifying its 
longstanding and long-term challenges (Morgan & Morgan, 1998:163). Initial 
strategies such as the 2002 National Economic Development Strategy for Wales 
(NEDS), have since been categorised as a compromise between these two 
competing imperatives (Harris, 2012:96). Disputes regarding the nature of 
development goals were apparent from the earliest days of devolution (Harris, 
2012:96): with the NEDS being identified as “the most politically contentious” (Storer 
& Cole, 2002:113) issue which went before the Assembly in its second session. 
NEDS goals for economic progress by 2010 were the proximate drivers of this 
controversy (Harris, 2012:96), as they were seen to be unwarrantedly optimistic 
(Storer & Cole, 2002:117-118). Despite the constrained powers of the Assembly, 
Welsh policymakers nevertheless held “an expansive view” (Cole & Stafford, 
2015:29) of its capacity for economic development and other fields; a view which 
would be increasingly “tempered by” (Cole & Stafford, 2015:50) a growing 
acknowledgement of its limited fiscal powers and structural obstacles within the 
Welsh economy. 
 
The final document, released in 2002, established a series of targets ranging from 
increased GDP per capita from 80% to 90% of the UK average by 2010, improving 
the skills of the Welsh workforce and increasing the number of companies 
established (Harris, 2012:97). Interim reports on the progress made in achieving 
these goals varied, with improvements in employment generally occurring, while 
progress in areas such as economic growth was failing to occur (Harris, 2012:97). 
The Assembly Government ascribed some of this difficulty to global macroeconomic 
conditions, especially impacting upon its export goals (Harris, 2012:97). Perhaps 
most surprisingly, while the underperformance of the Valleys region was noted in 
the NEDS (it accounted for around 60% of the  population of the region eligible for 
Objective 1 assistance) (Jones et al, 2011:639) (Brooksbank et al, 2001:261), 
development assistance was barely discussed in regional terms. 
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Table 2.3: Identifiable expenditure within the Valleys region during the Objective 1 
(2000-2006) period 
Year EU funds (£) Total project 
cost (£) 
Number of 
projects 
2002 £68,813,232 £181,068,727 199 
2003 £58,469,194 £141,480,845 82 
2004 £15,396,348 £30,719,492 16 
2005 £11,462,583 £22,282,111 30 
2006 £3,517,118 £6,367,862 8 
Total £157,658,475 £381,919,037 335 
 
(WEFO, 2016) 
Table 2.4: Identifiable expenditure within the Valleys region during the Convergence 
(2007-2013) period  
Year EU funds (£) National funds 
(£) 
Number of 
projects 
2007 £13,645,347 £21,823,568 4 
2008 £126,966,416 £133,546,175 10 
2009 £96,439,127 £106,526,541.86 13 
2010 £42,292,399 £48,588,642.01 10 
2011 £1,787,304 £746,441 1 
2012 £5,736,694 £4,725,998 1 
2013 £5,793,007 £4,867,680 1 
Total £292,660,294 £320,825,046 40 
 
(WEFO, 2016) 
The Government’s usage of EU Structural Aid is difficult to evaluate in regional 
terms, as expenditure for individual UAs within the eligible areas is not produced by 
the Welsh European Funding Office (WEFO) (WEFO Correspondence, 2015): the 
public body with administrative and operational responsibilities for “day to day 
activities” (Rawlings, 2003:441) pertaining to the funds. As of 2015, approximately 
£3.2 billion of EU funds had been invested under the auspices of the completed 
structural aid programmes across the assisted areas (Welsh Government, 2015). 
While the majority of this assistance is likely to have been distributed to areas of 
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Wales which included the Valleys, in the absence of data on funds disaggregated by 
UA, it is not possible to establish with precision the amount of European aid 
targeted there.  
 
A list of projects funded by the Objective 1 programme between 2000 and 2006 is 
available and this does demonstrate the commitment of significant funds for specific 
projects. It does, however, provide little explanatory data regarding the overall 
direction of funds within Wales, nor does it establish a specific location for the 
recipient. The Welsh Assembly Government’s active encouragement of partnership 
arrangements for Objective 1 projects (Osmond, 2004:66); many of which spanned 
multiple UAs, may explain this difficulty in providing geographic specificity for 
distributed funds. Interim and progress reports provide data on selected investments 
during the successor Convergence Programme, which ran from 2007 until 2013, 
such as the £30 million invested in the Valleys Regional Park (WEFO, 2014:41), 
although, as with the earlier round of funding, a comprehensive overview of 
investment amount by location is harder to ascertain and does not appear to be 
centrally compiled.  
 
Wales' most recent round of structural funds commenced in 2014 and is scheduled 
to continue until 2020. Total European expenditure for this period has been 
projected at £1.8 billion, although the June 2016 decision by the Welsh and UK 
electorates to withdraw from the EU has generated a degree of uncertainty as to its 
continuation (Welsh Government, 2015) (Mortimer, 2016). While the available 
project data is more detailed than for its predecessors in certain aspects, it retains a 
number of their reporting constraints. It specifies a clear contact for and the total 
cost of each project, although it does not specify the amount of Welsh or UK 
government funds committed to a project or the year during which funds were 
approved. Unless a clearly identifiable organisation is specified as a recipient of the 
funds, it remains difficult to categorise the expenditure geographically (WEFO, 
2016) (WEFO Correspondence, 2016).  
 
Early assessments of the completed funds were critical of their progress (Harris, 
2012:96) (Jones-Evans, 2003:12), with “both the design and delivery” (Boland, 
2004:268) of the Objective 1 programme particularly questioned. A subsequent 
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official evaluation determined that Objective 1 had met its target in terms of the 
number of jobs created, with an estimated 102,711 (Table 2.6) formed over the life 
of the programme, though it had failed to meet its target for business creation 
(WEFO, 2012:29). Qualitative research projects by academic researchers such as 
Asare-Donkoh (2010) have concluded that, based on interviews with Assembly 
Members and councillors familiar with Caerphilly-based projects, the impact of the 
funds may have been less palpable than their visibility (2010:141). Expressing 
concerns similar to those raised regarding the PFV over a decade earlier, the 
suggestion that there was an insufficient spend on enhancing skillsets and local 
infrastructure, with expenditure being tilted towards environmental or social 
initiatives, was made by several local stakeholders (Asare-Donkoh, 2010:141). The, 
perhaps fortuitous, juncture of devolution and the receipt of Objective 1 funds 
represented a logistical “baptism of fire” for the new institution, with the 
responsibility relative to the Assembly’s experience and staffing levels since 
described as “a nightmare” (Cole & Stafford, 2015:110) by civil servants. A lack of 
clarity regarding the “match” funding which the UK Government was expected to 
field additionally resulted in the Welsh Cabinet “scrabbl[ing] around for funds” 
(Rawlings, 2003:80) for the programme’s launch. 
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Table 2.5: Objective 1 indicators by Valleys UA (2000-2006) 
UA  Small and 
Medium 
Enterprises 
(SMEs) 
assisted 
SMEs 
created 
Gross new 
jobs 
Beneficiarie
s in work 
Blaenau Gwent    5,718      681     4,715    4,328  
Bridgend    9,402      999     6,249    3,157  
Caerphilly   11,962    1,817   10,310    3,902  
Merthyr Tydfil    3,396      414     2,350    1,711  
Neath Port Talbot   11,768    1,374     7,263    3,343  
Rhondda Cynon 
Taf 
  11,600    1,813     7,151    6,087  
Torfaen    6,885    1,080     4,450    3,347  
Total Valleys                         
60,731  
                       
8,178  
                      
42,488  
                     
25,875  
Total Wales 220,729 17,037 102,711 44,763 
Valleys as a % of 
total Wales 
27.5% 48.0% 41.4% 57.8% 
 
(WEFO, 2015) 
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Table 2.6: Convergence indicators by Valleys UA – as of April 2016 
UA Enterpri
ses 
created 
Enterpris
es 
assisted 
Jobs 
creat
ed 
Individuals 
helped into 
work 
Individuals 
helped into 
further learning 
Blaenau 
Gwent 
310 380 1,100 5,060 4,660 
Bridgend 540 1,000 2,045 4,135 2,145 
Caerphilly 600 865 2,255 5,615 5,530 
Merthyr 
Tydfil 
290 375 920 4,365 4,565 
Neath Port 
Talbot 
485 755 1,360 7,300 3,800 
Rhondda 
Cynon Taf 
770 1,355 2,555 8,475 6,640 
Torfaen 430 535 1,420 3,900 5,085 
Total 
Valleys 
3425 5265 11,65
5 
38850 32425 
Total Wales 11,925 18,645 36,97
0 
72,700 56,055 
Valleys as 
% of total 
Wales 
28.7% 28.2% 31.5% 53.4% 57.8% 
 
(WEFO, 2016) 
The picture when it comes to completed European funding rounds is not wholly 
oblique. WEFO does produce figures for its key performance indicators for individual 
UAs for both Objective 1 and Convergence programmes, enabling an overview of 
developments across Wales.  WEFO estimates that a total of 139,681 jobs were 
created across Wales during the lifespan of both programmes, with over 
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100,000 (73%) of these being created under the Objective 1 programme (Tables 
2.5; 2.6) (WEFO, 2015) (WEFO, 2016). 38% of these (54,143) were created across 
the seven UAs defined by this project as comprising the Valleys. A divergence 
between specific and more indirect metrics of job creation emerges, and between 
high-road and demand-side objectives and low-road and supply side ones, 
however: with a majority (55%) of individuals helped into work across both 
completed schemes located within the Valleys. Raw output figures such as these 
are rarely sufficient to gauge the overall success of a programme which, as outlined 
earlier, requires an often extensive level of data and an appropriate evaluative 
framework. Such an evaluation may not be practicable given the currently available 
data on European funding, and when identifying a definitive location for the 
distributed assistance is challenging to unachievable.  
 
Any attempt to determine the distribution of the structural funds therefore must rely 
on available project data and any identified sponsors. For many projects, this 
amounted to, at most, a cursory description on the WEFO website. While 
spreadsheets of identifiable funding have been compiled for the purposes of this 
project (Tables 2.3; 2.4), they are, at best, educated guesses and not an exhaustive 
database of all funds distributed under the auspices of the European programmes. 
They include only projects which appear to have been based exclusively within an 
individual UA and, as such, exclude projects which spanned multiple authorities, or 
which engaged organisations situated outside of the UA. The exclusion of multi-
authority projects is therefore liable to understate the total amount of assistance. 
With these qualifiers in mind, a provisional estimate of £450,318,769 in European 
funding can be broadly identified as having been dedicated to projects across the 
seven Valleys UAs between 2000 and 2013: coming to a combined total of 
£1,153,062,852 when funding from Welsh, UK Government and additional sources 
is factored in. This comes to an annualised average of £4,948,558 in European aid 
for each of the seven UAs per year of formal operation for the concluded schemes, 
and £12,671,020 for total funds. Identifying comparable amounts for Welsh and UK 
Government funds expended within each UA is less tractable. The information on 
non-EU sources of funding for Convergence projects differs from that which is 
available for Objective 1; with the latter providing only the total cost of the project, 
without a specific amount for other governmental funds committed to it.  
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WEFO notes total EU expenditure on both programmes at £3,209,036,928; with 
£1,356,090,212 in Objective 1 funding (WEFO, 2015) and £1,852,946,716 in 
Convergence funding (WEFO, 2015) (WEFO, 2016). In light of the tentative 
estimate of EU funds identified as having occurred exclusively in individual Valleys 
UAs and with the necessary provisos, this would amount to 14% of all European 
structural funding to Wales between 2000 and 2013 having been allocated to the 
area. Clearly such an estimate is highly provisional and likely to be an 
underestimate. Regrettably, further clarification is not possible within the parameters 
of the existing data - data which, it should be noted, can be detailed and transparent 
in other respects. The overall effectiveness of the funds in addressing the very 
pronounced social and economic challenges across the region, accumulated over 
the greater part of a century, is therefore, as with earlier initiatives intended to 
benefit the Valleys, not readily apparent and difficult to gauge with an appropriate 
degree of confidence.  
 
WEFO’s assessments have concluded that EU initiatives have represented an 
overall, though qualified, success according to the initial objectives and across the 
entirety of the programme area (WEFO, 2007:3) (WEFO, 2011:8). However, with 
the exception of monitoring documents on certain specific projects and published 
data on achievements within the UAs, there remains no comprehensive evaluation 
of their effectiveness within the Valleys specifically. The seven UAs collectively 
accounted for 44% of the population of the programme area as of 2011 
(StatsWales, 2016), yet this did not, apparently, render them candidates for a 
substantially greater share of the European funds on offer, or of closer assessment 
and direction once operational. The lack of more sustained, sub-regional analysis of 
their impact upon the area is surprising, given that WEFO publications have clearly 
identified and analysed the region’s specific needs such as its higher rates of 
economic inactivity (WEFO, 2010:15;16).  
 
The previously standalone WEFO website was transferred on to the Welsh 
Government’s pages in December 2015 (WCVA, 2015), and while the number of 
reports and information for earlier programmes appears to be somewhat lower than 
those on the previous site, with a clearer focus on current EU structural funds, 
updated factsheets detailing the outputs of Convergence funds upon each UA are 
accessible (Welsh Government, 2016). Data regarding the impacts of the scheme 
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has generally been disaggregated to far greater extent than data on the scheme’s 
funding; with inevitable implications for evaluating their impact. WEFO’s monitoring 
procedures would, however, be singled out for comment in a 2012 report by the 
National Assembly’s Finance Committee. While its internal monitoring of 
expenditure was considered intensive, if not excessive by surveyed stakeholders, its 
collection of outcome data beyond the primary figures on selected outputs such as 
jobs created was more problematic and raised questions as to “whether this 
monitoring … was even focussed on the right outcomes to begin with” (National 
Assembly for Wales Finance Committee, 2012:65). While partly attributing this gap 
to absence of longitudinal and comprehensive, “predefined indicators” (National 
Assembly for Wales Finance Committee, 2012:65) at an EU level, WEFO’s lack of a 
comprehensive  outcome monitoring system was classed as an institution-specific 
shortcoming (National Assembly for Wales Finance Committee, 2012:67). Similar 
limitations in the recording of outcome data have been identified within the literature 
relating to structural aid programmes across all eligible UK regions, suggesting that 
Wales’ data issues may not have been wholly anomalous (What Works Centre, 
2016:9).  
 
Reflecting, or perhaps resulting from these constraints is an absence of Valleys-
specific evaluations of the funds. Only one of WEFO’s reports relating to the 2007-
2013 period is exclusively or predominantly focused on the Valleys, and it 
addresses a topical though ultimately tangential issue; the experiences of recent 
Eastern European migrants to the area (Jones & Lever, 2014). Individual project 
evaluations of regeneration schemes in Rhondda Cynon Taff (AECOM & Robert 
Chapman & Company, 2013abc) or the Valleys Cycle Network (Peter Brett 
Associates, 2013), provide a wealth of information on individual projects, yet only for 
Convergence projects and without synthesising them into a holistic assessment of 
the programme’s effect on the region, or at times individual communities as a whole. 
Methodologically, the latter reports generally conform to the features of process 
evaluations: focusing primarily on initiative-specific outputs and methods of 
operation, more than on assessing their regional impact.  
 
Given the operationally expansive objectives of European structural aid, including, 
but not limited to: support for creating jobs and preparing individuals for 
employment, funding training schemes, developing business support initiatives, the 
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pursuit of environmental conservation and sustainability efforts and urban 
regeneration (Welsh Government, 2016), it can not be readily divided by Eisinger’s 
binary typology. Neither does it comply succinctly with one individual economic 
theory. The primary goal of Objective 1 was the development of economically 
lagging regions and to “narrow the gap between” (Bovis, 2011:91) them and the 
remainder of the Union (Bauer, 2001:37). It was, however,  comprised of four sub-
streams; each focusing upon a different remit and ranging from agricultural and 
environmental projects to investments in social and human capital to support for job 
creation, infrastructure and business development (Members’ Research Service, 
2006:1) (European Commission, 2014) (European Commission, 2015) (WEFO, 
2016). Convergence funds consisted of two streams: the development-focused 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the population-centred 
European Social Fund (ESF) (Woolford & Hunt, 2016:2) (National Assembly for 
Wales Finance Committee, 2012:5). With the former complying to a greater extent 
with supply-side notions, and the latter more to endogenous theories and demand-
side approaches, with its emphasis on investing in and cultivating the human 
resources of the region, the European funds can be said to have represented a 
theoretical and structural hybrid. They aimed to influence an array of different 
trends, were assessed via a range of metrics and were consistent with multiple 
economic theories. While it may not be possible to quantify the effect of this 
hybridity upon the performance of the funds, it is worth noting the differing 
theoretical and practical directions in which they were pulled in any discussion of 
their administration.  
 
The commitment of the Welsh Government to addressing regional development 
through its own policymaking processes was outlined more concretely with the 
publication of the Wales Spatial Plan, People, Places, Futures in 2004. While 
initially focused on planning policy, it evolved into “one of the principal policy 
documents of the Assembly” (Harris, 2012:99); concerned with the spatial 
dimensions of numerous fields of public policy (Harris, 2012:99). The plan was 
praised for acknowledging the heterogeneity of Wales, and for its recognition of the 
process of “divergent development” (Morgan, 1998:248) (Harris, 2012:100) which 
was evident within Wales itself. Valleys communities suffered from substantially 
weaker performance in skills and economic activity than more developed regions of 
South-East or even mid-Wales (Harris, 2012:100). The plan specifically referred to 
the particular socio-economic difficulties found in the upper or “Heads” of the 
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Valleys (Jones et al, 2011:641), and especially the region’s significantly above-
average rates of economic inactivity (WAG, 2004:17).  
 
In response, the plan separated the Valleys into two geographic segments: 
Swansea Bay - Waterfront and West Valleys; which covered the western reaches, 
and South East Wales; which comprised the remainder. It differed considerably in 
the detail afforded to both regions, particularly given the inclusion of the Eastern 
Valleys alongside Cardiff and Newport within its operational boundaries. The 
proposals for the Western Valleys were briefer and tied to a significant extent to the 
development of Swansea's waterfront, the reclamation of brownfield sites in the 
region (particularly in Neath and Port Talbot) and increased collaboration between 
and integration into the regional economy of the region's higher and further 
education institutions  (WAG, 2004:55). It outlined a two-track approach for the 
redevelopment for the Eastern Valleys: greater integration into the coastal core 
through enhanced transport links and a “programme of joined-up regeneration 
action along the Heads of the Valleys corridor” (WAG, 2004:49). The latter was 
seen to be the key to attracting further investment, residents and promoting a 
general increase in the region’s level of development. This component featured a 
particular emphasis on the towns of Merthyr Tydfil and Ebbw Vale; which it identified 
as the “catalysts” (WAG, 2004:50) for wider regional regeneration. These towns 
were to be physically regenerated, and their connections to smaller nearby towns 
such as Aberdare and Brynmawr enhanced to ensure a general diffusion of 
regenerative efforts and associated multipliers across the region (WAG, 2004:50).  
 
 
The plan’s other, more extensive, recommendation for the redevelopment of the 
Eastern Valleys was the formation of a networked “Capital region”. This would 
integrate the area with the more prosperous and connected regions of Cardiff and 
Newport (Hunt, 2011:8) to create a “networked city region of 1.4 million people” 
(WAG, 2008:98). By linking the Valleys to the two largest cities in the South-East 
through means such as enhanced transport links, it would “spread prosperity” 
(WAG, 2004:49) to more peripheral areas, and, over time, bring the region into the 
economic core of South Wales. The strategic vision for South Wales contained 
within the Spatial Plan retained ambitions of a comparable scale to those of the 
NEDS, though it outlined a clearer mechanism for actualising them; one which 
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sought to increase the attractiveness of its outlying regions to employers and 
investors by enmeshing them with some of its most economically advanced.  
 
 
As with earlier efforts, this vision remained somewhat programmatically and 
theoretically ambiguous. It aimed to capitalise on the strengths of the broader region 
to uplift its weaker, northern reaches; with a more long-term view related to 
infrastructural and, eventually, economic convergence. This made it a supply-side 
objective with certain differences, and one with clearer connections to the more 
applied variants of endogenous growth theory - particularly Porter’s emphasis on 
the criticality of infrastructure to both cluster formation and boosting competiveness 
(1998:637).  However, in spite of identifying a specific mechanism for the longer-
term development of the Valleys, further details regarding how this development 
was to be promoted were scant. While emphasising the importance of human 
capital, and the region’s HE institutions, its main commitment to enhancing it was 
vaguer; referring to increasing collaboration between relevant educational 
institutions, the development agencies and local businesses and “intervention[s]  on 
skill development” (WAG, 2004:53). Its proposals for increasing the region’s human 
capital reserves therefore relied primarily on national policy instruments such as 
investment in early years education (WAG, 2004:53). Its infrastructural proposals 
featured greater specificity, referring to increased rail provision and the upgrading of 
the A465 (WAG, 2004:53), though progress on these would vary considerably, and 
they were intended as explicitly long-term projects.  Its primary proposal of 
developing a metro system of transportation and upgrading existing links would 
prove costly and, expectedly, time-intensive; with the majority of its developments 
yet to commence as of 2016 (BBC Wales, 2016a). Structurally, it continued the 
programmatic hybridity seen in the PFV, particularly with its pursuit of urban 
regeneration policies as a means of promoting redevelopment alongside the 
deployment of more conventional supply-side instruments of regional policy. It was, 
however, distinguished from the PFV by its reduced emphasis on direct financial 
inducements and a clearer framework for regional integration, particularly regarding 
transport links.  
 
While the Spatial Plan aimed to address the variety of challenges faced by different 
areas, significant changes were also occurring within the broader administration of 
economic development policy (Goodwin et al, 2003:6). During the same year, the 
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First Minister announced a wide-ranging reorganisation of leading QUANGOs or, as 
subsequently identified, Assembly Sponsored Public Bodies (ASPBs): since 
characterised as a “bonfire” (WalesOnline, 2004). Major bodies with responsibilities 
regarding economic development and affiliated fields were to be abolished and their 
operations transferred to the Welsh Assembly Government. The WDA, the skills and 
training body, Education and Learning Wales (ELWa) and the Wales Tourist Board 
would all see their activities subsumed into the Government by 2006. The 
amalgamation is considered an act of proactive agenda-setting by the Assembly 
Government: informed by a historical unease between the Welsh Labour 
government and the WDA, and a normative and political decision, as much as an 
empirical or economic one (Rawlings, 2003:361). While rationalised on the grounds 
of increasing efficiency and accountability, it may have been the WDA’s and its 
counterparts’ independence  from the government, and their association with an 
administratively stratified, “top-down” approach to development that spurred their 
abolition more than a reputation for inefficiency and  a lack of accountability 
(Rawlings, 2003:361) (Cole, 2006:77). The bonfire, conducted in spite of reviews 
which found the contemporary WDA to be a largely effective agency, was an 
emphatic “statement that devolution matter[ed]” (Cole, 2006:77) (Rawlings, 
2003:362). The dispute over the wisdom of abolishing the WDA has continued to 
reverberate, with critics noting the lack of commercial awareness and adequate 
independence of the Welsh Government bodies which assumed its responsibilities 
(Holtham, 2015:26). 
 
On matters of wider regional development and the Spatial Plan’s regeneration 
objectives specifically, the government was pursuing similarly concrete, though 
ultimately less contentious initiatives. The Heads of the Valleys (HOTV) 
Programme; one of the largest regeneration efforts targeted towards the region 
since the PFV, was launched in 2006. Intended as a 15 year strategy, it was aimed 
at the five local authorities which collectively comprised the “Heads of the Valleys” 
(Rhondda Cynon Taf, Caerphilly, Blaenau Gwent, Torfaen and Merthyr Tydfil): the 
area deemed the hardest to help. Its main objectives were to improve the natural 
and built environment of the region by redeveloping blighted and disused areas, to 
increase the skillset of the local population and to promote leisure and tourism 
within the region (WAG, 2006b:4) (Clapham, 2014:11). The Assembly Government 
pledged £140 million in government funds to promote private sector investment; 
which it was hoped would reach at least £360 million. It aimed to establish 
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“balanced” (WAG, 2006b:7) Valley communities comprised of effective local 
amenities and services (WAG, 2006b:7). 
 
The regeneration scheme sought to transform the Valleys into a “nationally 
competitive business and investment location” (WAG, 2006b:20) by 2020. Unlike 
the NEDS, whose objectives were notably specific, those of the HOTV scheme were 
more operationally vague, such as increasing “business and community confidence” 
(WAG, 2006b: 30) in the area. The scheme was ended in 2014, six years ahead of 
the original schedule and was superseded by the Vibrant and Viable Places (VVP) 
scheme. Its successor was seen to be more consistent with the “more collaborative 
and targeted approach to regeneration” (Welsh Government, 2013) which did not 
necessarily end at specific “boundaries or borders” (Welsh Government, 2013). VVP 
is expected to invest £42 million in five selected towns (Bridgend, Merthyr Tydfil, 
Port Talbot, Pontypridd and Pontypool) across the Valleys by its conclusion in 2017 
(Welsh Government, 2014a). In addition to the cancellation of the Heads initiative, 
the upgrading of the A465 road, the main road link in the Upper Valleys, intended to 
transform it into a dual-carriageway capable of increased usage and to improve 
links between the Midlands and South Wales, has seen many of its initial targets 
delayed; with a current estimate for completion by 2022 (Welsh Government, 
2016f).  
 
Data on total expenditure for the HOTV regeneration scheme during its eight years 
of operation was obtained through an FOI request (Table 2.7). A total of 
£241,476,100 was expended on the initiative (Welsh Government Correspondence, 
2015): around £100 million above the traditional figure cited for this “£140m 
regeneration strategy” (Welsh Government, 2014). £167,372,253 or 69% of the total 
could be disaggregated by UA, while the remainder “cut across local authorities” 
(Welsh Government Correspondence, 2015). As with the European funds, multi-
authority projects and partnerships can inhibit accurately identifying the location of 
every pound spent on a project, although overall conclusions regarding the 
distribution of geographically identifiable funding can be reached.  
 
Of the five participating UAs, Blaenau Gwent received £84 million in identifiable 
funds: amounting to 35% of all expenditure on the programme and making it the 
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recipient of a clear plurality of identifiable programme spending. While a 
considerable degree of the programme’s funding was frontloaded, with 52% of 
identifiable funding granted between 2006 and 2009, 2012 saw the award of £41.2 
million to Blaenau Gwent Borough Council: the single largest allocation made to any 
authority. That this was granted during a period in the scheme’s lifecycle when 
expenditure was being wound down suggests that the Welsh Government retained 
a greater level of commitment to the upper reaches of this authority than it may 
have done for others in the Heads region. While the available dataset does not 
specify the projects for which the funding was dedicated, the continuing 
redevelopment of the former steelworks site in Ebbw Vale and the regeneration of 
its town centre would be consistent with expenditure of this magnitude (Welsh 
Government, 2013) (Evans, 2013). 
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Table 2.7: Identifiable expenditure on the Heads of the Valleys regeneration scheme (2006-2012) 
 
Blaenau Gwent Caerphilly Merthyr Tydfil Rhondda Cynon Taf Torfaen 
Year Amount (£) Year Amount (£) Year Amount (£) Year Amount (£) Year Amount (£) 
2006 £5,488,137 2006 £2,978,552 2006 £4,187,260 2006 £1,181,000 2006 £2,640,366 
2007 £1,298,293 2007 £930,406 2007 £553,312 2007 £5,230,418 2007 £1,826,408 
2008 £4,126,464 2008 £2,687,179 2008 £2,861,593 2008 £1,019,018 2008 £3,047,759 
2009 £21,184,960 2009 £8,272,791 2009 £6,501,596 2009 £6,232,511 2009 £5,680,673 
2010 £10,727,885 2010 £4,713,485 2010 £5,159,492 2010 £6,265,800 2010 £8,094,987 
2011 £442,983 2011 £244,760 2011 £938,706 2011 £19,232 2011 £35,000 
2012 £41,223,642 2012 £70,000 2012 £100,000 2012 £967,588 2012 £440,000 
Total £84,492,364 Total £19,897,172 Total £20,301,958 Total £20,915,567 Total £21,765,193 
66 
 
 
Available performance indicators note the creation of 483 gross jobs created, with 
another 579 jobs “accommodated” (Table 2.8) and a total of £43.7 million in induced 
investment was attributed to the scheme. A number of the remaining outputs for 
which data appears to have been collated related to developments in the physical 
landscape and infrastructure of the region: from the amount of land which was 
developed to the length of new or refurbished cycle-ways. A possible reason for the 
prioritisation of these metrics may be that ministerial responsibility for regeneration 
did not fall within the portfolio of the relevant Minister for the Economy, but rather in 
the separate and varied brief of the Minister for Social Justice and Regeneration, 
then the Minister for Communities and Tackling Poverty and, most recently, the 
Minister for Communities and Children (Jones & Evans, 2008:27) (Welsh 
Government, 2016). Responsibility for economic development, in contrast, has 
fallen within the portfolio of the Minister with responsibility for the Economy ever 
since the absorption of the WDA and allied QUANGOs into the Government in 2006 
(Assembly Research Service, 2008:1). Its initial remit emphasised a comprehensive 
approach to regeneration: spanning economic, social and environmental metrics 
(Clapham, 2014:11). The extent to which this was, or could be, pursued while 
formally residing within a brief with fewer direct corollaries to economic 
development, however, appears to be an open question and one which merits 
further examination. 
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Table 2.8: Selected indicators for the HOTV regeneration scheme 
 
Enterprises financially supported 206 
Footpath or cycleway created or 
reconstructed 
277.641 km 
Initiatives to address barriers to ICT 
uptake 
11 
Intermodal facilities created or improved 27 
Land developed – Employment 30,761 m2 
Land developed - other 60.97 ha 
Managed access to Countryside or Coast 
projects 
39 
Organisations financially supported 75 
Participants 4864 
Physical improvement schemes 1079 
Regeneration schemes 53 
Enterprises accommodated 116 
Gross jobs created 483.77 
Investment induced £43,685,120 
Jobs accommodated 579.59 
SMEs accommodated 35 
Premises created or refurbished 63 
Visits 2,497,629 
Organisations assisted 152 
 
Reflecting the bifurcation of the Valleys between two regions in the Spatial Plan, a 
smaller-scale, though geographically more expansive, initiative, aimed at the 
western reaches of the former South Wales coalfield was initiated in 2009. The 
Western Valleys Regeneration Area (WVRA) would span the UAs of 
Carmarthenshire, Powys, Swansea, Neath Port Talbot and Bridgend. It sought to 
promote greater investment and employment, improve transport links, remediate the 
physical environment and enhance the human capital and skillsets of local residents 
(Welsh Government, 2014b). A total of £20.7 million of Welsh Government funds 
were said to have been committed to this initiative between its inception in April 
2009 and its conclusion in March 2014 (Welsh Government, 2014b). While fewer 
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funds were committed from Welsh Government sources, statements regarding the 
scheme outlined its ability to leverage an estimated £41 million in funding from 
additional sources, particularly from European structural funds (Welsh Government, 
2014b).  
 
An FOI request yielded some clarification regarding its funding:  63% of total Welsh 
Government expenditure on the initiative went to the two Valleys UAs of Bridgend 
and, particularly, Neath Port Talbot (Table 2.9). The most recent data on additional 
funding sources places the aggregate amount committed by other organisations at 
£44.6 million across the entire programme area (Welsh Government 
Correspondence, 2016). Of note, however, is that European funds account for 32% 
of additional funds, while 50% of total additional funding came from the UAs 
themselves, while the remainder was provided by private (7%), third (2%) and other 
public sector entities (9%) (Welsh Government Correspondence, 2016).  Progress 
outputs placed the number of jobs created across all five participating UAs over the 
scheme’s lifetime at 53, while the number of those accommodated came to 192, 
although a breakdown by UA for either metric does not appear to be readily 
available (Welsh Government Correspondence, 2016). The amount of investment 
induced by the scheme across all five participating UAs reached £3.75 million 
(Welsh Government, 2016).  Upon its conclusion, the WVRA was enveloped into 
VVP, as its larger counterpart in the upper Valleys was (Welsh Government, 
2014b).  
 
Table 2.9: Welsh Government expenditure on the Western Valleys Regeneration 
Area (WVRA) (2009-2014) 
Unitary Authority WVRA funds 
(£) 
Bridgend £5,470,731 
Carmarthenshire £4,886,922 
Neath Port Talbot £8,090,874 
Powys £1,504,800 
Swansea £1,449,965 
Total £21,403,292 
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There has been no sustained evaluation of the either the HOTV or WVRA schemes 
comparable to the one commissioned by the former Welsh Office for the PFV. A 
number of dissertations have, however, analysed the HOTV initiative; often 
informed by surveys of residents and relevant stakeholders such as Owens (2012) 
and Todd-Jones (2010). These have tended to identify the ambiguous nature of the 
HOTV region as a geographic entity (Owens, 2012:1) (Todd-Jones, 2010:43) as a 
source of operational confusion and inter-authority and intra-authority disputes. An 
emphasis on physical projects and “things you can see” (Todd-Jones, 2010:44), 
rather than the holistic one that economic development may have required, was 
anecdotally cited as a particular barrier to its regenerative effectiveness (Todd-
Jones, 2010:45).  A further complication was presented by the often limited capacity 
of local officials to receive and deliver the funds, despite the amount of assistance 
given being “relatively modest” (Winckler, 2008:16) and generally viewed as 
insufficient by local administrators  (Todd-Jones, 2010:37;38;55). The £240 million 
expended during the scheme’s eight years of operation also remained “nowhere 
near” (Todd-Jones, 2010:38) the £496 million allocated to the CBDC two decades 
before, fuelling further complaints regarding the geographically skewed distribution 
of regeneration funds (Todd-Jones, 2010:38). 
 
The selection of projects and choice of indicators within both WVRA and HOTV 
regeneration schemes suggested a narrowing of their objectives to those featuring 
tangible, physical outputs. This may be unavoidable, given that responsibilities for 
economic development and regeneration lay within separate portfolios, yet the need 
for greater synchronisation between support for businesses, the development of 
appropriate transport infrastructure and targeted physical regeneration appeared to 
be increasingly undeniable as the first decade of devolved governance wore on. 
That the department tasked with responsibility for an overall economic development 
strategy, and of overseeing the region’s primary heavy infrastructure development 
did - and does not - bear responsibility for its regeneration means that such efforts 
may have lacked the full force that a combined and cohesive brief could have 
brought to bear upon it. This created an avoidable split between “area-based 
regeneration” (Clapham, 2014:2); which focused on improving outcomes for 
residents, and “area-based economic development” (Clapham, 2014:2); which 
aimed to improve the economic standing of specific areas.  
 
70 
 
Programmatically, both regeneration initiatives approximated urban policies to a 
greater extent than regional ones; a distinction which is therefore reflected in the 
primary outputs for which data is available. Perhaps to a greater extent than seen 
with the earlier PFV, the rationale behind both interventions was that targeted 
revitalisation efforts directed at the appearance and environment of individual areas 
could be sufficient to promote the development of the remainder (WAG, 2004:52). 
Unlike its antecedent, however, neither initiative appears to have deployed regional 
business assistance to anything approaching the same degree; an omission which 
speaks to their more ambiguous roles as economic development efforts, but also to 
their more demand-side goals. Both aimed to capitalise upon the region’s strengths 
to attract new residents and economic activity, although this was to occur in tandem 
with the enhancement of infrastructure specified in the Spatial Plan. While the 
adoption of “holistic” (Pike et al, 2006:256) development efforts which incorporate 
economic and environmental goals was increasing internationally, it appears that 
both the WVRA and HOTV initiatives may have in fact elevated the physical and 
social environment over economic factors, and to have pursued a strategy more 
akin to those for specific urban areas rather than for considerable swathes of South 
Wales. The highly localised effects of urban policy remain one of the primary 
obstacles to its deployment across a wider geographic scale: it can not, and, in 
many cases, does not aspire to significantly influence the direction of the regional 
economy (McCann, 2001:244). 
 
This ambiguity over the appropriate scale at which its regeneration initiatives should 
be directed may have been aggravated by a comparatively weak evaluative 
process, unclear metrics and issues of data accessibility.  When evaluations were 
conducted, they were often “undertaken by the project teams themselves” 
(Clapham, 2014:11) and focused upon general outputs in the absence of explicit 
and clearly measurable targets (Clapham, 2014:11) or, indeed, a clear definition of 
policy aims for the wider region. Continuing and “ex post” (Armstrong & Taylor, 
2000:362;364) evaluations are considered a prerequisite for ensuring the 
effectiveness of economic development policies, yet successive Welsh Government 
programmes would be initiated, approved or discontinued on the basis of 
comparatively slight analytical evidence or, in the case of the WDA’s abolition, in 
spite of evidence to the contrary. A perceived tendency for projects to be approved 
by acclamation, without significant empirical justification or conditions and “with little 
room for outside influences or independent evidence” (Clapham, 2014:16) had 
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begun to be identified with regard to devolved Welsh policymaking. Whether this 
trend would continue into subsequent Assemblies remained uncertain, however 
there would be little doubt that the composition of the Welsh Government, its overall 
development strategy and powers were to evolve considerably.  
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2.4: 2007 - 2016: Dragon lift-off - the Third to Fifth Assemblies  
 
The formation of the Labour-Plaid Cymru coalition in June 2007 saw the primary 
policy commitments outlined in the One Wales: A Progressive Agenda for 
Government accord. The somewhat expansive objective of this agreement was a 
“self-confident, prosperous, healthy nation and society which is fair to all” (Osmond, 
2007:97). Echoing the Spatial Plan in its acknowledgement of Welsh diversity, the 
accord pledged an “all-Wales approach to economic development” (One Wales, 
2007:14). It enumerated a number of largely supply-side strategies such as 
streamlining and increasing business assistance and simplifying procurement 
procedures to increase job creation (One Wales, 2007:14). This implied a 
continuation within the broadly neoclassical vein which had established itself as 
close to a de facto theoretical underpinning of regional development efforts. It 
featured a comparatively perfunctory commitment to human capital enhancement 
for economic purposes; affirming  support for upskilling existing curricula to meet 
employers’ requirements and preferences and increased entrepreneurial and 
vocation education (One Wales, 2007:15).  One Wales did commit itself to targeting 
job-creation to the “areas in greatest need” (Osmond, 2007:103) of employment and 
pledged to operate within the guidelines specified in the Spatial Plan.  It also 
committed to “integrated and cross-cutting initiatives aimed at [the] economic 
development and regeneration” (One Wales, 2007:28) of distressed regions. This 
indicated its recognition of the bifurcation between both types of policy, though 
further elaboration upon the form these initiatives would take was not immediately 
forthcoming.  Specific commitments to the Valleys were more limited, with the 
coalition agreement’s primary pledge to the region being a progression of both 
regeneration schemes (Osmond, 2007:104). Individual elements within Plaid did 
seek more stringent commitments from Labour as a precondition for coalition. One 
such commitment was for the Treasury to accede to £500 million in match funding 
for Convergence projects in the West Wales and Valleys region (Osmond, 2007:34). 
These and other proposals by dissenting voices within Plaid were, however, omitted 
from formal negotiations and were not seen as politically viable; with the leadership 
viewing the securement of a referendum on further law-making powers as the 
overriding objective (Osmond, 2007:34). 
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Following on from its commitment in One Wales, business support services were 
rapidly streamlined: falling from over 150 to 40 between 2006 and 2008, while the 
formation of the Single Investment Fund (SIF) - a more targeted grant - was 
announced in 2008 (Wales Online, 2008). This replaced RSA and aimed to support 
larger investments: with typical grants of £5,000 or more (WEFO, 2009). The 
replacement of RSA did not negate the fundamentally supply-side nature of 
discretionary, grants-based assistance to firms, nor its objectives of reducing 
business costs for the undertaking of specific projects, although it did speak to a 
growing awareness of its limitations.  
 
Further understanding of these limitations had been bolstered by the research of 
Criscuolo & Martin (2008a;2008b).Commissioned by the Welsh Government and 
employing an econometric approach to assess whether RSA grants had a causal 
effect on the productivity or employment of assisted plants within Wales between 
1985 and 2004, the authors concluded that the assistance exerted a “significant 
positive” (Criscuolo & Martin, 2008b:37) impact upon employment in the plants, but 
that its effects on firm productivity could not be determined (Criscuolo & Martin, 
2008b:37). While initially concerned with job creation and retention rather than 
productivity, RSA’s remit was gradually revised to emphasise the latter as well 
(Harris & Robinson, 2005:754). RSA’s relationship to firm productivity would be of 
particular relevance to Wales and the Valleys: as lower productivity and value-
added per-job has traditionally constituted one of the primary drivers of the disparity 
between Welsh and UK indicators (WEFO, 2010:14;20).  
 
The ambiguity surrounding RSA’s effect on productivity was compounded by the 
relatively limited presence of value-added heavy jobs. This was reflected in both the 
comparatively small number of firms with headquarters or research departments 
within Wales, as well as by the lighter footprint of sectors which traditionally led in 
the field of value-added and, particularly, financial services (WEFO, 2010:20). The 
apparently limited ability of the primary regional assistance programme to 
adequately reverse the “adverse and long standing occupational and industry mix” 
(WEFO, 2011:20) over the previous decades would be one of continuing 
significance to the economies of both Wales and the Valleys; with the lack of 
industrial diversification even more amplified in the latter (WEFO, 2010:22). 
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Earlier assessments of RSA had arrived at more equivocal conclusions regarding its 
overall effectiveness. Harris & Robinson (2005) had concluded that, while receipt of 
RSA was positively correlated with plant survival between 1990 and 1998, this was 
achieved at the cost of improved productivity (Harris & Robinson, 2005:756;761). 
Supported by RSA, less productive plants within areas receiving the greatest funds, 
such as Wales, were permitted to stay in operation longer than may have been 
expected given their level of output (Harris & Robinson, 2005:761). RSA may have 
therefore inhibited the “creative destruction” (Harris & Robinson, 2005:761) and 
natural churn needed to sustain productive and profitable industries which ultimately 
contribute to economic development in the longer-term. With this body of evidence, 
including a study specifically commissioned by it, reforming Wales’ business 
assistance schemes represented a logical exercise of the Welsh Government’s 
evolving priorities and powers. While its later decision to streamline business 
assistance would be empirically grounded, the distribution of the funds themselves 
following devolution, however, opens itself to greater ambivalence. 
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Table 2.10: Expenditure on business assistance schemes by the Welsh Government by Valleys UA (1999-2015) 
 
Financial Blaenau 
Bridgend Caerphilly 
Merthyr Neath Rhondda 
Torfaen Total Year Gwent Tydfil Port Cynon 
      Talbot Taf 
1999-
2000 
£3,923,916 £5,999,856 £5,856,403 £1,720,000 £599,548 £5,584,723 £969,500 £24,653,946 
2000-
2001 
£3,743,750 £2,675,600 £3,632,771 £3,665,520 £544,836 £4,162,068 £1,456,250 £19,880,795 
2001-
2002 
£4,612,008 £1,552,070 £5,566,895 £6,508,980 £2,494,576 £4,011,780 £2,175,125 £26,921,434 
2002-
2003 
£3,928,878 £7,528,761 £9,171,475 £3,429,553 £3,403,427 £8,395,996 £2,929,250 £38,787,340 
2003-
2004 
£4,420,718 £2,984,053 £7,415,952 £1,563,136 £2,659,256 £5,753,807 £4,003,470 £28,800,392 
2004-
2005 
£3,140,750 £16,129,250 £8,744,324 £2,959,865 £1,659,779 £8,464,119 £3,791,275 £44,889,362 
2005-
2006 
£1,745,993 £4,981,376 £9,892,435 £141,000 £3,844,931 £4,798,244 £3,212,400 £28,616,379 
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Financial Blaenau 
Bridgend Caerphilly 
Merthyr Neath Rhondda 
Torfaen Total Year Gwent Tydfil Port Cynon 
      Talbot Taf 
2006-
2007 
£4,553,812 £4,921,380 £6,161,226 £1,845,741 £5,137,652 £3,857,128 £1,991,857 £28,468,796 
2007-
2008 
£3,283,685 £17,095,403 £5,237,060 £1,267,000 £5,178,268 £9,428,163 £2,490,000 £43,979,579 
2008-
2009 
£4,199,535 £11,368,000 £4,673,300 £513,198 £3,851,546 £4,842,971 £3,029,210 £32,477,760 
2009-
2010 
£2,030,002 £17,256,684 £3,998,322 £372,000 £4,642,393 £4,214,239 £2,030,107 £34,543,747 
2010-
2011 
£2,596,082 £12,312,686 £7,526,347 £1,305,000 £1,104,891 £2,938,057 £3,128,756 £30,911,819 
2011-
2012 
£1,947,710 £1,990,367 £4,387,354 £442,169 £3,789,106 £1,414,453 £2,747,937 £16,719,096 
2012-
2013 
£2,944,902 £2,654,547 £3,935,550 £1,075,800 £4,097,960 £5,025,226 £2,448,902 £22,182,887 
2013-
2014 
£2,663,800 £3,929,838 £4,728,254 £100,000 £3,669,850 £2,444,939 £1,299,404 £18,836,085 
2014-
2015 
£3,286,000 £9,158,000 £4,712,000 £96,000 £1,449,000 £3,004,000 £2,162,000 £23,867,000 
2015-
2016 
£4,764,000 £6,049,000 £4,704,000 £5,841,000 £3,720,000 £7,253,000 £2,474,000 £34,805,000 
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Financial Blaenau 
Bridgend Caerphilly 
Merthyr Neath Rhondda 
Torfaen Total Year Gwent Tydfil Port Cynon 
      Talbot Taf 
Total 
£57,785,54
1 
£128,586,87
1 
£100,343,66
8 
£32,845,96
2 
£51,847,01
9 
£85,592,91
3 
£42,339,44
3 
£499,341,41
7 
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The amount of funding distributed to Valleys UAs under the auspices of the primary 
business assistance programmes between 1999 and 2015 is included in Table 2.10 
and, while care must be taken not to infer too much into a programme’s 
effectiveness from a limited dataset, certain trends regarding the distribution and 
volume of the assistance can be discerned; as can the extent to which these varied 
with fluctuations in regional employment trends. A plurality of total funds (26%) were 
allocated to Bridgend, followed by Caerphilly (20%), Rhondda Cynon Taf (17%), 
Neath Port Talbot (10%), Blaenau Gwent (12%), Torfaen (8%) and Merthyr Tydfil 
(7%). Given that a proposed overhaul of business assistance programmes would 
occur during the Third Assembly, it is somewhat noteworthy that a plurality of these 
funds (32%) were allocated during the 2007-2011 period.  
 
The strong representation of Bridgend among allocated funds appears 
counterintuitive given its comparatively favourable economic performance, with 
unemployment rates consistently below the Valleys average (Table 2.11). The 
preliminary relationship between expenditure and UA unemployment rates is 
examined by means of bivariate correlation coefficients in Table 2.12. Overall, there 
appears to be a comparatively strong negative relationship (-0.59) between average 
annual unemployment rates across the Valleys and the total amount of business 
assistance spending across the region. This indicates that an increase in one had 
tended to correlate with a decrease in the other. A number of potential explanations 
for this finding exist. There would be a transition away from grants beginning in 
2010 (Welsh Government, 2010:42): a period of comparatively high unemployment 
across the region. As illustrated within Figure 2.2, the three years of lowest 
expenditure were among those with the highest average unemployment rates. 
 
The results also tentatively suggest that there was a notably strong negative 
relationship between both unemployment and business assistance within Blaenau 
Gwent (-0.61); with the 54% fall in business assistance to the authority between 
2008 and 2011 occurring during a less than auspicious interval in which its 
unemployment rate more than doubled. The one authority for which a positive 
correlation appears, Bridgend, remains problematic due to the general weakness of 
the relationship (+0.1). This may be more attributable to Bridgend’s comparatively 
resilient labour market, and its ability to withstand the rise in unemployment to a 
greater extent than to any variation in distribution. Bridgend would also see 
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considerable real-term reductions in assistance of 82% between 2008 and 2011; 
compared to an average fall of 49% across the Valleys.  
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Table 2.11: International Labour Organisation (ILO) unemployment rates in Valleys UAs, 2001-2015 
 
Wales West 
Wales 
and 
the 
Valleys 
Blaenau 
Gwent 
Bridgend Caerphilly Merthyr 
Tydfil 
Neath 
Port 
Talbot 
Rhondda 
Cynon 
Taf 
Torfaen Valleys 
Average 
2001 5.4 6.0 7.7 4.6 8.5 7.1 6.1 5.9 5.8 6.53 
2002 5.2 5.8 6.3 4.8 6.8 6.7 8.6 6.3 5.8 6.47 
2003 5.0 5.4 7.4 3.9 5.2 5.4 6.9 6.9 5.5 5.89 
2004 4.7 5.1 7.1 3.7 6.9 6.7 6.6 5.4 4.8 5.89 
2005 5.1 5.4 8.6 6.2 6.5 7.9 7.3 6.4 6.2 7.01 
2006 5.2 5.6 8.5 7.8 5.9 10.3 6.2 5.5 4.9 7.01 
2007 5.5 5.7 6.5 7.1 6.1 8.2 5.1 6.7 6.8 6.64 
2008 6.3 6.7 7.8 7.6 7.5 7.5 5.4 7.1 8.1 7.29 
2009 8.2 8.8 15.3 8.7 11.8 13.7 9.7 9.1 11.0 11.33 
2010 8.3 8.5 12.5 7.9 9.2 11.0 8.9 11.6 8.7 9.97 
2011 8.3 9.0 15.5 7.5 11.2 14.9 10.4 10.4 11.3 11.60 
2012 8.3 8.5 15.3 9.1 9.0 12.1 7.1 12.6 13.1 11.19 
2013 7.9 8.4 15.3 6.9 7.6 9.9 9.0 11.7 11.1 10.21 
2014 6.8 7.2 12.4 6.9 9.9 7.1 6.9 7.0 8.8 8.43 
2015 6.0 6.5 9.3 6.9 6.8 8.0 6.9 6.8 6.6 7.33 
StatsWales (2016) 
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Table 2.12: Correlation coefficients between ILO unemployment rates and business assistance expenditure, 2001-2015 
Blaenau 
Gwent 
Bridgend Caerphilly Merthyr 
Tydfil 
Neath Port 
Talbot 
Rhondda Cynon 
Taf 
Torfaen  Valleys 
average 
-0.617498037 
 
0.106731942 
 
-0.521400488 
 
-0.386470729 
 
-0.092038721 
 
-0.525924075 
 
-
0.44825 
 
-0.592129634 
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Figure 2.2: Scatter plot for average annual unemployment rates across all Valleys UAs and aggregate annual business assistance 
expenditure, 2001-2015 
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The reasons behind this considerable drop-off in assistance lay with a rethinking of 
its objectives and mechanisms by the Welsh Government.  The most 
comprehensive revision of the Government’s approach came with the publication of 
the Economic Renewal strategy in 2010. With the impact of the financial crisis 
continuing to reverberate and the prospect of the devolution of greater law-making 
powers the following year, the Welsh Government opted for a “fundamental review” 
(Wyn-Jones, 2011) of its overall economic development strategy. Shunning the 
more expansive goals of the NEDS, it aimed for a “whole government” (Welsh 
Government, 2010:2) approach to the issue and amounted to a considerable shift in 
the role of the government in promoting economic and regional development. The 
resulting strategy outlined a modest role for the Government in encouraging 
business creation and expansion, yet a notable one in shaping the “conditions and 
framework” (Welsh Government, 2010:2) within which this could occur. In 
sentiments which closely paraphrased those of Porter (1998:620), it was held that 
the capacity to generate investment and employment did not rest with the 
government, but rather the ability to create an environment conducive to their 
creation by the private sector (Welsh Government, 2010:2). Its identification of the 
principal means through which public policy could influence the business climate as 
infrastructure, education policy and research and development support likewise 
resembled the “factor conditions” (Porter, 1998:71) (Welsh Government, 2010:7) 
seen as essential for the formation of successful and competitive clusters. The 
government would respond appropriately, and concentrate its efforts more on 
improving infrastructure, skills, promoting innovation and the general climate in 
which businesses would form and operate than through direct support (Welsh 
Government, 2010:3). With direct grants seen to “distort competition… and 
consume resources” (Welsh Government, 2010:42) needed elsewhere, the 
government announced its goal of making all of its financial support to firms 
repayable (Welsh Government, 2010:42). This support would be further 
restructured, with priority given to six specific industrial sectors: information and 
communications technology, energy and the environment, advanced materials and 
manufacturing, creative industries, life sciences and financial services (Welsh 
Government, 2010:37). These were seen as holding the greatest long-term potential 
growth prospects, as well as the highest rate of return relative to investment.  
 
 
Its revision of business assistance marked perhaps the greatest rupture with the 
conventionally supply-side orientation of Welsh development policy since 
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devolution, if not since the advent of regional aid. The spirit of the document leaned 
heavily towards the demand-side in both its assumptions and its proposals for direct 
financial assistance. It amounted to a more avowedly “high road” approach, 
particularly in its recognition of human capital and national skillsets as the 
“foundation” (Welsh Government, 2010:22) of economic growth, and its proposals 
for direct and indirect initiatives to increase business expenditure on research and 
development (Welsh Government, 2010:32). This emphasis likewise tilted the 
overall strategy, in principle, towards more endogenous theories. An evaluative 
framework outlining the relevant indicators to be used for assessing the short and 
medium-term impact of government policies stemming from the document was also 
prepared, although the level of evaluation conducted using its terms remains 
unclear (Welsh Government, 2011:3). There was limited discussion of 
geographically targeted support in the initial document, and the Valleys were not 
explicitly mentioned. It did, however, commit to continued support for the 
regeneration areas; presumably including the Heads of and Western Valleys, while 
also acknowledging regional distinctions in business activity and the penetration and 
influence of different sectors (Welsh Government, 2010:21;43).  
 
 
Enterprise Zones have represented one the most notable of the Welsh 
Government’s recent economic development initiatives. A contemporary Welsh 
iteration of supply-side schemes attempted in Wales in the early 1980s and in an 
estimated 22 U.S. states, they were comprised of seven zones dispersed across the 
whole of Wales;  each focusing on a designated sector, and became operational in 
2012 (Peters & Fisher, 2002:32) (Sissons & Brown, 2011:3; Hedges, 2013; 
Holtham, 2015:24). Companies investing within the zones would become eligible for 
business rates relief, and, in some instances, funding for capital expenditure. 
Aggregate investment across the zones from public and private sources appears to 
have amounted to £70 million between 2012 and 2014 (Ward, 2016:11).  
 
Reflecting the existing presence of manufacturing companies such as Yuasa 
Battery and Tenneco in the area, the Ebbw Vale Enterprise Zone - the only such 
zone within the Valleys - was targeted at the automotive sector and covered around 
40 hectares across the Vale (Welsh Government, 2013b:1). In line with the strategy 
outlined in Economic Renewal, a supply-side mix of financial incentives were 
offered in a discriminating way to specific sectors within the zones: seeking to 
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attract firms with inducements, yet by harnessing what were classed as certain 
existing industrial strengths and developing existing markets. In this regard, they 
utilised supply-side instruments subject to demand-side conditions and for realising 
demand-side goals. Enterprise Zones generally rank closest to neoclassical 
assumptions with their goal of defraying direct costs for firms locating or expanding 
their activities within the designated region (Papke, 1993:39). This made their 
adoption in light of the theoretically and structurally mixed approach outlined in 
Economic Renewal a clear indicator of the persistence of neoclassical influences, 
consciously or subconsciously, within the formation of Welsh regional development 
policy.  
 
The Enterprise Zone initiative has experienced sustained criticism for a perceived 
lack of transparency. A report by the National Assembly Finance Committee faulted 
the Government for the “air of mystery” (Henry, 2013) seen to characterise the 
programme and a lack of publicly available data on the progress being made by the 
zones towards job creation and retention targets was the subject of a protracted FOI 
process initiated by Plaid Cymru in early 2014. Taking several months and requiring 
the intervention of the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), figures were 
ultimately published in early 2015. These recorded the creation of 172 jobs across 
the Ebbw Vale zone, along with the safeguarding of 61 (Sands, 2015). The 
publicised disputes regarding Enterprise Zone data is particularly noteworthy given 
both the repeated commitment of senior Welsh political figures to “maximum 
openness” (Rawlings, 2003:114) and their actions such as liberalising FOI 
provisions in a manner favourable to the petitioner (Rawlings, 2003:114). 
 
The website for the Ebbw Vale zone has since been updated with the information 
that, in addition to the figures of 172 jobs created between 2012 and 2014, “7.5 jobs 
were created…with a further half a full time equivalent safeguarded” (Business 
Wales, 2015) between 2014 and 2015. On the issue of investment, a total of “more 
than £6.1 million” (Business Wales, 2015) in public and private funds was invested 
in government-assisted projects within the area between 2012 and 2014; with an 
additional £4.6 million invested between 2014 and 2015 (Business Wales, 2015).  
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The relative performance of the Ebbw Vale zone itself remains difficult to gauge 
accurately, given the earlier level of hesitancy regarding data publication. The 
Government has, however, published Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) relating to 
the investment generated and jobs supported by the zones (Department for 
Economy, Science & Transport, 2014:29) (Department for Economy, Science & 
Transport, 2015:2). These statistics record a total of 7,002 jobs assisted and a total 
of £107,081,248 invested across all zones between 2012 and 2015 (Department for 
Economy, Science & Transport, 2015:2). This information is instructive, and does 
provide some indication of how the zone has fared: with it receiving approximately 
9.9% of public and private investment within the zones since 2012, and 3.4% of jobs 
created or assisted by the scheme. 
 
Calculating the specific amount of Welsh Government expenditure on the zone 
compared to others is more challenging. The amount of government funds for 
business rates relief allocated to firms in individual zones for financial year 2015/16 
was, however, disclosed by Economy, Science and Transport Minister Edwina Hart 
in December 2015. Companies within the Ebbw Vale zone received 18% of total 
funds; the second largest amount listed for any zone (Welsh Government, 2015). 
This figure would indicate that the zone was, at least for that year, receiving a 
moderate share, though relatively significant amount of public funds. 
 
While the relative employment and investment benefits of the Ebbw Vale zone may 
be somewhat uncertain, the selection of the automotive sector as its target industry 
aligned with one of the largest development projects proposed for the region: the 
Circuit of Wales racing track. Projected to attract 750,000 visitors to the region each 
year and to create 6,000 jobs, it has been described as the area’s “last hope” 
(Easton, 2013a). While construction was initially scheduled for February 2014, the 
development suffered successive delays related to planning permission and legal 
disputes. The final phase of regulatory approval was cleared in November 2015 and 
private sector funding tentatively secured from Aviva in February 2016, with 
construction intended to commence at some point later in the year (BBC Wales, 
2015c) (BBC Wales, 2016a). A further and perhaps intractable obstacle to the 
project would emerge in April 2016. Following legal advice, the Welsh Government 
announced that it would be unable to underwrite the total project cost and, while a 
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willingness to pursue the project “on revised terms” (BBC Wales, 2016a) has been 
expressed, the development remains, for logistical purposes, stalled (Barry, 2016). 
 
A concrete development for the wider Valleys region came in March 2016, with the 
signing of a multi-year, £1.2 billion Cardiff Capital Region Deal. While its focus 
remained the capital city, the agreement, as drafted, committed £734 million of the 
total price tag to the “key priority” (Cardiff Capital Region, 2016:4) of developing a 
metro transport system for South Wales. This brought the Spatial Plan’s vision of 
the integration of the Valleys and the coastal cities somewhat closer to realisation. 
The development would consist of the electrification of Valleys rail lines and 
expanded and integrated rail and bus links (BBC Wales, 2016b). The metro 
component would account for 61.2% of the total funding for the project and make it 
the single largest funding commitment arising from the deal. While the funding 
would be extended over a 20 year period, the Welsh Government will field £580 
million (48%) of this total within the initial seven years, with this figure matched by 
the Treasury and a final £120 million from the 10 local authorities included within the 
designated Capital Region (BBC Wales, 2016b). As with the CBDC almost thirty 
years before it, the centrality of Cardiff within economic development strategies for 
South Wales has persisted: reflecting that the capital and its surrounding authorities 
are estimated to comprise 50% of all Welsh economic output and 49% of the 
nation’s employment (Cardiff Capital Region, 2016:2). The final text of the 
agreement noted the aspiration that it would yield the creation of “up to 25,000 new 
jobs” (Cardiff Capital Region, 2016:1;4) within the Capital Region as a whole, 
however, there does not, to date, appear to be a detailed breakdown of this and 
other estimates by UA. 
 
The deal had barely been signed however, before a deeper challenge to the Valleys 
and the Welsh economy had emerged - one with the potential to equal the closures 
of the 1980s in its impact. In response to falling global steel prices and the profusion 
of Chinese steel imports, Tata Steel announced a wave of redundancies at their 
Port Talbot steelworks: the largest remaining steel facility in Wales with an 
estimated 4,104 workers (BBC News, 2016c). The implications of this for the wider 
Welsh economy and for surrounding regions prompted considerable unease, with 
calls for nationalisation and other avenues of state intervention. The situation 
continues to develop at the time of writing. The firm has, however, expressed a 
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willingness to retain its UK operations pending sufficient concessions from the UK 
Government, and a formal decision regarding the future ownership of it is expected 
in the coming months (Ruddick, 2016). With calculations suggesting that “every job 
at Tata supports another 1.22 employees throughout the Welsh economy” (Pinto & 
Jones, 2012:30), the settlement of this critical period for Welsh heavy industry is 
likely to reverberate both in and around Port Talbot, the western reaches of the 
Valleys and the wider Welsh economy for the foreseeable future.  
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2.5: The state of the Valleys  
 
The region continues to face a similar array of social and economic difficulties to 
those which prompted the interventions of the 1930s. Its employment rates 
continually rank below national averages and those of former coalfields (Foden et 
al, 2014:19). While it may be intuitively defensible to ascribe this situation to a 
failure of development schemes, the very nature of available data means that an 
empirical judgement of this sort on the programmes themselves can not be 
meaningfully rendered. Failings within the collection and dissemination of the 
information needed to reach one are obscuring whether conclusions could be drawn 
on whether economic development initiatives have constituted a relative success 
given the steep challenges of the region, or the “failure” (Williamson, 2014) which 
the Welsh Government’s critics have decried. In Wales, as in other nations in which 
development policymaking is devolved, absent decisive and agenda-setting 
direction, the possibility of such policies being influenced and determined as much 
by media coverage as any other factor remains real and growing (Pike et al, 
2006:148).  
 
Substantial constraints in needed data did not begin in 1999, though nor were they 
meaningfully addressed afterwards. The issue that, initially, “no political or 
administrative boundaries exactly accord with the Valleys” (Ty Toronto, 1977:35) 
and that “Wales was not seen as a meaningful economic unit” (Williams, 1995:267) 
until well into the 20th Century led to a reliance on disparate and unreliable datasets 
(Williams, 1995:267). In spite of subsequent advances in data availability, and two 
decades into devolution, around 50% of the figures required to construct a workable 
economic model for the Welsh economy are estimated to be currently unavailable 
Crawley (2014:20) (Crawley, 2015:5). This contrasts sharply with Scotland, where 
the necessary “economic intelligence” (Crawley, 2014) is more freely available and 
where evaluations of development schemes have been undertaken more routinely 
(Goodwin et al, 2003:8).  Whereas Wales opted to abolish the WDA, Scotland 
preserved an arms-length economic development organisation in the form of 
Scottish Enterprise (SE). SE continues to exercise administrative responsibility for 
its primary regional assistance schemes, and compiles publicly available quarterly 
reports on all financial offers made since 2010 and annual reports which aggregate 
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the number of jobs created or safeguarded and the capital investment supported by 
them (Scottish Enterprise, 2016a).  
 
Political judgements alone do not fully account for the absence of broader 
evaluations of redevelopment efforts within the Valleys.  The difficulty of defining the 
region geographically in particular further tightens confines of existing data. While 
efforts have been made by Foden et al (2014) to do so through the use of Lower 
Super Output Areas (LSOAs): a geographical definition used for the disaggregation 
of Census data, there are considerable limits to the data which is available at this 
level. Gross Value Added (GVA), a controversial but nevertheless “primary 
yardstick” (Robinson & Blackaby, 2012:95) measure of economic output, is 
unavailable at the UA, let alone LSOA level. When seeking data beyond the largely 
demographic nature of the Census, this can leave UA data for authorities which 
contain significant portions of the former coalfields as the only tractable option 
(Foden et al, 2014:12). Such an array of definitional and statistical problems would 
suggest that further and sustained efforts by the Welsh Government and 
appropriate research bodies are needed to correct them, so that decision-making 
with regard to future regional redevelopment efforts is informed by robust regional 
information, rather than by inclination or intuition as, it would appear, may have 
been the case with earlier devolved initiatives (Clapham, 2014:16). 
 
The actual amount of public expenditure on economic development in Wales 
experienced a real-terms fall following devolution, with 2011 expenditure below that 
of 1996. (Godfrey, 2012:356). Its share of identifiable government spending also fell 
from 9.7% to 8.3% during the same period (Godfrey, 2012:67); a trend seen to 
signify a shifting of priorities towards more demand-heavy government functions 
such as education and health (Godfrey, 2012:356). While expressing caution 
regarding the preliminary nature of the findings and attendant data constraints, a 
quantitative study of the post-devolution economy did conclude that “public 
spending on economic development has not been effective” (Godfrey, 2012:v) in 
improving the trajectory of the principality’s economy. As some of the most 
economically peripheral regions of Wales, a failure to measurably increase national 
economic performance is unlikely to yield appreciably more positive outcomes for 
the area. While broad, given present constraints, it appears as if conclusions such 
as these may represent the closest to which a reasonable judgement regarding the 
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effect of economic development initiatives upon the Valleys region can realistically 
aspire to.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.13: Trends in Welsh regional development policy (1934-2016): included 
overleaf 
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Period Policy instruments Urban/Regional Objectives Theory Supply/demand 
side 
1934-1972 
Emergence 
 Loans and 
grants 
 Trading 
estates 
 Restrictions on 
developments 
outside of 
assisted areas 
Regional  Reduce 
unemployment  
 Lessen regional 
economic 
disparities 
Keynesian Supply 
1972-1999 
Restructuring 
 RSA 
 PFV 
Regional and 
urban 
 Increase 
employment  
 Targeted 
regeneration 
Neoclassical Supply 
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1999-2010 
Decentralisation 
 RSA/SIF 
 EU structural 
funds 
 HOTV and 
WVRA 
Regional and 
urban 
 Increase 
employment  
 Revitalise 
specific 
geographic 
sections 
 Promote 
general 
convergence 
between 
Assisted Areas 
and UK/EU 
averages  
 
Neoclassical 
and 
endogenous 
Supply and 
demand 
2010- 
Evolution? 
 Enterprise 
Zones 
 Repayable 
loans 
 VVP 
 Continued 
structural aid 
Regional and 
urban 
 Job creation 
and 
development of 
specific sectors  
 
 Geographically 
and sectorally 
targeted 
investment 
Endogenous 
and 
neoclassical 
Supply and 
demand 
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Four broad periods in UK and, ultimately, Welsh regional development policies 
towards the Valleys can be identified (Table 2.13). The first consisted of the 
embryonic initiatives first launched during the depths of depression. Focused on 
alleviating mass unemployment before eventuating into efforts to reduce regional 
disparities by means of financial assistance, these persisted until a period of 
restructuring occurred - with the establishment of the more discretionary RSA and a 
general “downgrading” (Armstrong & Taylor, 2000:218) of resources committed to 
regional policy from UK Government bodies during the 1980s. The government’s 
reorientation of development policy towards urban areas during this period would be 
reflected in the urban nature of the region’s largest regeneration effort, and this 
feature of the programme may serve to clarify its more ambiguous impact.  
 
While the confluence of devolution and the arrival of Objective 1 funds did not 
prompt an immediate recalibration of existing policies, they did lead to a multiplicity 
of objectives which were intensified by the aspirations of the newly established 
Assembly and its executive. Over time, the Assembly Government would move to 
reform development policy and administration in ways which set it at odds not only 
with recent precedent but with other devolved nations as well; particularly with its 
abolition of the WDA. Regarding specific “area-based” (What Works Centre, 2016:9) 
strategies for the Valleys themselves, however, there was a greater degree of 
continuity. The WVRA and HOTV regeneration schemes, as the PFV had two 
decades earlier, approximated policies adopted for urban development to a more 
considerable extent than regional ones.  
 
The most radical conceptual and strategic evolution within Welsh Government policy 
occurred with the transition away from grants and its identification with a supportive, 
rather than formational role for public funds and wider public policies in generating 
employment and economic activity. Yet the adoption of Enterprise Zones betrayed a 
basic preservation of the supply-side approaches which had dominated regional 
development efforts for much of the preceding century. The replacement of both 
regeneration areas with an alternative which is more explicitly urban in its emphasis 
similarly suggests the resilience of urban strategies as a means of regional 
redevelopment.   
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Control over and the format which economic development programmes in South 
Wales have taken over the 82 years following the passage of the first Special Areas 
Act have shifted appreciably. So too and, perhaps because of, have the underlying 
theories behind them. While it would be overly simplistic to infer that the adoption of 
differing strategies paralleled the developments within theories of economic growth, 
shifts in economic theory do appear to have augured movements in the emphasis, 
objectives and assumptions of policies. The Special Areas Acts and the post-war 
legislation which proceeded them followed Keynesian theory to a recognisable 
extent, while the development of neoclassical approaches during the 1950s and 
1960s were followed by the reform of regional development tools during the 1970s 
and their retrenchment during the following decade. It is with subsequent theoretical 
developments, such as the rise of endogenous growth theory and its more applied 
variants that this trend was abrogated. Devolved development efforts became 
gradually more cognisant of the significance of human capital in determining regional 
and national growth, for instance, although this recognition was not always reflected 
to the same extent among the regional policy instruments adopted to promote them. 
 
The state of economic development efforts within the Welsh Valleys as of 2016 can 
therefore be considered, with some justification, a literal “work in progress”, with 
many schemes currently ongoing and others yet to begin. The track record can, 
however, legitimately be considered to be one of fits and starts. The primary 
regeneration initiative for the most distressed sections of the region was terminated 
while only halfway through and replaced with a less targeted and resourced 
alternative. The main infrastructure investment for the region has been hit with 
multiple delays and is not expected to be completed until 2020. Finally, direct 
assistance to firms has not been distributed with particular emphasis on the Valleys, 
nor on its most deprived areas. After a decade and a half of largely devolved 
policymaking within this area, and successive Governments who have clearly 
exercised newfound law-making powers to fashion development schemes in their 
image, a development strategy tailored to the needs and reality of the Valleys, 
apparently, continues to elude us.  
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Chapter 3: Detroit 
 
3.1: 1950-1974: Stalling of the Motor City and the exodus to the exurbs  
 
The decline of Detroit into “a poster child for our most paranoid dystopian fears” 
(Borden, 2013:135) was an extensive and multifaceted process, and an 
understanding of its unprecedented fall is incomplete in the absence of a 
consideration of the social and economic context shaped by its initial rise.  The 
magnitude of its challenges was the cumulative result of a number of demographic 
and industrial vulnerabilities. These had their roots in the earliest years of the 20th 
Century, and their after-effects continue to reverberate well into the 21st; with 
inevitable consequences for the city’s redevelopment efforts. 
 
Detroit’s evolution into an epicentre of American industry was, by most standards, 
meteoric. As the base of a cluster of successful industries at the beginning of the 
20th century, it was a “second tier” (Sugrue, 2007) mid-sized, Midwestern city. This 
would shift almost instantaneously with Henry Ford’s establishment of the 
eponymous auto company in 1903 (Sugrue, 2007).With Ford soon followed by 
General Motors (GM) and a number of smaller car manufacturers, the take-off of the 
auto industry brought the city both national prestige and mass employment. By 1910, 
over 5,000 residents were employed in car manufacturing (Martelle, 2014:71).  
Production boomed and by 1918, Ford alone was producing more than 533,000 cars 
annually (Martelle, 2014:72). Newcomers to the city soon found work on its 
expanding assembly lines and the city ranked as the fourth most populous in the 
nation by 1930 (Martelle, 2014:117). The ranks of Detroit’s premier carmakers were 
rounded out by the establishment of the Chrysler Corporation in 1925; soon joining 
Ford and GM to form the “Big Three” Detroit manufacturers after four years of brisk 
expansion (Hyde, 2003:xvi;15). While their fortunes as well as their connections to it 
would vary and finally decline in the decades to come, for better or worse, their 
brand names became virtually synonymous with the city (Plumer, 2013). 
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As with many such booms, there were inevitable busts. After close to two decades of 
increasing prosperity and promise, bolstered by ever increasing demand, the city felt 
the full force of systemic shock. The automotive industry was hit heavily by the 
decline in consumer spending following the stock market crash of 1929 and the 
onset of the Great Depression. In three years, car production fell by two-thirds while 
job losses were similarly precipitous and  223,000 Detroit residents were out of work 
by early 1932 (Galster, 2014:82) (Woodford, 2001:121). The cyclical demand for its 
products during the early half of the twentieth century did, however, allow for multiple 
rebounds, even from the depths of depression. By 1937, the output of the automotive 
industry tripled from its 1932 nadir (Galster, 2014:82). 
 
 
The city’s troubles had begun to dissipate as those of the United States and the 
world were on the rise (Martelle, 2014:139). American supplies to and intervention 
on behalf of the Allies generated an exponential demand for the products of Detroit’s 
car manufacturers. A fifth of American military production came out of the city and its 
immediate surroundings as it “l[e]d the nation” (Poremba, 2003:123) in war contracts 
(Galster, 2014:82). As with the Valleys, the Second World War represented 
something close to Detroit’s rebirth: replenishing its industrial base, raising a car 
industry still emerging from its Depression induced slump and transforming it and the 
city into the armoury of the “arsenal of democracy” (Herman, 2012:129).  
 
As the base of three major car manufacturers by mid-century, Detroit remained 
inherently vulnerable to changes in consumer behaviour involving its key products 
(Cowell, 2015:65). It lacked “a backup industry” (Farley et al, 2000:59) of sufficient 
penetration to compensate for any reductions in automotive manufacturing 
employment; a feature compounded by the strategic missteps of the industry itself. 
The decision by the Big Three to rapidly demobilise their military production lines in 
the post-war years proved to be particularly short-sighted (Martelle, 2014:159). 
Betting on increasing demand for civilian car ownership, the city which had 
dominated wartime military contracts during the 1940s was poorly equipped to apply 
for similar bids during the Korean War and the defence build-up of the 1950s 
99 
 
(Sugrue, 2014:141). While manufacturers in the South and West benefited from a 
steady stream of Federal dollars, Detroit’s manufacturers lacked this Pentagon 
shaped cushion (Martelle, 2014:161) (Sugrue, 2014:141). Opting to rely on civilian 
consumption patterns highly susceptible to changes in interest rates, oil prices, 
consumer tastes and macroeconomic conditions was not an unrealistic aspiration; as 
car companies had enjoyed an extended grace period immediately proceeding the 
war (Ward, 1995:5) (Ebert, 2013:5), though it remained a poorly grounded long-term 
assumption. The city’s primary industry would have to contend with no fewer than 
four recessions between 1949 and 1960 alone (Sugrue, 2014:126). These cyclical 
downturns, and the 1958 recession in particular, prompted an observable increase in 
the market share of imports, especially of smaller German-produced cars: with the 
share of imports exceeding 10% of the U.S. market by 1959 (McCarthy, 2007:142; 
144) (Klier, 2009:5). These trends prompted a vigorous response by the Big Three to 
develop its smaller models, to streamline production and to economise (Klier, 
2009:5). 
 
The sensitivity of the city’s manufacturing base to even minor shifts within the 
broader macroeconomic situation was brought into sharp relief from the 1970s 
onwards (Hall & Hall, 1993:25). This, however, only accelerated difficulties which 
were already well-established by then, with the percentage of US automobile 
employment situated within the Detroit area having fallen from 35% to 20% between 
1950 and 1970 (Cowell, 2015:65). The city lost 130,000 manufacturing jobs between 
1948 and 1963 alone (Sugrue, 2014:142;144); losses driven by a combination of 
automation, the decline of independent producers and the centralising pressures of 
the post-war market. The Big Three squeezed the market share of smaller car 
producers to just 4% by 1955 (Sugrue, 2014:136). Consolidation, closures and 
layoffs by these smaller firms soon followed and the city’s East Side in particular was 
hit heavily; with around 70,000 jobs lost between 1954 and 1960 (Woodford, 
2001:162) (Sugrue, 2014:136) (Woodford, 2001:162-163) (Sugrue, 2014:137). While 
smaller producers were rapidly downsizing their workforces, the Big Three were 
automating, moving responsibilities in-house and shifting their operations to the 
suburbs and beyond (Martelle, 2014:175). This was partly driven by a need to 
economise as well as the more pressing need for space (Sugrue, 2014:129). Half a 
century of rapid construction had left comparatively few locations suitable for the 
100 
 
establishment of the sizeable, modern plants necessary to develop their new product 
lines (Sugrue, 2014:129). Chrysler, Ford and GM would, by contrast, build a total of 
25 plants in the city’s suburbs, often more than 15 miles from the city between 1947 
and 1958 (Sugrue, 2014:128) (Kenyon, 2004:12).   
 
The city’s expanding suburbs were therefore the principal beneficiaries of this 
downward trend within the city proper (Table 3.1). 192 automotive factories were 
estimated to have ended their operations within the city during the 1950-1957 period 
(Barnard, 2004:295). Those which remained were bludgeoned by successive 
downturns, with Chrysler reducing its Detroit workforce by almost half following the 
1958 recession (Sugrue, 2014:136). By 1960, Michigan accounted for only 40% of 
automotive employment in the United States (Sugrue, 2014:128). Yet in spite of 
these shocks, the leaner car industry, shorn of competition and contractors, began to 
rebound; with the five years proceeding the late-1950s recession dubbed its “longest 
postwar period” (Galster, 2014:83) of growth.  
 
More ominously however was that, while the industry’s fortunes were still essential to 
the city’s, their once common interests were diverging. The loss of smaller 
manufacturers, the streamlining of production and the relocation of plants to the 
suburbs indicated that the perceived utility of the city to the industry was declining.  
The Big Three became, in effect, the Big Two, after Ford transferred its residual 
operations to the suburbs in 1956 (Poremba, 2001:291) (Hessler, 2013:174). The 
remainder of Detroit’s manufacturing base struggled to contend with the change in 
consumption patterns precipitated by later pressures such as the late 1960s 
recession, the 1973-1974 oil shock and increasing European and Asian imports 
(Cowell, 2015:65). By 1972, only 33% of manufacturing jobs in the Detroit 
Metropolitan area were located within the city proper (Bockmeyer, 2000:2423).  
 
 
Table 3.1: Manufacturing employees within Detroit and surrounding suburbs, 1947-
1972 
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Area 1947 1963 1972 
Detroit (city) 338,000 201,000 180,000 
Wayne County 
(minus Detroit) 
159,000 157,000 172,000 
Macomb County 15,000 70,000 93,000 
Oakland County 45,000 67,000 91,000 
Total 557,000 495,000 536,000 
(Farley et al, 2000:66)  
 
While the wide-ranging changes occurring within its core industries were pivotal to 
Detroit’s decline, a number of interrelated processes greatly contributed to its current 
pathologies. Of these, rapid depopulation has been one of the most pervasive: 
leaving tangible fiscal and physical effects including the depletion of its tax base and 
the widespread abandonment of properties. While these have been exacerbated by 
recent housing and financial crises, this was a decades-long process (Reese & 
Sands, 2013:5). By the late-1960s, Detroit was increasingly faced with the twin 
pathologies of a declining workforce in its dominant industry and the depopulation of 
its central areas (Pastor & Benner, 2008:105). 
 
Detroit’s population fell from its post-war high of 1.85 million to 1.67 million during the 
1950s alone (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016): an exodus assisted by the city’s 
topography, the existence of well-developed suburbs and the construction of major 
freeways which simplified access to them (Hill, 1986:88) (Farley et al, 2000:26). 
Time magazine would prove prescient though understated in its 1961 depiction of 
the city as “now in trouble” (Time, 1961). A survey of the city’s commercial property 
conducted the same year found a vacancy rate of 22% for the city’s central areas - 
compared to rates of below 4% in the suburbs (Sugrue, 2014:149). The amount of 
commercial and industrial buildings constructed or adapted “fell tenfold” (Sugrue, 
2014:149) between the early 1950s and 1963 and city property values would fall by 
almost $10 billion over the course of the 1960s (Detroit Free Press, 2013). 
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The racial dimension of Detroit’s depopulation is often considered integral to 
understanding both its origins and its rapidity (McGraw, 2007:297). The city’s African 
American population increased significantly within the post-war years; from 16% in 
1950 to 45% by 1970 (Widick, 1989:170) (McGraw, 2007:297). As one commentator 
noted, many African-Americans arrived “just as the jobs began leaving” (McGraw, 
2007:297). The auto industry was Detroit’s “largest employer of blacks” (Sugrue, 
2014:95), with the proportion of African Americans employed within it rising from 4% 
in the early 1940s, to 15% in 1945 (Sugrue, 2014:95). The work offered significant 
job security, effective bargaining rates and competitive salaries (Sugrue, 2014:95). 
These overall benefits, however, helped conceal more localised discrimination in 
hiring practices at specific plants (Sugrue, 2014:95).  
 
The impact of restructuring within the auto-industry was also notably harsher on 
African Americans. Laid-off black employees were, on average, unemployed for 
longer than whites, while black workers faced a significantly higher rate of long-term 
unemployment (Sugrue, 2014:146). While plants sought to economise by 
automating, they often attempted to avoid direct layoffs in order to minimise industrial 
disputes (Sugrue, 2014:146). Reductions in staffing were therefore often sought 
through attrition and by curtailing the number of new hires and entry-level 
opportunities (Sugrue, 2014:146); positions which African American newcomers had 
previously taken advantage of and whose abolition ensured that younger African-
Americans were at a particular and an increasing disadvantage (Sugrue, 2014:146).  
 
Race relations in the city, never harmonious, became progressively more fractious. 
Animosity, harassment and occasional acts of violence between white and African-
American residents would become increasingly commonplace by the early 1960s 
(McGraw, 2007:298). Racial unease, violent clashes and the expansion of the 
suburbs served as both a stimulus and a mechanism for the exodus of the city’s 
white population (McGraw, 2007:297). The ease of access to outlying areas was 
expedited by the construction of Federal highways in the late 1950s; making a flight 
to the suburbs and the “exurbs” even further afield almost a foregone conclusion 
(Poremba, 2003:127). The construction of its three major freeways also exacerbated 
tensions within the city. Requiring the clearance of 2,800 buildings and 109 business 
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in majority black neighbourhoods on the West Side, the process left the area as a 
“depressed wasteland” (Hanlon et al, 2010:40). As a result, the African American 
population would increasingly cluster into densely populated neighbourhoods such 
as Twelfth Street in the city’s core (Kenyon, 2004:12). 
 
The white population of Detroit declined by more than 700,000 between 1950 and 
1970 (McGraw, 2007:298), with around one in every four white residents leaving 
during the 1950s (Kenyon, 2004:12). This trend persisted and accelerated 
throughout the 1960s, with the number of white residents exiting the city between 
1964 and 1966 averaging 22,000 per year (Thomas, 2013:130). Efforts by Mayor 
Jerome Cavanagh and Governor George Romney to mollify a racial tinderbox by 
vocal support for civil rights, outreach to the black community, policing reforms and 
usage of $34.5 million in Federal anti-poverty funds, while some of the highest such 
allocations in the country (Galster, 2014:206) (Thomas, 2013:132), were simply “too 
little, too late” (Sugrue, 2014:260). Initial city-led efforts to regenerate select 
downtown neighbourhoods, launched by Mayor Cavanagh in 1966 particularly 
suffered from weak coordination and bureaucratic infighting between city and 
Federal officials (Hill, 1986:95).  These came especially late for younger African 
Americans; whose position in the labour market was even weaker and who had 
increasingly sought employment in low-level criminality (Sugrue, 2014:261). With 
dropout rates in the city’s schools at 50%, educational opportunities for advancement 
were limited (Harris, 1998:8) Prospects for employment were not appreciably higher. 
Detroit’s East Side had employed 100,000 workers across 23 plants in 1953, yet by 
1960, 10 of these plants, along with 71,000 jobs were gone: creating an “economic 
slum” (Sugrue, 2014:149). Municipal efforts over the course of the decade yielded 
few apparent returns, with 25% to 30% of young African Americans still unemployed 
by 1967 (Sugrue, 2014:261). 
 
The most destructive outburst of racial unrest came on July 23rd, 1967, when the 
arrest of 85 African Americans in a late-night raid on an unauthorised bar on the 
heavily black Twelfth Street prompted a four day, city-wide outbreak of violence 
(Sugrue, 2014:259). Requiring the intervention of the National Guard, a force of 
17,000 police and military personnel ultimately succeeded in ending the rioting 
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(Sugrue, 2014:259). Over the course of four days in the July heat, the riot had left 43 
dead, 467 injured  and 2,509 buildings ransacked, burnt or otherwise damaged 
(Sugrue, 2014:259) (McGraw, 2007:299). It was the most extensive and destructive 
urban riot of the 1960s and the largest in American history at that time (Rucker, 
2007:251). The city’s population, already declining and falling heavily along racial 
lines, fell further and a notable increase in violent crimes took place (McGraw, 
2007:299) (Neill, 1995:642). The city’s labour market was in similarly perilous straits. 
Over the next five years, its battered manufacturing sector would haemorrhage a 
further 29,000 jobs and 549 firms (Sugrue, 2014:144). The number of whites leaving 
rose from 47,000 in 1967 to 80,000 the following year as the predominantly white 
suburbs “steadily cut ties with the city” (Thomas, 1997:130). Blacks remained within 
the city, while “the good-paying jobs left” (Farley et al, 2000:65) for the suburbs, 
along with many residents. 
 
Detroit’s industrial and demographic challenges were not, fundamentally, unique to 
it. The growth of inner-ring and the development of outer-ring suburban areas; 
facilitated by increased transport links and car ownership, had contributed to a 
fundamental shift in the racial composition of urban areas (McDonald, 2015:85; 292). 
The population of America’s largest metropolitan regions increased by an estimated 
40 million between 1940 and 1960; with 80% of the white increase occurring in 
suburban areas, and 84% of the black rise in central cities (Kain, 1968:191). The 
share of metropolitan area populations residing within central cities fell from 57% 
during the 1950s to 49% in 1960 to 43% in 1970 (Mieszkowski & Mills, 1993:135). 
Paralleling the movement of firms from cities to outlying regions, the share of metro 
area jobs located within cities declined from 70% during the 1950s, to 63% by 1960 
and 55% in 1970 (Mieszkowski & Mills, 1993:135). The result was an increasing 
“spatial mismatch” (Glaeser, 2008:186) between urban areas; which contained 
significant numbers of black residents and comparatively fewer jobs, and the 
predominantly white suburbs; which were attracting increasingly mobile firms in 
growing numbers. In Detroit, as elsewhere, the decentralisation of residents had 
foreshadowed the decentralisation of employment (Mieszkowski & Mills, 1993:136). 
The processes may not have been unique to Detroit, however their magnitude soon 
would be (Neill, 2015:1). Detroit proper held 44% of the metropolitan population and 
54% of its jobs by 1960; figures which contracted to 36% and 39% respectively by 
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1970 (Farley et al, 2000:111). The city was underperforming national trends to a 
notable extent; with outmigration and the decentralisation of employment beginning 
earlier, proceeding with greater rapidity and to a greater extent than seen, on 
average, elsewhere in the nation.  
 
The issue for Detroit as it entered a new era of industrial challenges and changing 
municipal leadership would be the extent to which the unique gravity of these 
difficulties was identified by the policymakers charged with addressing them. 
Combating the emerging narrative “of Detroit as a hopelessly failed state” (Binelli, 
2013:3) and its unfortunate basis in reality would have been challenging for any unit 
of government. The 1973 election of Coleman Young, the city’s first African 
American Mayor, however, ensured that this increasingly colossal challenge would, 
to a considerable extent, fall to him. 
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3.2 1975-2000: Restarting 
 
Young was elected in a year which saw Middle Eastern states launch an embargo on 
oil sales to the U.S. and in an election which broke almost evenly along racial 
cleavages (Thomas, 2014:150). He had benefited from the pace of “white flight” from 
the city; a development which had enabled a number of African American Mayors 
across the country to sweep to office on dramatically changed turnout models 
(Thomas, 2014:150). As may have been expected, Young had one overall objective: 
“the redevelopment of Detroit” (Rich, 1991:73). Given the precipitous downward 
trend in the city’s fortunes, this would be a sizable undertaking. Yet with the city hit 
by the ravages of the 1973-4 oil embargo “harder than any other” (Gorton, 1979:114) 
and with an estimated unemployment rate of 25%, it had become even greater 
(Wildavsky, 1986:208). 
 
In spite of his at times vehement denunciation of white flight, political opponents and 
the suburbs (McGraw, 2005:29), Young has since been credited as a pragmatic 
“entrepreneurial leader” (Thomas, 2014:152) (Neill, 1995:124) who forged workable 
and productive relationships with the city’s corporate leaders (McGraw, 2005:25) 
(Thomas, 2014:151;152). Those seeking to revitalise Detroit over the next two 
decades would therefore consist of two primary groups in a somewhat uneasy but 
functional partnership. The first was comprised of the city’s remaining business 
community and was formally represented an umbrella group of corporate leaders 
known as Detroit Renaissance (Rich, 1999:139). The second, more influential, 
contingent consisted of its predominantly black municipal leadership and was led by 
Young (Rich, 1991:70).  
 
While there were therefore a number of actors with varying motives though generally 
compatible objectives relating to its redevelopment, the Mayor was unquestionably at 
the helm of this fragmented coalition; chairing the influential Economic Development 
Corporation (EDC)  board which worked to remedy the city’s industrial decline (Rich, 
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1991:75). Whilst workable, the divided urban regime has been noted as one 
impediment to a more coordinated approach to redevelopment. The efforts of its 
corporate leaders had a specific agenda, while those of the city’s black political 
leadership had another (Pastor & Benner, 2008:106) (Jo, 2002:16) (Hall & Hall, 
1993). 
 
Young’s 20 year tenure in City Hall would, however, involve a clear focus on 
successive and substantial development efforts, employing local, state and Federal 
funds - often without compunction (Hall & Hall, 1993:26). Following offers from 
Chrysler to undertake a $50 million redevelopment of its disused plant on Mack 
Avenue (Anderson & Wassmer, 2000:67) (Kang et al, 2013:10), Young and the city’s 
public leadership lobbied extensively for one of the State of Michigan’s first economic 
development incentives: the Industrial Facilities Tax exemption (IFT) (Anderson & 
Wassmer, 2000:68). Enacted in 1974, this permitted local governments such as the 
Detroit City Council to identify and classify specific districts which held significant 
numbers of blighted or otherwise obsolete properties (Anderson et al, 2010:16). 
Once designated as such, a tax abatement which reduced property taxes for new 
facilities by “approximately” (MEDC, 2016:2) 50%, and which provided an effective 
exemption of 100% from additional taxes on remediated obsolete facilities could be 
granted for up to 12 years.  
 
The IFT represented a prototypical supply-side incentive to offset the costs of an 
investment to the participating firm and, over the longer-term, to extract value 
through the economic activity and increased revenues generated by it. Its adoption 
reflected the contemporary trend within U.S. economic development policy of “first 
wave” initiatives (Table 1.4). First wave programmes were directed at attracting 
businesses to the relevant regions, and, while consisting of a number of different 
initiatives such as infrastructural improvements and in-kind business support, they 
had quickly become synonymous with “direct business subsidies” (Glasmeier, 
2000:561). Their rapid adoption would lead to the onset of a “zero-sum” (Glasmeier, 
2000:562) view of competition between regions which has been particularly 
associated with more decentralised polities (Rodriguez-Pose & Gill, 2003:28). The 
combination of economic decline and devolved powers, especially fiscal ones, 
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quickly lent itself to pronounced competition between states and localities and the 
outbreak of a hypothetical “war between the states” (LeRoy, 2005:80) (White et al, 
2003:75) for jobs and investment. The result was a nationwide proliferation of 
supply-side, generally low-road economic incentives with a considerable theoretical 
lineage to neoclassical theory: incentives which Detroit would utilise aggressively.   
The IFT abatements were not insignificant concessions given the city’s escalating 
fiscal difficulties. Writing off what often amounted to millions in taxable revenue with 
debts of over $3 billion by the mid-1970s (Wolkoff, 1985:305) (Detroit Free Press, 
2013) was, however, viewed as an acceptable trade-off. IFTs represented a key tool 
in the arsenal of development officials and were wielded repeatedly to attract and 
retain investment; with a total of 390 granted between 1974 and 2015 (Michigan 
Treasury, 2016). The remaining Big 2 were well-represented among these, with 
Chrysler and its subsidiaries receiving a total of 17 abatements for specific 
investments within the city and GM receiving 11 (Michigan Treasury, 2016). The 
number of abatements issued declined significantly across Michigan after the 1980s, 
as companies increasingly lacked the cash-flow to commit to extensive 
redevelopment projects (Kang et al, 2013:11-12). This reduction was particularly 
evident in Detroit, with 59% of dated abatements being issued prior to 1990 
(Michigan Treasury, 2016). While Detroit offered some of the highest absolute 
numbers of abatements among Michigan localities, once the number of abatements 
is calculated on a per capita basis, it is apparent that the city has offered “relatively 
few” (Kang et al, 2013:16). This is consistent with their limited penetration across 
Michigan’s other central cities, with these having issued “proportionately the fewest 
IFT exemptions” (LeRoy et al, 2006:4). Despite their notable cost, Detroit was finding 
itself outgunned in the war against its perceived competitors.  
 
The continued usage of these abatements nevertheless contrasted with a general 
move away from first wave policies nationwide. A combination of developments 
including the early 1980s recession, a general “bottoming out” of transfers of plants 
to southern states and the inexorable rise of international (as opposed to inter-
regional) competition on business costs, led many states in the industrial Midwest to 
conclude that “smokestack chasing no longer provided a means to generate enough 
new jobs” (Ross & Friedman, 1991:126). The share of American goods subject to 
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foreign competition had risen from 20% in 1960 to over 70% by 1980, and the falling 
costs of transport and communications simplified the process of moving facilities to 
Mexico or further afield (Ross & Friedman, 1991:126). Increasing recognition of the 
technological innovation, automation and rising productivity and competitiveness of 
foreign competitors similarly contributed to a general transition towards the second 
wave - typified by a demand-side bolstering of indigenous firms and sectors 
(Shuttleworth, 1993:88). While the city would see the number of abatements it 
granted decline over the course of the decade, it deployed them to a greater extent 
than a transition away from supply-side, low-road and first wave policies would imply; 
granting 155 during the 1980s (Figure 3.1). Economic development policy in Detroit 
was, if not bucking national trends, not heeding them as promptly as other states.  
 
Comparatively few of the studies which assess the impact of the IFT within the 
Detroit Metropolitan Area (Kang et al, 2013) (Anderson & Wassmer, 2000) 
(Wassmer, 1994) detail specific results for the city itself. The area-wide conclusions 
of these studies have been broadly, though qualifiedly, sceptical of its efficacy. 
Wassmer (1994) was able to ascertain a positive impact from IFT abatements on 
economic activity in only 5 out of 31 Detroit area cities under consideration 
(Wassmer, 2007:28) and, while Anderson & Wassmer’s  (2000) study of 112 metro 
area communities did elicit a positive relationship between the granting of tax 
abatements and selected economic metrics, it was heavily temporal. Abatements 
offered within the first three years (1974-1977) of the IFT scheme’s existence 
generally registered the greatest effects in the form of increased property values and 
decreased poverty rates, while they were deemed to have exerted no measurable 
impact upon property values between 1978 and 1982 and a negative relationship 
upon them between 1983 and 1987 (Anderson & Wassmer, 2000:144;147-148). A 
proposed explanation for this apparent diminution in effectiveness is that as the 
number of localities providing the incentives increased, firms began to view them as 
a de facto entitlement rather than an inducement (Wassmer, 2007:30) (Anderson & 
Wassmer, 2000:67; 71).  
 
 
State-wide data on the total amount of abatements granted, the number of jobs 
purported to have been created as a result and the amount of taxable property value 
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estimated to have been abated between 1984 and 2010 is provided by Drake (2014). 
18,597 abatements were granted across the state during the 26 year period, with the 
creation of 327,820 “claimed” (Drake, 2014:45) jobs and an average abatement of 
$133,580,095 in taxable value (Drake, 2014:45). Comparable figures for individual 
cities were not included within the study though, if the number of abatements 
successfully granted and approved for the city between 1984 and 2010 (Figure 3.1) 
is calculated as a percentage of the state-wide total, it amounts to 1.2% of those 
granted. This would tentatively suggest that, as the city granted relatively few 
proportional to its population, it also appears to have accounted for a relatively slight 
proportion of abatements granted state-wide. 
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Figure 3.1: IFT abatements, 1974-2015 
 
Michigan Treasury (2016) 
 
As it did not deplete the city’s ailing revenues, Federal assistance to the city during 
the 1970s and 1980s represented a more promising route for redevelopment. 
Washington’s contribution to the city was represented largely by Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) funds such as Community Development 
Block Grants (CDBG); launched in 1974 (HUD, 2015) and Urban Development 
Action Grants (UDAG); passed in 1977 (Webman, 1981:189). UDAG grants were 
generally smaller, with a more competitive “old style” (Thomas, 2013:181) application 
process which demanded commitments on and sought to augment private 
investment (Thomas, 2013: 157) (Wildavsky, 1986:208). While both grants were 
intended for deprived communities, they were deployed liberally and often within the 
city’s Central Business District (CBD) (Hall, 1993: 26) (Darden et al, 1987:193;196). 
Detroit’s CBD alone received 16.7% of CDBG grants between 1975 and 1982, while 
only one of the city’s highest poverty neighbourhoods received greater than 2% of 
CDBG funds and others received none (Darden et al, 1987:194;196). Subsequent 
studies determined that the allocation of funds and neighbourhood poverty rates 
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were weakly correlated (Darden et al, 1987:196). Detroit received an estimated $465 
million in Federal HUD funds across both programmes between 1978 and 1984 
(Thomas, 2013:157). The city would ultimately receive over $500 million in CDBG 
funds throughout the 1980s (HUD, 2016) as Federal assistance soon became its 
“largest single revenue source” (Bockmeyer, 2000:2423).  
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Figure 3.2: Map of Detroit Neighbourhoods with selected projects featured 
 
 
City of Detroit (2017)  
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As one of the few programmes for which a detailed breakdown by city and year is 
available, total CDBG funds to Detroit have amounted to $1.88 billion since 1975: 
averaging $45.8 million per year (HUD, 2016). This made Detroit the recipient of the 
fifth largest amount of HUD funds over the past 40 years, behind only New York City, 
Chicago, Los Angeles and Philadelphia (HUD, 2016). The most frequent 
retrospective criticism of both CDBG and UDAG has been their purported neglect of 
strategic planning; emphasising single-project approaches to development without 
their meaningful integration into a more comprehensive, city-wide strategy (Thomas, 
2013:181.  Federal funds are nevertheless credited with a measure of “damage 
limitation” in averting steeper municipal job losses during the chastened budgetary 
environment of the early 1980s (Anton, 1983:32) (Sugrue, 2014:314). While there 
was a degree of, at times significant year-to-year fluctuation in award size, they have 
trended downwards: contracting by 40.4% between 2002 and 2015. These trends 
coincided with years of particular turbulence for the city and its residual industry.  
 
The correlation coefficient for the relationship between the city’s unemployment rates 
and receipt of CDBG funds from 1990 onwards - the first year for which Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) figures for major cities are available online was negative and 
relatively strong at-0.58; suggesting that, while CDBG funds may have been 
gratefully received initially, their granting generally became scarcer as the city’s 
hours and years of need hastened. (Figure 3.4).  
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Detroit’s leaders would exploit almost any means at their disposal to attract and 
retain investment and employment. While the wisdom, cost-effectiveness and long-
term impact of their usage can be questioned, the ingenuity of its leadership in 
exploring the available avenues is less open to question. The approach of Young 
and other municipal leaders could perhaps be termed one of “improvisation”. With 
little in the way of dedicated economic development initiatives, they had to lobby for 
and grant whichever incentives they could and then deploy these vociferously and 
“with impunity” (Hall & Hall, 1993:26). This approach presented inevitable trade-offs, 
and the overall lack of conditionality of available assistance would become one of 
the most faulted aspects of development policy under Young (Hall & Hall, 1993:27). 
It was not until 1992, after repeated commitments and overly optimistic job creation 
targets had consistently failed to be met that an IFT abatement was actually 
rescinded (Hall & Hall, 1993:27). 
Detroit’s almost exclusively supply-side efforts from the 1970s to the early 1990s 
were also dominated by the pursuit of a select number of costly “megaprojects” 
(Neill, 1995:639;642): large-scale, often industrial or retail developments intended to 
be financed by public and private funds. In reality, such was the desperation of 
Detroit’s leadership that public funds were often employed without regard for the 
cost-benefit calculus. The value of property in the city had fallen precipitously since 
1960 (Detroit Free Press, 2013) and was poised to decline further. Manufacturing 
employment had decreased by 27,000 between 1972 and 1977 alone (Sugrue, 
2014:144).  
The centrepiece of Young’s approach to combat this deterioration and revitalise the 
city was a series of large-scale developments on the riverfront area of the CBD. 
This reflected Young’s belief that the regeneration of the city’s riverfront would spur 
the revitalisation of the remainder (Thomas, 2013:157). The heart of this 
centrepiece was represented by the Renaissance Center: a multi-storey office suite 
constructed with the support of and, ostensibly, in partnership with the city’s main 
corporate leaders (Neill, 1995:642-643). Opened in 1977 with an estimated public 
price tag of $260 million, it would accumulate losses of $130 million during its first 
five years of operation (Bockmeyer, 2000: 2423;2424). While visiting reporters could 
later speak of a “city center bustling with activity” (Stokes, 1988:273), the trickle-
down impact of this development was not particularly in evidence, even within the 
CBD. Vacancy rates for prime retail spaces in the area were at 35% in 1980, with 
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sales less than half of their pre-1967 levels (Bockmeyer, 2000:2424). Additional 
riverfront developments during the Young years would include the Joe Louis Arena, 
which opened in 1979 and was aided by the award of an unprecedented $38 million 
Federal loan (Rich, 1999:201) (McGraw, 2007:299-300) (Thomas, 2013:157). Yet all 
of their costs, both public and private, the impact of these and other developments 
upon the drivers of Detroit’s decline was less explicable (Hall & Hall, 1993:27). The 
emphasis on the CBD may have reflected a tendency seen within urban policy 
analysis of viewing it as being synonymous with the city as a whole (Hill et al, 
1995:160), as well an increasingly outmoded view of the district as the locus of 
employment: a notion which had been progressively eroded by the out-migration of 
jobs from cities altogether (Glaeser, 2008:40).  
 
Later developments suffered from similarly high costs and comparatively limited 
public benefits. The construction of the Central Industrial Park (CIP) GM plant, 
commonly known as the Poletown plant, would prove particularly symptomatic of 
this trend (Ryan, 2012:73). Constructed on redeveloped residential land straddling 
Detroit and the independent city of Hamtramck, the project involved the clearance of 
3,500 residents, 100 businesses and 1,500 buildings (Bachelor, 1985:601) 
(Bockmeyer, 2000:2424). Combined public assistance for this project from Federal 
and local funds was estimated at a minimum of $260 million (Thomas, 2013:165). 
Once fully operational, the new plant employed just 3,400 workers compared to the 
6,000 initially pledged (Thomas, 2013: 165) (Ryan, 2012:73). Fewer than 2,000 jobs 
went to Detroit residents; resulting in an estimated cost per resident employed of 
$156,250 (Hall & Hall, 1993:30). Given the volume of public investment and the $60 
million tax abatement granted in aid of it, retrospective assessments concluded that 
Detroit would “receive virtually no revenues” (Thomas, 2013:165) from the project. 
This rendered Young’s prediction that the plant was “the best thing to happen to the 
city…in a long time” (Hall & Hall, 1993:29) somewhat premature. 
 
The pursuit of these projects and their disproportionate costs to the public purse is 
increasingly faulted for having inhibited municipal leaders from grappling with the 
city’s underlying problems - especially its declining public services (Glaeser, 
2011:63). Instead of prioritising public safety and education, Young’s strategy 
involved “overbuilding a declining city” (Glaeser, 2011:62) which had lost 20% of its 
population during the 1970s (Detroit Free Press, 2013). This strategy emphasised 
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the construction of tangible but ultimately transient structures instead of attracting 
the generators of wealth ultimately needed for long-term success, and “confusing a 
city…with its structures” (Glaeser, 2011:43;61). The dependence on constructions 
was also undermined by, as with the IFT incentives, their usage by multiple 
municipalities; many of which offered more explicit spatial, labour force and 
facilities-based advantages over Detroit, and which raised the question of “how 
many successful convention centres [and] sports stadia...can there be?” (Harvey, 
2012:361). For the initial decade, these initiatives did not burden the city’s debts 
excessively, as they were compensated for by hawkish budgets which reined them 
in and permitted the city’s revenues to actually exceed its debts for close to a 
decade from 1977 (Detroit Free Press, 2013). This situation changed dramatically 
by the mid-1980s, however, as the city increasingly sold municipal bonds to pay for 
a further tranche of public improvements, large-scale renovations of notable 
buildings such as the Cobo Center and the construction of a major Chrysler plant in 
the city’s East Side (Detroit Free Press, 2013). 
 
The state of the city’s retrenched but residual auto industry would be a key 
consideration for redevelopment policies throughout the 1980s. U.S. automakers 
had collectively seen some of their worst years in a generation. Pounded by 
escalating interest rates, car production in 1979 stood at its lowest level since the 
1958 recession (Galster, 2014:84). Company revenues declined to the extent that 
Chrysler approached the Federal Government for assistance in meeting its pension 
obligations in the event of bankruptcy (Galster, 2014:84). Manufacturing 
employment in Detroit had more than halved over the past three decades; leaving a 
city-wide unemployment rate of 15% by 1980 (Hall & Hall, 1993:25). Yet even by the 
early 1980s, after close to a decade of continuously falling employment within the 
industry, city officials remained sceptical that its decline would be as pronounced as 
it ultimately became (Cowell, 2015:66). As with its struggles with depopulation, the 
difficulties of Detroit’s auto industry were not fundamentally unique to the city, and 
reflected the increasing hurdles faced by the American auto industry in a changing 
market. The doubling in inflation-adjusted gasoline prices between 1972 and 1980, 
precipitated by two international energy crises, prompted a rapid move towards 
cheaper, more fuel efficient models among American consumers; a move which 
American manufacturers simply lacked the capacity to meet (Klier, 2009:7) 
(McCarthy, 2007:224) (Ciment, 2015:104).  
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Imports from Asia had increased progressively from the 1960s onwards, while 
foreign manufacturers increasingly challenged the Big Three on their home ground 
(Katz, 2008:134). Leading Asian manufacturers such as Honda, Mazda, Nissan, 
Toyota and Mitsubishi began to establish U.S. based production facilities; with these 
“transplants” (Rubenstein, 2001:170:322) largely bypassing Detroit and its home 
state in favour of lower-cost locales elsewhere in the Midwest or the South (Eberts 
& Erickcek, 2009:2). Chastened by its first annual loss in 60 years, 1980 saw GM 
launch a $20 billion cost-cutting initiative which included the closure of two Detroit 
plants (Hall & Hall, 1993:25) (Perrucci, 1994:4). Companies relentlessly automated 
their assembly lines, and GM facilities such as its Fleetwood and Clark Street 
Cadillac plants closed in 1987 with the loss of 6,600 jobs (Widick, 1989:253) 
(Rubenstein, 1992:260). This overarching decline made the late 1980s a difficult 
time for optimism in the city. Major closures not only heightened the city’s 
unemployment rate, which stood at 15.7% in 1989 (Thomas, 2013:175) and further 
depressed its below average labour force participation rate, but also negated at 
least $10 million in property taxes (Maines, 2001:213). City officials had to strike an 
optimistic tone in light of such a “great economic blow” (Maines, 2001:213) and note 
their successes in retaining some level of automotive employment. While Michigan 
had been able to sustain its share of total U.S. car assemblies at close to 30% 
throughout the 1980s, Detroit itself had struggled to remain above 5% (Thomas, 
2013:173). The number of Detroit residents employed by Chrysler fell by 69% 
between 1979 and 1990 (Thompson, 2004:218). The city government’s response to 
these developments would be to release further funds through the sale of its 
municipal bonds: selling $130 million of these in order to finance the construction of 
a Chrysler plant on its East Side (Detroit Free Press, 2013). The result of this and 
similar deals was an estimated 72% increase in the city’s debts between 1987 and 
1994 (Detroit Free Press, 2013). 
 
As Detroit entered the final decade of a century which had seen it rise from a mid-
sized Midwestern city to an automotive giant and regional behemoth before its steep 
decline, there was, however, growing cause for hope. The Big Two remained the 
city’s two largest employers; collectively employing 29,427 residents by 1993 
(Thomas, 2013:167). While the city’s debts were mounting, it was soon to benefit 
sufficiently from a nationwide economic expansion that its revenues would stable 
121 
 
(Detroit Free Press, 2013). Its population decline, which had been rapid and 
progressive during the three preceding decades, was beginning to slow and 
household incomes would increase by 18% over the course of the decade 
(McDonald, 2015:305) (Galster, 2014:130) (Farley et al, 2000:54).  
 
The election of Dennis Archer as Mayor in 1993, who had displayed a more 
conciliatory attitude to the suburbs than Young, additionally seemed to symbolise a 
different approach to urban policymaking (Dunbar & May, 1995:647). Early in 
Archer’s first term, Detroit would submit a bid for one of the Clinton Administration’s 
flagship initiatives for revitalising areas of high poverty and unemployment: the 
Empowerment Zone (EZ) programme (McCarthy, 1997:5). An area of 18.35 square 
miles was approved as a Federal Empowerment Zone in December 1994 
(McCarthy, 1997:7): making Detroit one of six U.S. cities to receive “first-round” 
status (Clinch, 2008:87-88) (McCarthy, 1997:7). The zone encompassed 49 of the 
city’s census tracts; making it the largest first-round zone by area, the third largest 
by population, and the holder of the joint-highest unemployment rate (28%) among 
the initial six (Citizens Research Council of Michigan, 2007:6) (Government 
Accounting Office, 2006:103) (Busso & Kline, 2007:41). Its goals were described as 
the “most extensive” (Oakley & Tsao, 2006:452) of any first-round city. Prioritising 
job-creation, workforce mobilisation, individual self-sufficiency, neighbourhood 
regeneration, and business modernisation, it was boosted by financial commitments 
from GM and an additional $1.2 billion from the wider private sector (Busso & Kline, 
2007:9) (Oakley & Tsao, 2006:452). The zone was therefore considered to have 
one of the most adept in attracting and leveraging private sector funds (Oakley & 
Tsao, 2006:456).   
 
As with Wales’ receipt of structural funds in 1999, Detroit’s successful bid for EZ 
status would be welcomed as a new era for the city. It followed a number of modest 
improvements and emphasised not only attracting employment and investment, but 
employment specifically targeted at zone residents. It would fund local 
infrastructure, workforce training and social service initiatives through $100 million in 
Social Services Block Grants within its first 10 years of operation (HUD 
Correspondence, 2015).  The EZ additionally provided tax incentives to facilitate 
hiring for the entirety of its 20 year lifespan (HUD Correspondence, 2015). These 
attributes stood it in contrast to the IFT and similar incentives which had tended to 
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prioritise property reclamation and project-specific targets over wider community 
investment. Taken as a whole, the EZ and its constituent incentives represented the 
city’s most significant infusion of Federal money after a decade of falling allocations 
(Neill, 1995:644) (Sugrue, 2014:xviii).  
 
Assessments of the Detroit EZ have reached differing conclusions, as have 
evaluations of the initiative nationally. Initial reports noted improvements in key 
social and economic metrics across the zone, yet cautioned against making a 
causal link (Clark, 2013:45). Within six years, the poverty rate within the Zone had 
decreased by 12.5%, while its unemployment rate was down by 10.6% (Oakley & 
Tsao, 2006:464). The arrival of targeted and substantial injections of Federal aid 
had undeniably coincided with a reduction in the city’s unemployment rate; with a 
6.6% decline observed between 1993 and 2000 (BLS, 2016). The independent 
responsibility of the EZ designation and the funds it carried with it for this change is 
however obscured by both the contraction of the city’s labour force, which fell by 
3.9% during the same period, as well as a simultaneous nationwide economic 
expansion. Employment within the city had not increased materially, and the extent 
to which metrics indicated that it did may have owed as much, if not more to 
national economic trends. President Clinton likely spoke for most Federal officials 
when discussing the city’s lower unemployment rate by 1999; stating simply, “I hope 
the empowerment zone had something to do with that” (Clinton, 2000:23). 
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Table 3.2: National unemployment rates and labour force 
size for the city of Detroit, 1990-2015 
Year U.S unemployment 
rate (%) 
Detroit labour force 
size 
1990 5.6 400931 
1991 6.8 403788 
1992 7.5 407976 
1993 6.9 397028 
1994 6.1 391066 
1995 5.6 387917 
1996 5.4 394054 
1997 4.9 392098 
1998 4.5 394282 
1999 4.2 395585 
2000 4.0 381656 
2001 4.7 381167 
2002 5.8 374910 
2003 6.0 379877 
2004 5.5 378419 
2005 5.1 375071 
2006 4.6 371254 
2007 4.6 363760 
2008 5.8 358157 
2009 9.3 377828 
2010 9.6 276885 
2011 8.9 261343 
2012 8.1 256747 
2013 7.4 255742 
2014 6.2 248099 
2015 5.3 240000 
 
BLS (2016) 
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Figure 3.5: Unemployment rates for the city of Detroit, 1990-2015 
 
Whether the zone did in fact have something to do with these improvements is a 
topic which has received greater scrutiny in recent years. Despite being both 
geographically targeted and initiated by the Federal Government, the volume of 
data necessary to gauge its overall effectiveness nevertheless remains 
comparatively limited. Partly, this lies in the divided remit of the scheme itself: as a 
“nexus” (Busso & Kline, 2007:2) between economic development and conventional 
social welfare programmes. While the scheme was therefore formally administered 
by HUD, the funds were often provided by a number of different agencies. The 
social services component was administered by the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), while the tax incentives provided to businesses which hired 
residents, the primary economic development component of the EZ programme, 
were administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Data on tax incentives 
awarded to individual zones by the IRS is currently unavailable (HUD, 2016) (HUD 
Correspondence, 2015). While annual reports which provide details on EZ activities 
began to be uploaded to the HUD website beginning in 1998 (Oakley & Tsao, 
2006:449), the relevant links no longer appear to be functional (HUD, 2016).  
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Initial evaluations of the Detroit zone were complicated by limited data and disputes 
between EZ staff and proposed external evaluators over evaluation designs (Dewar, 
2004:120) (Dewar, 2003:18). Later studies however began to disaggregate 
performance effects across individual EZs to a greater extent, with a HUD 
commissioned study by Hebert et al (2001) finding that Detroit’s zone saw above-
average performance across selected metrics. Employment within the Detroit EZ 
increased by 11% over its neighbouring areas, whereas the Chicago and 
Philadelphia zones actually underperformed their contiguous regions (Hebert et al, 
2001:ii) (Dewar, 2004:285). Overall, employment within the Detroit zone increased 
by 15% over the five year period under consideration; a figure close to the six zone 
average of 16% (Hebert et al, 2001:2-8;2-9). On the issue of economic benefits to 
zone residents themselves, the data was more ambiguous. There was a 93% 
increase in the number of zone residents employed during the EZ’s first years of 
operation (Hebert et al, 2001:3-4), however the proportion of Detroit EZ jobs held by 
zone residents actually declined; making it one of only two EZs in which this trend 
could be observed (Hebert et al, 2001:3-4;5).  
 
Firms in the Detroit zone were more likely to access the economic incentives 
provided for hiring zone residents, with an estimated 19% of surveyed firms in 2000 
making use of its primary tax credit; higher than any other zone (Hebert et al, 
2001:3-22). The percentage of respondents stating that receipt of the credit was 
“not important at all” (Hebert et al, 2001:3;26) in hiring considerations was 
nevertheless also the highest of the six zones and suggesting that it may ultimately 
have been less decisive in firm decisions. Subsequent interviews of local employers 
have tended to corroborate a more conservative estimation of incentives’ impact on 
firms’ considerations, with Dewar (2003) finding that the incentives were often 
insufficiently publicised, accessible or compensatory; all of which served to deter a 
more sustained uptake (Dewar, 2003:286-287;297). 
 
Perhaps most significantly, delays in the delivery of Federal funds for social service 
projects obstructed the Detroit EZ’s initially broad-based and “multi-faceted” (Hebert 
et al, 2001:9-8) redevelopment plan. However, this very setback appears to have 
enabled a more investment and employment focused strategy to fill the strategic 
vacuum, as policymakers successfully marketed the zone designation to channel an 
estimated $1.3 billion in private sector investment there (Hebert et al, 2001:9-8). As 
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with many developments, the precise role played by EZ status in securing this is not 
easily resolvable. Some sources suggest that many of these funds were committed 
prior to the city’s receipt of the EZ designation, while other surveys indicate that its 
status did exert a “modest” (Hebert, 2001:9-9) impact on firm perceptions of the 
area.  The booming economy of the late 1990s also made attributing responsibility 
for shifts in employment particularly challenging (Hebert et al, 2001: iii).  
 
There are grounds for assuming that Detroit was uniquely poorly placed to capitalise 
upon and reap the “spread effects” (Myrdal, 1957:31) and benefits of economic 
growth, even when these were comparatively widely distributed. Between 1993 and 
1996; a period of escalating, if modest, nationwide economic growth (World Bank, 
2016), employment within the city increased by 0.5% while those in its suburbs rose 
by 11.6% (Brennan & Hill, 1999:4). Detroit's share of its metropolitan area's 
employment would remain the lowest of any other central city; falling by 1.3% during 
a period of moderate, though consistent nationwide economic growth (Brennan & 
Hill, 1999:7; 9). While the city was benefiting from national economic trends, it was, 
again, underperforming them to a notable degree. The impact of the EZ was 
needed, though national economic conditions, and their mixed effect upon the city 
made it difficult to even define what it was.  
 
As the vision for the Detroit EZ placed such a premium on promoting the 
fundamentals needed for economic growth, from increased policing to remediating 
dilapidated housing (Oakley & Tsao, 2006:452-3), its aspirations did not shy away 
from its deep challenges. The total amount of HUD funds provided to the Detroit 
zone between 1994 and 2004 has been calculated at $1.785 billion (Oakley & Tsao, 
2006:455): the highest of the four Round 1 zones (Oakley & Tsao, 2006:454). Of 
this, 71% went on “business and banking loan program[me]s” (Oakley & Tsao, 
2006:455). Housing received 11% of specified funds, followed by infrastructure 
developments at 8.3% (Oakley & Tsao, 2006:455). Public safety projects received 
approximately 1% of this expenditure over the life-cycle of the funds (Oakley & 
Tsao, 2006:455). These figures are likely an underestimate of total expenditure on 
the zone, given the difficulty in obtaining data on IRS-administered incentives. They 
are, however, indicative of a heavily firm-focused strategy; with a comparatively 
modest share of HUD administered funds (below 10%) committed for infrastructure 
and public safety enhancement. 
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Detroit expended more funds on conventional economic development functions than 
any other zone (Oakley & Tsao, 2006:456), yet the dispersion of these funds across 
the EZ would be questioned in interim assessments such as Boyle & Eisinger 
(2001:6). Funds were said to be overly localised and isolated in individual pockets of 
activity with “little chance of forming critical mass” (Boyle & Eisinger, 2001:6). 
Projects earmarked for improvements in the city’s schools were hampered by 
successive changes in project goals and strategies, with few coming to fruition in 
anything approximating their original proposal or with the expected results (Boyle & 
Eisinger, 2001:7). Overall data was said to be “almost useless” (Boyle & Eisinger, 
2001:10) and largely unaudited. Many businesses involved in ongoing projects 
within the zone publicly stated that they would have proceeded in its absence and 
there was, additionally, “little evidence that significant numbers” (Boyle & Eisinger, 
2001:11) of local residents were hired.  
 
Structurally, the EZ fused classic, though now Federally-funded, supply-side tax 
incentives with a demand-side emphasis on bolstering indigenous markets, the 
funding of in-kind business support and efforts to leverage private funds. This 
programmatic hybridity illustrated that, while Detroit may not have fully transcended 
the supply-side, low road approaches which typified the first wave of American 
economic development policy (Glasmeier, 2000:562), it was, at least with Federal 
funding and facilitation, receptive to pursuing approaches which were distinct from 
those which had characterised the previous two decades of its urban redevelopment 
efforts.  
 
While Washington’s effect on the city at large remained somewhat of an open 
question, Lansing was also signalling a different approach to economic 
development:  increasing the number of programmes and reforming their 
administration. The creation of the public-private Michigan Economic Development 
Corporation (MEDC) in 1999 introduced a new actor to this livelier economic 
development scene. Assuming the responsibilities of a number of disparate 
agencies, MEDC would have the primary responsibility for administering and 
overseeing the by then considerable number of tax incentives on offer within the 
state (LaFaive, 2003), as well as for filing relevant reports with the state Legislature 
(Engler, 1999). 
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Between 1994 and 1998, no fewer than four tax incentive programmes were 
launched. These varied in both scope and coverage, from targeted tax credits 
available on a state-wide basis to near total tax exemptions within designated areas. 
The flagship incentive of this more interventionist course was the Michigan 
Economic Growth Authority (MEGA) tax credit. Established in 1995, this provided 
credits to offset Michigan Business Tax (MBT) liabilities for selected projects to 
promote job creation and retention (MEDC, 2009:1) (Anderson et al 2010:17). 
Credits were not geographically restricted and their size, which could exceed a 
company’s actual tax liability, demonstrated the extent of Lansing’s expansion of 
state-level incentives.  
 
While initial awards were modest, the number and size of credits would increase 
considerably by time the combined force of the automotive and financial crises 
engulfed the city and the state in 2007 (Gautz, 2014). Until its cancellation in 2011, 
MEGA distributed an estimated $1.2 billion in investments either entirely within 
Detroit or as part of multi-site projects which included it (Table 3.3). The vast 
majority of this expenditure came with the award of over $1 billion in MEGA funds to 
GM in 2009. Once these later and multi-site projects are excluded, the city received 
a considerably more modest total of $142 million (Table 3.3). An assessment of the 
geographic distribution of the first decade of MEGA deals concluded that central 
cities such as Detroit received only 6% of credits and only 1% of total funds - and 
that there were four years during which Detroit received no credits (LeRoy et al, 
2006:4;40). Previous studies had determined that 60% of MEGA credits went to 
Michigan counties with above-average economic indicators (LeRoy et al, 2006:22). 
While information on the amounts claimed can be constructed from publicly 
available datasets, there are limitations, with performance related data; which would 
permit a more rigorous evaluation, being less readily available. A Michigan House of 
Representatives staffer commented, upon attempting to determine the total MEGA-
related liabilities of the state, that “we just didn't have the information” (Gautz, 
2014). 
 
While it suffered from considerable omissions of data, as the state’s “most 
influential” (LaFaive & Hohman, 2009:15) initiative, and its single largest 
discretionary tax incentive for more than 15 years, it nevertheless received some of 
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the closest scrutiny of any state level programme from outside bodies.  Given the 
magnitude and length of the awards, with an average cost per job created during 
each year of its operation almost double the average for economic incentives in 
similar states (Bartik & Erickcek, 2012:10), this focus may have been a function of 
its specific costs and size. State-wide assessments of MEGA have also ranked as 
some of the most methodologically sophisticated: with techniques ranging from 
economic simulation (Bartik & Erickcek, 2012) (Anderson et al, 2010) to regression 
analysis (LaFaive & Hohman, 2009) (LaFaive & Hicks, 2005).  
 
The latter studies reached more critical conclusions for the initiative: contending, in 
line with LeRoy et al (2006), that awards were both spatially misplaced; being 
disproportionately awarded to counties of below average unemployment, and of 
limited utility; with the authors unable to determine significant relationships between 
MEGA credits and improvements in sectoral or county employment trends (LaFaive 
& Hicks, 2005:43) (LaFaive & Hohman, 2009:25-26). While the application process 
for MEGA attempted to ascertain a “but for” (Bartik & Erickek, 2003:5) condition, to 
ensure that, in the absence of the credit, the project could not proceed, questions 
remained as to quite how robust this test for an ultimately unfalsifiable judgement 
was (LaFaive & Hicks, 2005:6).  
 
Bartik & Erickcek’s (2012) simulation-based evaluation reached more favourable 
results for the programme; conclusions which may reflect their underlying 
assumptions regarding the influence of tax rates on business activity. As MEGA was 
a heavily export-oriented credit targeted at highly mobile companies, the firms 
should, theoretically, have been more sensitive to the costs of taxation (Bartik & 
Erickcek, 2012:15). MEGA credits were also targeted towards Michigan’s traditional 
strengths; with 80% of all credits going to automotive or other manufacturing firms 
(Bartik & Erickcek, 2012:10). With substantial monetary packages targeted at firms 
with historic ties to the state and traditionally above average wages, positive effects 
should, intuitively, have been expected (Bartik & Erickcek, 2012:10). Bartik & 
Erickcek concluded that such results were evident; with the estimated average 
annual wage of a MEGA supported job coming to $75,627 (Bartik & Erickcek, 
2012:10). With wages at this level, the simulation estimated that even if the awards 
were only decisive in a handful of instances, the cost to the state for each job would 
still only amount to $13,000 per year (Bartik & Erickcek, 2012:20). The aggressive 
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sectoral targeting combined with the above-average wages of the Michigan auto 
industry - standing at $58,799 against an average wage of $45,941 across the U.S. 
auto industry by 2000 - likely contributed to this (Porter, 2003:564).  
 
Table 3.3: MEGA expenditure in Detroit (including joint projects), 1996-2011      
Year MEGA ($) Joint projects 
($) 
Total 
including 
joint ($) 
1996 13,636,000 0 13,636,000 
1997 0 0 0 
1998 8,071,000 0 8,071,000 
1999 3,241,000 0 3,241,000 
2000 0 0 0 
2001 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 0 
2003 0 0 0 
2004 4,395,000 0 4,395,000 
2005 0 7,726,000 7,726,000 
2006 0 0 0 
2007 12,926,000 0 12,926,000 
2008 8,555,000 3,091,000 11,646,000 
2009 82,075,888 1,095,218,634 1,177,294,522 
2010 4,987,000 0 4,987,000 
2011 4,499,000 0 4,499,000 
Total 142,385,888 1,106,035,634 1,248,421,522 
 
(MEDC, 2010;2011;2012); (LaFaive & Hohman, 2009) 
 
Identifying the amount of MEGA credits allocated to Detroit is a complex process. 
While credits for projects located exclusively within the city limits can be extracted 
from project spreadsheets, some of the largest credits awarded during the 
programme’s lifetime are for multi-site projects which spanned multiple cities, if not 
counties. The 15 year “global retention credit” (MEGA, 2010) provided to GM at the 
height of the automotive crisis was a particularly notable instance of this. Amounting 
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to more than $1 billion, it was allocated to GM projects located across multiple 
Michigan locations, with the primary objective of retaining its operations within the 
state (MEGA, 2010). The Renaissance Center, which had housed GM’s global 
headquarters since 2003, and the Poletown plant appear to have been the main 
designated recipients within Detroit. GM committed to “additional investment in its 
existing operations” (MEGA, 2008:3) at the Poletown facility, however the most 
specific requirements related to the retention of 2,000 jobs per year at select 
facilities for each year of the credit’s lifetime (MEGA, 2008:3:4:10). The terms of the 
retention credit with regard to operations in Detroit were subsequently revised in 
2010; with the number of employees to be “housed” (MEGA, 2010:2) at the 
Renaissance Center increased from the original 2,000 to 4,000 and the funds 
allocated to the Center increased from the original maximum allocation of $50 
million to $75 million (Halcom, 2010). Subsequent reports place the value of 
outstanding MEGA credits to GM and the other major car manufacturers at $4.5 
billion (Livengood, 2015). MEGA credits were also often offered alongside financial 
inducements such as IFTs or subsequent abatements. This ensured that certain 
project costs were shouldered by local and municipal governments, even if the 
MEGA credits themselves were provided out of state funds (MEGA, 2012:5). This 
packaging further added to the collective price tag of MEGA projects and made it 
“all but impossible” (LaFaive & Hohman, 2009:19) to ascertain the total amount 
expended on the projects from official publications.  
 
While state-wide evaluations of the MEGA scheme have ranked as some of the 
most frequent, sophisticated and detailed, assessing its impact on Detroit is less 
straightforward due to documented data constraints. From accessible datasets and 
previous studies, however, it appears that, with the exception of the sizeable 
intervention in 2009, the city was underrepresented both in overall funds and total 
projects. Reese (2014) identifies 28 MEGA projects within Detroit (2014:638) - a 
number which is not insignificant given that 60% of Michigan cities in receipt of 
MEGA credits received fewer than three (Reese, 2014:638). Relative to the scale of 
the city’s challenges however, this number is less notable than it appears, and it 
contrasts unfavourably with the 47 MEGA backed initiatives in Troy and 43 in both 
Auburn Hills and Ann Arbor: all relatively prosperous cities in nearby or adjacent 
counties. The recent poverty rate stood at 7.0% in Troy and 39.8% in Detroit, 
whereas median household income was $85,685 and $26,095 respectively (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2016). 
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The correlation coefficient between the distribution of MEGA funds to the city and its 
unemployment rate indicates a comparatively strong positive relationship of 0.547. 
Given the difficulty in determining the location of funds with multi-site projects, this is 
calculated to include Detroit-only projects, and is therefore likely to understate total 
MEGA expenditure within the city. While highly tentative, however, it appears that, 
while the amount of MEGA funds were comparatively modest, and while less 
distressed localities appear to have benefited from greater allocations, that MEGA 
expenditure and Detroit’s labour market indicators were cyclically related. As 
unemployment rose, so, generally, did MEGA funds. This is, however, particularly 
skewed by the back-loaded nature of MEGA funding to the city. 79% of funds for 
Detroit only projects were allocated between 2007 and 2011 as its unemployment 
rate spiked with the onset of the housing and financial crises, and MEGA funds for 
projects within the city increased by 859% between 2008 and 2009 alone. The 
scatter plot in Figure 3.6 clearly identifies this anomaly; with the sheer size of the 
2009 award likely accounting for this statistical relationship.  While assessing the 
impact of the scheme upon the city is particularly difficult, it appears that, at least 
initially, and to a greater extent than seen in Wales, that Michigan’s economic 
development organisations did increase assistance to businesses in response to 
adverse shifts in economic conditions.  
 
MEGA was without comparable programmatic precedent among Michigan’s 
incentives, and its theoretical underpinnings are more mixed than those of some of 
its predecessors and successors. In common with first wave initiatives which 
complied with neoclassical assumptions, it was a discretionary supply-side initiative 
which aimed to induce business activity through sizeable reductions in business 
costs. However it was often targeted at the state’s perceived existing industrial 
strengths, especially in automotive manufacturing, as well as towards the promotion 
of more high-tech activities (Bartik, 2011:59) (Bartik & Erickcek, 2012:1;21). This 
trended it, in remit and practice, towards endogenous objectives of bolstering and 
upgrading its extant primary industry as well. 
 
MEGA also amounted to a regional policy tool with state-wide goals which utilised 
state-wide funds to “promote economic growth and job creation” (Michigan 
Legislative Council, 2016:1). Its more restrained deployment within Detroit is not, 
therefore, wholly unexpected. The allocation of substantial credits to more 
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prosperous Michigan localities, and the ambiguous rationale behind and conditions 
attached to Detroit’s largest grants do, however, call into question whether awards 
were distributed  in the most equitable and impactful way possible. With 
headquarters activity traditionally functionally separated from the “traded activity” 
(Porter, 2003:563) seen as necessary to spur agglomeration and cluster formation, 
the stipulations relating to the Renaissance Center in particular suggest that specific 
MEGA awards could  have been more judiciously directed towards activity with 
potentially greater multipliers for the city, as well as a clearer grounding in 
applicable economic theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134 
 
Figure 3.6: Scatter plot of MEGA funds and city-wide unemployment rates, 1995-2011 
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A series of further tax incentives which broadly continued the supply-side, first wave 
inclination of the IFT abatements were launched throughout the 1990s and into the 
following decade. These consisted of the Brownfield Redevelopment Act (BRA) and 
Renaissance Zones (RZs) in 1996, followed by the New Personal Property Act 
(NPP) in 1998, then joined by the operationally similar Obsolete Property 
Rehabilitation Act (OPRA) in mid-2000 (Anderson et al, 2009:10-11). In addition to 
the EZ and MEGA, these additional incentives made the 1990s one of the most 
interventionist periods for Michigan’s economic development efforts. Many of these 
initiatives built upon and extended the remit of existing schemes such as the IFT, 
while replicating their supply-side goals and neoclassical assumptions of reducing 
costs for firms undertaking specific developments. The generally followed their 
administrative structure as well; empowering local governments with the authority to 
redirect local revenues, rather than in distributing state revenues to them (LeRoy et 
al, 2006:11).  
 
 
The BRA was more anomalous in this regard. While it permitted local governments 
to establish authorities to grant local revenue abatements for the development of 
brownfield sites, it also provided state tax credits of up to 10% of the value of an 
investment to offset the developer’s MBT liabilities (Davis, 2002:657) (Citizens 
Research Council of Michigan, 2007:40). The decision to approve or deny an 
application for BRA credits would ultimately lie with MEDC, with the eligibility criteria 
and the maximum amounts permitted being widened substantially in 2000 (Lowham, 
2007:133) (Valade, 2003:1)(Citizens Research Council of Michigan, 2007:40). 
Around 200 BRA funded developments have been recorded across the city since 
the scheme’s introduction, and these are credited with the creation of 18,500 jobs 
and the attraction of over $6.5 billion in investment (DEGC, 2015a). The scheme 
has, however, suffered from “no adequate, state-wide analyses” (Anderson et al, 
2010:20) having been conducted of it. While an initial effort to establish a tracking 
database for BRA funds spearheaded by Michigan State University was proposed in 
2003, it apparently did not proceed to implementation (Anderson et al, 2010:20). 
 
OPRA was structured in a similar manner to IFTs, with local government units 
permitted to establish Obsolete Property Rehabilitation Districts and developers 
considering the remediation of obsolete properties within these districts for 
commercial purposes then able to apply for the exemptions (DEGC, 2015b:1). If 
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granted, obsolete or blighted properties undergoing rehabilitation were insulated 
from conventional property tax rates for up to 12 years (DEGC, 2015b:1). The value 
of the property was then “frozen” (Michigan Treasury, 2014:1) at its pre-
rehabilitation level. To successfully obtain an exemption, applicants were required to 
demonstrate that the development would increase or safeguard employment, spur 
greater business involvement or increased occupancy and that such a development 
could not occur in its absence (DEGC, 2015b:1). OPRA exemptions will be formally 
closed to new applicants as of December 31st, 2016 (DEGCb, 2015:1). While a 
relatively high number of OPRA abatements were granted over the scheme’s 
lifetime relative to other tax incentives; with 92 approved between 2001 and 2015 
(Figure 3.7), this amounted to an average of 6 OPRA-aided developments per year 
and often considerably fewer than this. 40% were granted prior to 2008; with the 
remaining 60% approved after the escalation of both housing and financial crises. A 
comparative surfeit of abatements were granted during the scheme’s penultimate 
year of 2015 - the highest number registered in more than a decade. 
 
The NPP provided complete exemption from personal property taxes and 
overlapped most significantly with existing schemes. NPP exemptions were 
permitted for developments in IFT districts, RZs, BRAs and EZs (DEGC, 2015c:1) 
(Anderson et al, 2010:25). With considerable sections of the city having received 
such designations, Detroit had considerable latitude to approve NPP credits.  In 
common with OPRA and earlier incentives, final approval by the State Tax 
Commission (STC) was required (DEGC, 2015c:1). The number of credits actually 
approved for the city was, however, comparatively low; with only 31 granted 
between 1999 and 2015 (Figure 3.8). There are also considerable limitations in the 
reported data for both OPRA and NPP exemptions and, especially, regarding their 
dollar value. These have made quantifying their impact as well as conducting a 
detailed cost-benefit analysis problematic (Anderson et al, 2010:22;26). 
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Figure 3.7:  OPRA exemptions, 2001-2015 
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Figure 3.8: NPP exemptions, 1999-2015 
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Not all state-wide incentives were as structurally homogenised as the property tax 
abatements. The RZ scheme, launched in 1996, represented one of the clearest 
exceptions. This exempted businesses investing in designated areas of individual 
cities from virtually all state and local taxes: making them an aggressively supply-
side instrument of urban policy and “among the most powerful” (DEGC, 2013:1) 
incentives available (Anderson et al, 2010:26). Detroit would ultimately see 16 areas 
of the city designated as RZs (City of Detroit, 2015). While more powerful than 
conventional property tax abatements and explicitly targeted towards distressed 
regions, the impact of RZs has, however, proven difficult to establish.  
 
A report by the state’s Auditor General reprimanded MEDC for failing to critically 
evaluate the performance of the zones as well as for a lack of adequate data on 
zone performance (Schuring, 2006:345) (Office of the Auditor General, 2013:1). 
While the state did directly reimburse local school districts and public libraries for 
the loss of revenue from state-wide taxes, it did not reimburse local government 
units for lost revenue from city income and other tax exemptions (Office of the 
Auditor General, 2013:8). Detroit was, even in comparative boom times, accruing 
debts of over $3 billion on a precarious revenue base; thereby rendering any further 
depletion particularly detrimental (Detroit Free Press, 2013). Of Detroit’s 16 RZs, 9 
remain active; with the majority of these scheduled to expire on New Year’s Eve 
2017 (City of Detroit, 2015).   
 
With the zones drawn from 33 separate localities across Michigan, they comprised a 
broad economic and demographic cross-section; “from aging industrial centers…to 
relatively prosperous small towns” (Reese & Sands, 2008:18). While Detroit was 
firmly in the former camp, with the largest population and second highest poverty 
rate of any participating Michigan locality (Sands, 2002:26), its zones nevertheless 
saw tangible overall results within the programme’s formative years. Detroit’s RZs 
saw the creation of 1,005 jobs and inward investment of $79 million between 1997 
and 1999: the highest of any locality’s zones (Sands, 2003:727). Determining 
whether these initial trends continued, as well as the RZs’ responsibility for them 
has, however, been complicated by a number of programme-specific limitations. 
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As the zones were some of the most sweeping in terms of taxes exempted, if state 
and local tax rates were decisive factors affecting business location - itself a point of 
debate (Bartik, 1991:38-39) (Wassmer, 2007:26) - then these should have been well 
positioned to counteract them. The RZs’ interaction with the city’s other 
geographically targeted initiative may, in particular, have enhanced their appeal to 
potential investors. The Southwest/Delray subzone fell within the same quadrant of 
the city as the EZ (Sands, 2003:52) (Citizens Research Council of Michigan, 
1998:14); making its southwestern section “the most heavily tax-abated in the state” 
(Citizens Research Council of Michigan, 1998:14). This clustering of potent 
incentives within a narrowly demarcated section of the city inevitably makes the 
process of isolating the specific contribution of the RZ scheme itself a more 
challenging undertaking. The pronounced nationwide economic growth of the mid to 
late 1990s may have similarly contributed to the successes which did occur and 
further obscured the independent impact of the RZ programme itself (Brookings 
Institution, 2003).  
 
Reporting issues have plagued the RZ programme for a number of years. Figures 
on specific job creation and investment outputs were not collected for a number of 
zones in any form prior to 2009 and, while this information has increased 
considerably in recent years, it remains variable in the absence of compulsory and 
standardised reporting requirements (Office of the Auditor General, 2013;16;18). 
Actual expenditure on the programme has also proven difficult to estimate; 
prompting the auditor’s office to instruct MEDC to “determine [its] true value” (Office 
of the Auditor General, 2013:17;73). The administrative simplicity of the scheme 
was said to be widely lauded by state officials, with the ability for recipients to “just 
move in and do business” (Schuring, 2006:335). Yet while perceived as an asset, 
this ensured that RZ incentives came with few, if any, strings attached, few means 
of inducing firms to remain within the area following their expiration and created 
considerable gaps in state intelligence on some of its “most powerful” (DEGC, 
2011:1) programmes (Schuring, 2006:336;337). Altogether, these constraints 
confirmed that the Detroit RZs’ “effectiveness is as difficult to measure as [their] 
cost” (Schuring, 2006:348). RZs, while spatially targeted in the same manner as the 
EZ, represented an amplified, though structurally conventional supply-side 
incentive. Whereas the EZ incorporated demand-side and second wave 
components, the RZ programme resembled a more exclusively first wave initiative. 
Its limited eligibility requirements additionally meant that its incentives were not 
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awarded on a discretionary basis. This made it one of the most expansive 
redevelopment programmes deployed within the city and rendered its data 
constraints especially problematic from both an analytical and accounting 
perspective. 
 
While the progress of its redevelopment efforts remained ambiguous, the 1990s had 
represented a mixed yet relatively and atypically positive decade for the city. The 
Motor City’s engines were no longer firing on all cylinders by 2000, yet they were 
stalling far less dramatically than in previous decades. Analysts could plausibly cite 
it as an example of “urban rebirth” (McDonald, 2015:305). Its poverty rate had 
declined by 6.5% and the number of homicides per 100,000 of its residents declined 
from 57 to 41 per year during the preceding decade (McDonald, 2015:305). Federal 
funds offered not only recognition of the city’s problems, but direct cash to its 
services. Bolstered by the development of new product lines, the auto industry had 
experienced some of its most profitable years in decades - with the Big Three 
posting profits each year during the 1990s (Galster, 2014:84). Two automotive 
plants owned by the Big Two were still operational within the city and major 
investments had occurred within the downtown area. Quite how much of this 
progress could be attributed to development initiatives and how much occurred in 
spite of them was difficult to gauge as, often, was their ultimate cost to the public 
purse. Municipal leaders were grateful for any progress, going to great lengths to 
retain whatever industrial activity they could within city limits. The next decade 
would however bring into crashing sharp relief the tenuous, temporary and easily 
reversible nature of these successes - and the ambiguous foundation upon which 
they were built. 
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3.3 2000-2015: Bailouts to bankruptcy and beyond  
 
Prior to the additional challenges of financial crisis and municipal bankruptcy, Detroit 
was plagued by worsening social and economic conditions. Poverty rates increased 
by 11% between 2002 and 2004 alone, while the city ranked second highest in the 
nation for violent crime rates for three consecutive years (McGraw, 2007:300). 
Detroit’s difficulties were similar in nature to those faced by many other former 
industrial Midwestern cities: with outward migration of trained workers having left the 
urban core with outmoded infrastructure, high municipal taxes and deteriorating 
public service provision (Bowen & Song, 2014:245). Yet they were vastly different in 
magnitude. Even by 2006, its unemployment rate stood at 13.7%; considerably 
above the highest national unemployment rate recorded in recent decades 
(Glaeser, 2011:63) (Table 3.6). Detroit’s unemployment rate would rise to 29% at 
the height of the twin automotive and financial crises, while house prices in the 
metropolitan area declined by 49.5% between 2005 and 2009: the second highest 
fall for any metro area in the country (The Economist, 2015) (Solomon, 2013:7) 
(Lagorio, 2008). Empty lots covered more than 40% of the entire city by 2006 
(McGraw, 2007:293) and the city’s population contracted by 237,408 between 2000 
and 2010 (SEMCOG, 2015). 
 
The 2000s were not without some, though heavily qualified successes for the city. A 
2006 report which surveyed residents within the nearby downtown area had found a 
population which was larger, wealthier and more educated than previous estimates 
had assumed (Brookings, 2006:9). The residential population in downtown Detroit 
by 2006 was 13% higher than Census Bureau projections (Brookings Institution, 
2006:9). 83% of residents held a Bachelors’ degree or higher qualification - more 
than three times the national average (Brookings Institution, 2006:9). This meant 
that the CBD and surrounding neighbourhoods were no longer simply an 
aggregation of office space in the most desirable core of the city, but home to “well-
educated, and relatively wealthy population” (Brookings Institution, 2006:13). This 
change was attributed, in part, to city leaders’ aggressive use of incentives and 
major projects to render it a more attractive space overall (Brookings Institution, 
2006:6). This change did, however, reflect comparable developments seen across 
other U.S. metropolitan areas; with a notable degree of repopulation having 
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occurred and an average population increase of 15% observed within the central 
cities of 45 major metropolitan regions (Leinberger, 2005:1). This trend made it 
harder to identify the precise input of Detroit’s interventions relative to simultaneous, 
possibly exogenously driven trends. The presence of existing  “anchor institutions” 
(Ehlenz et al, 2014:1) such as Wayne State University, the Henry Ford Health 
System and the Detroit Medical Center close to the area may have similarly 
contributed  to these movements (Gallagher,2013: 20). These and other education 
and medical employers had accounted for an estimated 11.8% of the city's total jobs 
by the late 1990s: the second highest share of any major U.S. city (Harkavy & 
Zuckerman, 1999:6). Irrespective of causal impact, however, it represented an 
almost unequivocally positive development for the city during what was amounting 
to a growing storm.  
 
The remainder of the city’s once-hegemonic auto industry would see a more 
unambiguously turbulent decade. Beginning the millennium on an unusually 
profitable streak, it would stand on the precipice of catastrophic failure within eight 
years; an eventuality only averted by a controversial Federal bailout and a 
protracted reorganisation process. While Michigan’s auto industry held certain 
advantages, with traditionally higher wages and a greater market share than other 
manufacturing states, trends were gravitating against it - and in spite of the 
deployment of MEGA funds directed towards its retention. From 1986 to 2006, 
Michigan’s auto sector saw a 34% fall in sectoral employment while Kentucky and 
South Carolina saw increases of 152% and 105% respectively (Katz, 2008:136). 
This signified a “shift in the epicentre of auto production from Michigan” (Eberts & 
Erickek, 2009:2) to lower cost regions, and the Detroit Metro Area duly experienced 
the loss of 60% of its automotive sector jobs between 2000 and 2009 (Eberts & 
Erickcek, 2009:2).  These years similarly ranked as some of the hardest for the 
industry nationally, as the share of the American auto market occupied by the Big 
Three fell from 66% in 2000 to just 43% in 2009 (Associated Press, 2009). The 
Federal Government was compelled to intervene with the assistance the 1970s 
crises had almost necessitated. Its intervention amounted to a total of $79.68 billion 
between 2008 and 2009; with more than half of this total provided to GM alone 
(Snavely, 2014).  
While the city’s primary industry was struggling to adapt during the early years of 
the 21st Century, the city’s governance and the state’s approach to economic 
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development were also in for notable gear shifts. The 2001 election of Kwame 
Kilpatrick to the Mayoralty and Jennifer Granholm to the Governor’s Mansion the 
following year would have significant implications for both the city’s finances and 
ongoing development efforts. Spurred by the out-migration of college graduates 
from the state, and continued job losses from an auto industry facing competitive 
and geographic pressures (Cool Cities, 2005:3:5), Granholm would revise the 
state’s approach to economic development; taking the rationale away from the first-
wave, low-road “war among the states” which had traditionally governed Michigan’s 
redevelopment efforts, and towards a competing approach: one explicitly predicated 
upon Florida’s creative class theory and the endogenous growth assumptions upon 
which it drew.    
 
The primary initiative to attract and retain this class was the Cool Cities scheme. 
Launched in 2003, the programme funded targeted developments in urban areas to 
enhance their appeal to young professionals (Granholm & Mulhern, 2012:124). It 
chimed with the Governor’s assumption, echoing Florida (2005:3) that “talent is 
what matters” (Granholm & Mulhern, 2012:124) in attracting high-wage, high-tech 
jobs more so than direct financial aid. It would represent one of the most 
theoretically-aligned development policies pursued by the state. It, perhaps not 
coincidentally, also represented one of its most explicitly demand-side and second 
wave initiatives (Reese, 2013:2:6); seeking to capitalise upon the strengths of 
Michigan’s cities to attract the growing class of creative workers which, by that 
stage, accounted for an estimated 30% of the entire U.S. labour force (Florida, 
2005:35). Florida himself had described Detroit as holding “greater potential for 
improvement” (Peck, 2011:54) than any other city in the country, despite its metro 
area being ranked 68th out of 132 regions within his own index (Ball et al, 2003:3).  
 
The funds it received to actually affect these changes and transform it into a magnet 
for creative professionals were low, in keeping with the modest size of the scheme. 
Grant allocations to the city ranged from $400,000 in its first year of operation in 
2004 (DLEG, 2005) to $300,000 the following year (LARA, 2006). Data on 
subsequent years is scarcer, with the website for the initiative, which provided 
project and funding details, now defunct. Detroit specific conclusions were relatively 
sparse, with press releases noting that its Midtown area had seen “commercial 
investment that it has not been seen in several decades” (Office of the Governor, 
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2008:3) and a mid-term status report of the scheme’s first two years of operation 
identifying the creation of 35 jobs and the attraction of $1.5 million in private 
investment linked to the 2004 grants awarded to Detroit projects (Public Policy 
Associates, 2007:4;6). 
 
One of the more enduring initiatives of the 2000s would be the establishment of the 
Detroit Riverfront Conservancy (DRFC). Formed in 2003, the organisation was 
comprised of public, private and third sector partners, with the overall objective of 
enhancing the city’s riverfront as an area for leisure, retail and, ultimately, 
residence. The rationale behind riverfront development remained as it had been 
under Young’s tenure, the exploitation of its “only notable topographical feature” 
(Eisinger, 2003:92), though with a more expansive view of the area’s capacity. Its 
aspiration was that, in time, the benefits of a vibrant and secure riverfront would 
percolate upwards into the downtown area and beyond (Cool Cities, 2005:68). In 
attracting new visitors, sales and revenues for the city, in addition to the possibility 
of market-rate, residential housing, it would serve as a “catalyst for economic 
development in the city” (CSL International, 2013:10). A focus on the riverfront also 
dovetailed to a sufficient degree with the theory which underpinned the Cool Cities 
initiative; particularly in attracting and engaging new residents and visitors, although 
Cool Cities grants had largely concentrated upon the downtown area.  
 
The DRFC remains one of the most recent development initiatives to have, at its 
request, been externally evaluated. This assessment approximated that $1.55 billion 
in combined investment either had, or would occur in the near future; with an 
estimated $639 million (41%) of this being linked to riverfront improvements (CSL 
International, 2013:5). These improvements in particular were projected to have 
aided 16,700 jobs within the construction industry; with an estimated 1,300 jobs 
supported by them each year (CSL International, 2013:6). On its loftier and more 
consequential aspiration of aiding Detroit’s redevelopment, however, the evaluation 
was more circumspect, noting that this was “less successful” (CSL International, 
2013:19) and highlighting the disruption of the 2008 financial crisis (CSL 
International, 2013:19).   
 
145 
 
While a cluster of regional Cool Cities with vibrant, urban centres and highly skilled 
workforces was a long-term aspiration, direct assistance, largely in the form of tax 
incentives, remained the state’s proximate tools for economic development. The 
Governor herself explained they had to be utilised “constantly as a competitive tool 
against other states” (Granholm & Mulhern, 2012:124). The war among the states 
may have reached a stalemate as policymakers entertained more recent concepts, 
though it showed no means of concluding. The transition to the second wave was 
far from complete, nor was a complete pivot from supply to demand-side 
programmes. If anything, the number and scope of the former would be increased 
owing to the continuing turbulence within the automotive industry. Eligibility for 
MEGA credits was significantly liberalised during Granholm’s two terms, especially 
following the financial crisis; as the state granted “more than 80 per year to entice 
companies” (Gautz, 2014). The criteria for Brownfield credits was similarly 
broadened and a number of further tax incentives were introduced (Office of the 
Governor, 2008:3) (LaFaive & Hicks, 2005:14).  
 
The largest of these more recent incentives, the Commercial Rehabilitation Tax 
Abatement (CRA), was established in 2005. As with its antecedents, this resembled 
a supply-side inducement aimed at primarily urban localities; financing the 
remediation of commercial property by means of taxing rehabilitated properties at 
pre-intervention values for a period of up to 10 years (DEGC, 2015d:1). In line with 
earlier schemes, the onus remained upon the City Council to establish the 
appropriate designation, a Commercial Rehabilitation district, wherein properties 
could submit applications for the exemption (DEGC, 2015d:1). An estimated 29 
CRA applications have been approved within the city since its inception (Figure 3.9) 
- with more than half of these granted in 2015 - its final year of operation. The 
exemption closed for all new applicants on December 31st 2015 (DEGC, 2015d:1).  
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Figure 3.9: CRA exemptions, 2009-2015 
 
Michigan Treasury (2016) 
The election of Rick Snyder as Granholm’s successor in 2010 heralded a definitive 
move away from individual supply-side tax incentives and towards reductions in 
overall tax rates as a means of offsetting business costs and spurring economic 
development. MEGA, Brownfield credits and a number of smaller incentives were 
abolished for new entrants, although payments to existing MEGA recipients could 
continue until 2032 (Lawler, 2015) (Gautz, 2014). In total, these changes amounted 
to “most sweeping fiscal policy changes” (Drake, 2014:46) the state had seen in 
close to 50 years. The terminated incentives were replaced by two new initiatives: 
the Michigan Business Development Program (MBDP) and the Michigan 
Community Revitalization Program (MCRP) (Snyder, 2011).  
 
The MBDP broadly covered the same operational remit as MEGA; with supply-side 
objectives relating to job-creation and inward investment, while the MCRP assumed 
some of the goals of the Brownfield credits; prioritising urban regeneration and 
sustainable development (Snyder, 2011) (MEDC, 2014:57). In a perhaps pointed 
rebuke to their predecessors, Snyder identified these initiatives as “fair, efficient and 
transparent” (Snyder, 2011) economic development and community renewal 
initiatives. They were also considerably smaller.  Whereas the average MEGA credit 
between 2008 and 2010 came in at almost $2 billion, the MBDP paid out average 
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awards of only $100 million in its first two years of operation (Lawler, 2015). No 
single business was permitted to receive awards in excess of $10 million per year 
(Snyder, 2011). Additional safeguards were also built into both schemes. While 
applicants provided an estimate for the amount of jobs and investment that would 
result from a project, the state established a specific number which applicants were 
required to meet in order for all funds to be released; with “clawback” mechanisms 
in case of noncompliance (MEDC, 2013).  
 
Detroit has received 16% of MBDP funds approved since 2012, and 23.1% of those 
formally disbursed (Table 3.6), while the city was the designated recipient of 33.3% 
of approved MCRP funds and 27.2% of disbursed awards (Table 3.4). Detroit-
located MCRP projects succeeded in attracting 96.9% of proposed private 
investment (Table 3.5); below the 99.9% seen for all state-wide projects, yet a 
proportion which nevertheless emphasised the impact of the schemes’ enforcement 
mechanisms. MBDP projects within the city have, to date, successfully attracted 
79.9% of the investment initially proposed; considerably above the state-wide 
average of 58.9% (Table 3.7). MBDP projects were less successful on job creation 
metrics, however, attracting 45.1% of the jobs recipients committed to supporting, 
compared to state-wide average of 53.0%.  
 
The costs incurred by earlier initiatives and documented concerns regarding their 
effectiveness and accountability appear to have been translated into a reduced 
emphasis on, and further oversight of state-wide incentives, more so than a 
fundamental reimagining of their objectives and structure. Direct financial 
inducements to encourage job creation on the supply-side and to regenerate urban 
areas on the demand-side were retained, albeit in a retrenched and restructured 
form. The formation of MBDP and MCRP programmes, along with the broader 
restructuring of development incentives, had, irrespective of their format and 
objectives, arrived at what would soon become a critical juncture for the city. Within 
two years, the issue was not attracting investment and jobs, but ensuring the 
delivery of the most basic of municipal services and managing its own bankruptcy.  
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Table 3.4: MCRP funds approved for city of Detroit projects, 2012-2014 
Year Approved funds 
($) 
Disbursed 
funds ($) 
2012 2,387,412 2,349,412 
2013 19,160,000 8,625,000 
2014 2,957,800 0 
Total (Detroit) 24,505,212 10,974,412 
Total state-wide 73,601,314 
 
40,401,397 
 
 
MEDC (2013; 2014; 2015) 
Table 3.5: MCRP targets and outputs, 2012-2014 
Year Proposed total 
project investment 
($) 
Proposed private 
investment amount 
($) 
Actual private 
investment attracted 
($) 
2012 31,233,790 27,525,838 27,293,441 
2013 184,745,883 170,024,883 173,326,299 
2014 22,597,065 19,639,265 9,745,924 
Total 
(Detroi
t) 
238,576,738 217,189,986 210,365,664 
Total 
state-
wide 
638,814,373 565,213,059 564,178,638 
 
MEDC (2013; 2014; 2015) 
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Table 3.6: MBDP funds approved for city of Detroit projects, 2012-2014 
Year Amount approved in 
agreements ($) 
Amount 
disbursed 
($) 
2012 1,500,000 1,115,000 
2013 7,586,000 2,236,000 
2014 14,400,000 0 
Total (Detroit) 23,486,000 13,386,000 
Total (state-wide) 146,473,230 57,968,410 
 
MEDC (2013; 2014; 2015) 
 
Table 3.7: MBDP targets and outputs, 2012-2014 
Year Proposed 
investment ($) 
Actual 
investment 
($) 
Committed 
jobs 
Projecte
d jobs 
Net 
new 
jobs 
2012 18,600,000 15,000,000 170 180 103 
2013 48,692,990 53623212 1,439 1,679 639 
2014 20,030,000 1,200,000 100 100 30 
Total 
(Detroi
t) 
87,322,990 69,823,212 1,709 1,959 772 
Total 
(state-
wide) 
2,688,297,061 1,585,517,667 21,083 23,101 11,182 
 
MEDC (2013;2014;2015) 
 
While the initiatives coming out of Lansing produced mixed results, the performance 
of Detroit’s government during the decade prior to bankruptcy was less ambiguous. 
Redevelopment efforts during Kilpatrick’s mayoralty were dominated by downtown 
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developments to host major events such as the 2006 Super Bowl and 2005’s Major 
League All-Star Game within the city (Maynard, 2006), though his role in securing 
both events is contested (Wattrick, 2011). Kilpatrick’s management of the city’s 
finances, as well as his controversial governing style soon began to outweigh these 
contested gains. His 2005 restructuring of local government pension obligations in 
particular is considered to have been a key driver of the city’s increasingly 
inexorable slide towards bankruptcy (Detroit Free Press, 2013). Representing 
almost a fifth of its pre-bankruptcy debts, the city’s inability to service the interest on 
the additional debts used to finance the restructure resulted in a doubling of its initial 
$1.44 billion price tag (Detroit Free Press, 2013).  
 
The city’s public services were similarly problematic. Despite the appointment of a 
Chief Executive Officer to directly manage and increase mayoral control over the 
Detroit Public Schools (DPS) system in 1999, the performance of the city’s 
schoolchildren in state-wide tests continued to decline as it entered the 21st century, 
and the Mayor’s office did not prioritise further interventions (Eisinger, 2003:88) 
(Wong et al, 2007:46). Determined to have the lowest graduation rate of any major 
American city by a 2003 study (Data Driven Detroit, 2011:19), DPS stumbled from 
weakness to weakness in the years after. It was publicly described as “arguably the 
worst urban school district in the country” (Greenup, 2013:11) by Education 
Secretary Arne Duncan in 2010. One study noted that fewer than a third of 2006 
DPS leavers had graduated on time while another estimated that only 12% of 2008 
DPS leavers would complete college (Data Driven Detroit, 2011:19;22). By 2009, 
11% of the city’s 16-19 year olds had either not graduated or were not even 
attending schools (Data Driven Detroit, 2011:22): amounting to mid-20th Century 
statistics almost a decade into the 21st. High levels of human capital are far from a 
panacea for urban decline, and the direction of causality between education levels 
and urban growth remains a point of analytical contention (Kodrzycki & Munoz, 
2013:25). They are, however, seen to correlate considerably with urban, as well as 
national rates of economic growth (Glaeser, 2000:90;95) (Barro, 1998:19). It was 
the acknowledgement of human capital’s growing significance - coupled with the 
perceived failure of neoclassical models to adequately incorporate it - which spurred 
the rise of endogenous theories and, eventually, the applied variants which 
Michigan and Detroit policymakers did see fit to implement in certain contexts 
(Nafziger, 2006:155). Transforming the DPS into an equivalent to the Finnish school 
system on the Great Lakes would not have resolved the city’s manifold challenges, 
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and was likely infeasible. The limited impact of and, until recently, efforts to remedy 
the city’s educational deficiencies, however, are not easily reconcilable with any 
explicit theory of economic development.  
 
Public safety was an even graver cause for concern. Detroit had a higher rate of 
violent crime than any other major American city during the year leading up to 
bankruptcy (City of Detroit, 2013:9). The city suffered 344 murders in 2011 
compared to 85 in similarly sized and nearby Milwaukee and only 3 in the 
neighbouring suburb of Dearborn (City of Detroit, 2013:9). The ability of the city’s 
public services to appropriately respond to these threats to life and property was 
rapidly eroding. The percentage of homicide cases closed by the city’s police 
department was just 11.3% in 2011 (City of Detroit, 2013:10). Police response times 
to the highest priority calls slowed from a lengthy baseline of 30 minutes in 2012 to 
58 minutes in 2013 - against a national average of 11 minutes (City of Detroit, 
2013:13). Management disputes, inadequate funding, the loss of over 40% of its 
workforce over the preceding decade and commensurately declining morale 
contributed to an unprecedentedly trying state of affairs in the months preceding 
bankruptcy (City of Detroit, 2013:14) (Reese & Sands, 2013:10-11).  
 
Having defied the laws of budgetary gravity for decades, the city’s finances were 
fast reaching fiscal breaking point. The housing crash sent property tax revenues 
tumbling by nearly $30 million between 2007 and 2008 (McDonald, 2015:296). 47% 
of tax eligible properties in the city were in arrears on their payments by 2011; 
forgoing $246 million in revenue (Detroit Free Press, 2012). The city ran a deficit for 
each year between 2001 and 2013 (McDonald, 2015:295). Detroit’s aggregate fiscal 
obligations stood between $18-20 billion by 2013 (Bowen & Kinahan, 2014:13) 
(Renaud-Komiya, 2013) and, following last-ditch attempts to negotiate settlements 
with its exasperated creditors, the city acceded to what many suspected was 
inevitable and formally filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code on July 18th. The level of financial obligations involved made it the 
largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history by a considerable margin (Bowen & 
Kinahan, 2014:13). Following the approval of a Federal Judge, Detroit was 
permitted to write off around $7 billion of its obligations, and the city formally exited 
bankruptcy in December 2014 (Detroit Free Press, 2014) (Davey,  2014). Reducing 
the city’s contributions to retirees’ healthcare costs by over 90% from $4.3 billion to 
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just $450 million, and almost halving the amount spent on unfunded pensions 
(Detroit Free Press, 2014), the final settlement closed the chapter on the endgame 
of close to four decades of accumulating debts. It would not however resolve the 
city’s difficulties in their entirety.  
 
Post-bankruptcy redevelopment efforts have largely concentrated upon improving 
public service provision and remediating damaged or abandoned structures. To this 
end, President Barack Obama appointed a task force comprised of public, private 
sector and non-profit leaders to assess the scope of Detroit’s structural challenges 
(Detroit Blight Removal Task Force, 2014:6). Principal among these was the city’s 
widespread urban blight; a product of its aging housing stock, rising crime rates and 
declining public services (Glaeser, 2011:64). The President's task force identified 
this as a “cancer” (Detroit Blight Removal Task Force, 2014:1) on the city. 
Estimating that 22% of its structures were blighted or vacant, it recommended the 
removal of almost half of these (Detroit Blight Removal Task Force, 2014:1:15). 
However, with an estimated cost of $8,535 per building demolished (City of Detroit, 
2013:17), the cost of removing these properties threatened to be prohibitive. 
 
Detroit’s emergence from bankruptcy in 2014 and certain modest improvements in 
public service provision may not have been a cause for celebration, however they 
were one for relief (Snyder, 2015). Police response times for the highest priority 
callouts fell from nearly an hour in 2013 to 17 minutes by December 2014 and 2,900 
blighted buildings were demolished (Detroit Free Press, 2014). These 
improvements continued into 2015; with the removal of 837 blighted homes and a 
continued fall in emergency response times to slightly under 11 minutes (Detroit 
Dashboard, 2015). The number of homicides within the city fell by 11% between 
2013 and 2015 - to their lowest number in half a century (Detroit Police Department, 
2016:1). 
 
There have, however, been clear limits to Detroit’s recovery, and ones which may 
represent the next wave of challenges for the city’s residents and policymakers. The 
city’s near infamous public schools continue to operate in a state of perpetual 
financial crisis, academic underperformance and collapsing enrolment (Bosman, 
January 2016). On the same day as a January 2016 visit by President Obama, a 
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majority of the city’s public school teachers staged an unofficial strike over working 
conditions and salary proposals (Strauss, 2016) (Zaniewski, 2016). Fewer than a 
third of fourth year students in the city’s public schools were proficient in reading 
(Bosman, 2016). In spite of progress in the aftermath of bankruptcy, other municipal 
services also continue to struggle to meet the needs of residents; with the city’s 
water and sanitation authorities recently beginning to disconnect up to 23,000 
customers who were in default (Johnson, 2016) (Thibodeau, 2016).  
 
Concluding that “business as usual” (Detroit Future City, 2012:18) was no longer 
tenable, then Mayor David Bing had launched an extended consultation process 
aimed at devising a viable strategic framework for regeneration in 2010 (Gallagher, 
2015). Released in December 2012, with declining response times, dwindling 
revenues and escalating debts all weighing ever more heavily upon its horizons, the 
Detroit Future City (DFC) framework had identified the need for immediate 
improvements within the domains of public safety, education and health (2012:20). 
Noting that a third of Detroit residents in a recent survey expressed their intention to 
leave it within five years (2012:20), the DFC plan has taken on an even greater 
urgency during the post-bankruptcy era; providing something close to an 
overarching redevelopment strategy which had, in earlier years, been absent (Neill, 
2015:12). 
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3.4: The state of the city 
 
In the final, though necessarily tentative analysis, efforts to redevelop the city’s 
economy have been cyclical and have been encumbered by inconsistent and, at 
times, random, targeting. The deployment of incentives veered from haphazard and 
wanton allocations in the 1970s and 1980s, to a more judicious and restrained 
approach throughout the 1990s to one focused squarely on damage control by the 
late 2000s. The lengths to which the city's administration went to in order to secure 
even minimal investment was demonstrated by the construction of costly plants in 
Poletown and Jefferson North. The effective absence of initiatives explicitly aimed at 
the city compelled it to compete for Federal and state funds, and diminished the 
amounts that were likely necessary to even marginally ameliorate its longstanding 
social and economic troubles.  
 
Logistically, Detroit’s redevelopment efforts have seen the application of largely 
urban development instruments; from the IFT and subsequent property tax 
incentives to the more expansive RZs. While the impact of urban policy is unlikely to 
be disseminated across a region, Detroit’s projects may have been too localised to 
generate multiplier effects even on a city-wide level. The emphasis on  major 
projects, often based within the CBD also hinged upon not only an optimistic 
reading of their economic benefits, but also an emphasis on the centrality of the 
central district which, in an increasingly suburbanised and decentralised labour 
market, bordered on the anachronistic (Neill, 2015:6).  
 
As with South Wales, the reliance upon almost exclusively supply-side assistance to 
firms may have been intuitively defensible during the initial period of locally-driven 
development efforts. Their pursuit, potentially at the expense of actions with a 
clearer long-term benefit for regional development such as improving its public 
education system, upskilling its labour force and ensuring adequate public service 
provision, however, proved increasingly problematic with the passage of time 
(Glaeser, 2011:27;58;109). The advent of Detroit’s redevelopment efforts towards 
the end of the first wave of American development policy, within a context of inter-
regional competition informed by the, at the time, more dominant neoclassical 
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paradigms may have contributed to a considerable degree of path-dependence. 
While its efforts would increasingly pay greater heed to the role of human capital 
stressed by endogenous theory, these found their way into practice within the 
comparatively underfunded Cool Cities initiative which drew from the more 
contested variant developed by Florida, and not in long-term efforts to increase its 
human capital reserves through its education system.   
 
State level supply-side tax incentives such as MEGA likewise often prioritised the 
suburbs of Detroit and Michigan’s other industrial cities until its final years, although 
given its status as a regional policy focused on state-wide employment and revenue 
objectives, its relative exclusion of the city was not incompatible with its overall 
mission statement. The deployment of state-wide funds to its suburbs, should have, 
theoretically, generated spillover employment growth for Detroit’s working residents, 
given that almost half of them commute to nearby localities and further afield for 
work (SEMCOG, 2015). The suburbs are however “functionally autonomous” (Hall & 
Hall, 1993:25) from the city proper and insulated from it by a notoriously 
dysfunctional transport system. Detroit’s losses of population and jobs over the 
preceding six decades have “essentially been its suburbs’ gains” (Data Driven 
Detroit, 2015) and, in large part, the “suburbs have become the city” (Gallagher, 
2013:15). What was, on balance, beneficial for suburbs such as Dearborn was not 
similarly positive for the city of Detroit.  As such, any further gravitational pull of 
employment to the suburbs threatened to pose negative implications for job growth 
within the city.  
 
Compounding these logistical and distributional challenges has been an irregular 
approach to programme evaluation and data collection. Limitations in the available 
data for both the initiatives themselves and the relevant social and economic 
indicators at the level of the city itself further cloud the situation. While the 
boundaries of the city of Detroit are straightforward, it does not automatically follow 
that statistics regarding Michigan’s economic development initiatives are available 
at this level for all programmes, nor that the range of necessary economic indicators 
are collected at it either; with many of the latter aggregated at the metropolitan level 
(Glaeser, 2000:88;89). As much as Michigan and the Detroit metropolitan area are 
“anomalies” (Anderson & Wassmer, 2000:20) in terms of the information available 
for their economic development programmes, the data is neither consistently 
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detailed across all initiatives, nor routinely available at the level of individual cities 
(Reese, 2014:634). These omissions have particular implications for tax abatements 
such as the IFT, with much of the available data often failing to specify a clear dollar 
value for individual abatements (Reese, 2014:9). The result is that there is often 
little or no sense of the overall cost of an individual project to the city’s purse. 
 
 
Expenditure for the field of economic development by the city itself is publicly 
available, at least in accessible and audited form from 2002 onwards, and is 
included in Table 1.5. This indicates total expenditure of $1.18 billion by the city 
upon this function of government over the last 13 financial years for which this data 
is available. Annual reports do not appear to identify all incentives or projects which 
are used to aggregate it, however it appears that these figures do include Federal 
CDBG funds along with a number of smaller city-based awards (City of Detroit 
Correspondence, 2016). While this does not clarify the opaque overall picture for 
city-wide economic development expenditure, as one of the few datasets which 
provides specific dollar values, its relationship to city-wide metrics does merit further 
consideration. 
 
 
The correlation coefficient between this expenditure and the city’s annual 
unemployment rates was relatively strong at -0.51: suggesting an inverse 
relationship between both variables. The city’s straitened financial conditions during 
years of growing unemployment likely accounts for this. Economic development 
spending averaged $98 million per year prior to 2008; when annualised average 
unemployment rates for the city amounted to 13.4%, but $77 million between 2008 
and 2013; as its unemployment rates averaged 21.5%. Separating the Federal 
funds from municipal incentives may represent the clearest difficulty when engaging 
with this dataset - as does the more limited coverage for years prior to 2002. It does, 
however, tentatively suggest that, in contrast to the state-wide MEGA initiative, city-
based economic development expenditure was less cyclical. This trend would be 
consistent with the more restrained abatement activity in years of particularly high 
unemployment; with IFT, CRA and NPP awards often in the low single digits 
between 2008 and 2013 (Figures 3.1;3.8;3.9), and, given the city’s deteriorating 
finances, may be intuitively credible. 
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Figure 3.10: Scatter plot of economic development expenditure and city-wide unemployment rates, 2002-2015 
0
20,000,000
40,000,000
60,000,000
80,000,000
100,000,000
120,000,000
140,000,000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
EC
O
N
O
M
IC
 D
EV
EL
O
P
M
EN
T 
EX
P
EN
D
IT
U
R
E 
($
)
AVERAGE ANNUAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (%)
158 
 
The sheer number of state-wide incentives, with 251 created since 1998 alone 
(Drake, 2014:44:76), makes itemising total expenditure, let alone evaluating all 
schemes a daunting challenge, and Michigan Treasury reports do not detail the 
amount of property tax incentives granted to Detroit itself(Michigan Treasury, 
2015:66). The result is an absence of a blanket, detailed and accessible inventory of 
state incentives, and one which presents further impediments for assessing their 
impact upon the city (Anderson et al, 2009:3). A recent overview could determine 
dollar amounts at the city level for only one economic development initiative (Reese, 
2014:635. Nor, as the experience of MEGA and RZs belies, are programmes 
administered by MEDC immune from these limitations.  
 
Table 3.8: Assessed and state equalized value of key property classes within 
Detroit, 2000-2016 
Year Commercial ($) Industrial ($) Residential ($) Personal  
($) 
Total 
 ($) 
2000 1,548,832,550 633,221,550 5,924,124,350 1,718,118,920 9,824,297,370 
2001 1,762,100,650 642,225,400 6,912,038.25 1,656,437,990 10,972,802,290 
2002 1,745,274,850 640,497,950 7,912,571,400 1,749,983,210 12,048,327,410 
2003 1,977,760,856 709,092,292 7,981,680,697 1,391,662,381 12,060,196,226 
2004 2,063,117,764 774,256,488 8,429,748,953 1,573,479,752 12,840,642,957 
2005 2,252,275,323 856,344,224 8,649,348,048 1,654,260,635 13,412,228,230 
2006 2,299,265,879 877,750,103 8,622,589,002 1,655,569,747 13,455,174,731 
2007 2,542,438,771 861,156,533 9,063,123,282 1,646,721,974 14,113,440,560 
2008 2,766,213,085 750,693,136 8,815,608,633 1,612,957,472 13,945,472,326 
2009 2,714,762,418 718,520,068 7,427,226,864 1,637,133,708 12,497,643,058 
2010 2,561,852,863 711,088,399 6,331,071,460 1,516,381,857 11,120,394,579 
2011 2,617,911,119 660,159,475 5,475,901,289 1,369,132,417 10,123,104,300 
2012 2,417,370,906 576,899,633 4,850,303,038 1,592,878,021 9,437,451,598 
2013 2,270,628,738 555,507,010 4,292,795,455 1,862,606,852 8,981,538,055 
2014 2,204,881,995 531,132,811 3,335,506,139 1,740,559,868 7,812,080,813 
2015 2,306,431,357 503,961,929 3,030,574,465 1,752,545,052 7,593,512,803 
2016 2,386,675,689 480,503,000 2,566,135,740 1,518,530,153 6,951,844,582 
 
Michigan Treasury (2016) 
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Identifying the apparent impact of local tax incentives should, theoretically, be more 
straightforward. The Michigan Treasury does produce reports totalling assessed 
property values across the principal classes of property: industrial, commercial, 
residential and personal, and these should be sufficient to ostensibly gauge whether 
incentive usage was related to appreciable changes in relevant values during their 
period of operation. These reports are, however, unavailable for years prior to 2000; 
limiting the ability to track property values for many of the abatements launched 
between 1974 and 2000 (City of Detroit Correspondence, 2015). The city’s publicly 
available Annual Financial Reviews do backdate overall property values to 1994, 
however these figures are unaudited and do not disaggregate values into all four 
relevant classes (City of Detroit, 2002:112). This gap is particularly problematic for 
IFTs, given that 85.1% of the total granted within the city were issued prior to 2000 
(Figure 3.1).  
 
Superficially, CRAs appear to have coincided with the most robust growth trends in 
property values for its respective category; with commercial property representing 
the only class to consistently increase its overall assessed value between 2000 and 
2016 (Table 3.8). Industrial and residential property both experienced precipitous 
declines during the previous decade, following several years of positive growth. 
Personal property values fluctuated considerably; with the total for the 2016 
financial year ranking below its 2000 figure. Its most recent total is anomalously low, 
having outperformed its early 2000s valuations repeatedly in earlier years. 
Proceeding on property values alone, both the NPP and CRA would therefore have 
the strongest claim to efficacy, due to their largely upward growth trends during a 
particularly trying time for the city’s property market.  Inferences from the available 
data must, however, be made with a requisite degree of caution. In the absence of 
concrete information regarding the amount of the financial awards involved, the 
number of abatements issued in isolation lacks much of the explanatory power 
needed to assess their impact, or, indeed, to make an informed speculation 
regarding it.  
 
Any attribution of a causal relationship between CRA abatements and commercial 
property values must similarly acknowledge that the initiative was not launched until 
2005, that the first abatement within the city was not granted until 2009 and that the 
number of abatements since then has averaged somewhat more than 4 per year. In 
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addition, average annualised growth trends for commercial property values 
amounted to +7.6% between 2000 and 2009; prior to its launch within the city, and -
1.7% in the years following. The relative infrequency of NPP awards, with a total of 
7 years during which no abatements were granted within Detroit, as well as a similar 
paucity of data regarding their financial value poses a familiar obstacle to 
ascertaining a relationship between incentives and personal property values. There 
is also the question of the extent to which a total of 58 CRA and NPP abatements 
granted over a period of a decade and half are sufficient to meaningfully uplift 
commercial or personal property values, in addition to the larger question of, if their 
impact on their own category of property is unclear, whether their effect on broader 
economic condition of the city would even be measurable.  
 
An additional complication is presented by the occurrence of the housing and 
financial crises. Successive, year-on-year falls in aggregate property values were 
observed between 2007 and 2016 and a 50.7% decline in assessed values between 
the onset of the housing crisis and the current financial year. It is intuitively plausible 
that the availability of abatements lessened the destructive force of the financial 
crisis. This inference, however, could only be drawn in the presence of a notably 
larger dataset than that which, at present, appears to be available. Property values 
represent a worthwhile proxy for the overall state of physical capital within the city. 
They ultimately do not, in and of themselves, gauge their impact upon its broader 
economic condition. It is here that the central difficulty lies. The city’s economic 
incentives were intended to promote its redevelopment yet their primary objectives, 
the metrics conventionally used to assess and the conditions attached to them were 
not always conducive to the formation of a holistic redevelopment strategy.  
 
Many incentives focused on remediating property; an objective for which it is 
possible, albeit in a limited and fragmentary fashion, to assess on a city-wide level. 
While some did focus upon job creation, there were often insufficient requirements 
and enforcement mechanisms placed upon participating firms. The outputs were 
often too minor to have a viable expectation of city-wide economic revitalisation or, 
as in the case of the Poletown development, simply failed to materialise. Finally and 
relatedly, the single-project nature encouraged by many incentives compounded the 
issues encountered with Federal assistance during the 1970s and 1980s. Funds 
promoted developments in isolation, with individual objectives, rather than city-wide 
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ones; hindering their incorporation into overall redevelopment efforts. While certain 
incentives did target distressed areas of the city, many did not: resulting in a 
patchwork quilt of incentives awarded, often for different purposes, operating under 
differing assumptions and with different goals and conditions. These varied from 
IFTs focused on industrial sections and which had, particularly initially, few if any job 
creation requirements, to CRAs targeted at commercial properties with looser 
property-related requirements than earlier incentives (Barr & McCulloch, 2009:126) 
(Anderson et al, 2010:31).  
 
With certain exceptions, the city’s primary development instruments have not 
progressed measurably beyond the first wave of development efforts: leading to a 
continued, although potentially unavoidable dependence on financial incentives. 
Their adherence to economic theory is similarly mixed. Programmes such as the 
RZs and subsequent tax incentives continued to draw on explicitly neoclassical 
assumptions regarding the objectives of development tools as late as the 1990s and 
beyond. While endogenous growth theory did find its way into redevelopment 
efforts, this was in the form of a more contested, applied variant, employed in a 
programme whose allocations were intentionally modest and which did not, 
fundamentally, address the more pressing avenues for improvements in the city’s 
level of human capital. The net result has been an array of incentives which Detroit 
could utilise, yet which were not customised with its history and needs in mind, a 
succession of policies which drew from economic theory, yet which often did so 
incidentally, and which structurally straddled the boundaries between supply and 
demand-side initiatives to the extent that categorising them, let alone quantifying 
their impact upon the city is difficult.  
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Table 3.9: Economic development policy trends within Detroit (1974-2016): 
commencing overleaf
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Period Policies Urban/Regional Objectives Theory Supply/demand 
side 
1974-1993 
Improvisation 
 IFT 
abatements 
 Major 
construction 
projects 
 CDBG/UDAG 
grants 
 
Urban  Generate and 
retain 
employment. 
 Promote the 
development 
of industrial 
property.   
 Enhance the 
riverfront and 
CBD.  
Neoclassical Supply 
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Period Policies Urban/Regional Objectives Theory Supply/demand 
side 
1993-2010 
Expansion 
 Renaissance 
Zones 
 NPP, OPRA, 
BRA and CRA 
exemptions 
 Empowerment 
Zone 
 Cool Cities 
grants 
 DRFC 
Urban and 
regional 
 Support the 
development 
of differing 
classes of 
property 
 Increase 
employment  
 Develop and 
spur 
investment in 
distressed 
sections of the 
city 
 Attract and 
retain creative 
workers  
 Continue 
riverfront 
developments  
 
Neoclassical 
and 
endogenous 
Supply and 
demand 
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Period Policies Urban/Regional Objectives Theory Supply/demand 
side 
2010-2014 
Reinvention 
 MBDP and 
MCRP 
 Blight removal 
 Public service 
improvements 
Urban  Remediate the 
city’s built 
environment 
 Increase 
public service 
provision to 
practical 
levels 
 Targeted 
regeneration 
and job-
creation 
projects 
Endogenous 
and 
neoclassical 
Supply and 
demand 
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The discernible trends within the city’s redevelopment efforts (Table 3.9) do signify 
the level of change which has occurred within it, though also suggest a basic level 
of continuity in incentives and objectives. The locally-driven efforts which required 
municipal leaders to improvise with the development instruments and incentives 
available to them gave way to a more active Federal and state level role, at least in 
the provision of incentives and funds by the 1990s; although the city’s usage of 
these earlier incentives would continue. This expansion of development instruments 
did not prompt as immediate a shift in the basic objectives of development policy as 
may have been necessary. The Cool Cities and DRFC initiatives would not launch 
in earnest until mid-way into the next decade, by which point the challenges to 
state’s auto industry, the city’s finances and services were already accumulating at 
a precipitous rate. It would not be prior to the effective onset of bankruptcy that city-
wide objectives relating to its development instruments began to fully reflect the 
scale of the city’s, by this stage, immense structural and fiscal obstacles. The 
combination of the settlement of Detroit’s bankruptcy and this shift in operational 
objectives may amount to a new era in development policymaking, although it may 
not be possible to define the extent of the change in post-bankruptcy strategy at this 
stage.   
 
The mixed conclusions of Michigan’s economic development initiatives have been 
granted further credence by recent research such as Reese (2014); which 
concluded that the most positive impacts upon recipient areas’ “economic health” 
(Reese, 2014:629) were associated with the demand-side Cool Cities scheme, 
while “no statistically significant relationship between abatements and economic 
health” (Reese, 2014:647) could be determined. Similarly, significant effects could 
not be determined from the MEGA programme, although, as RZs were more likely 
to be utilised by deprived and distressed localities, their usage was “related to” 
(Reese, 2014:647) certain positive developments with regard to their economic 
vitality.  
 
Some of the more unambiguously positive findings related to public expenditure by 
local government units on functions such as “public safety, recreation and general 
government services” (Reese, 2014:647). These are services which Detroit has 
struggled to administer for decades, and for which major Federal funds such as the 
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EZ had not resulted in meaningful funding increases. By 2000, Detroit’s expenditure 
on police protection amounted to less than 8% of its general spending despite a 
violent crime rate higher than the nation’s two largest cities (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2010). Given that expenditure on these services may have represented some of the 
most consistently effective means of advancing economic development (Reese, 
2014:647), this limitation would be of continuing and problematic significance to the 
city. 
 
The resolution of the city’s bankruptcy, the overhaul of state development incentives 
and ongoing efforts to improve its public services and reduce blight ensure that the 
proceeding phase of Detroit’s redevelopment remains, by necessity, a work in 
progress.  Of the local, state and Federal initiatives undertaken to redevelop it, 
some appear to have yielded greater results than others, while the reverse appears 
to have been true more often than city officials may have been willing to 
acknowledge. Yet in too many cases, reaching such a judgement with an 
appropriate degree of analytical confidence is not possible: necessitating more 
qualified, logistical and process-oriented conclusions. Successive efforts to 
redevelop the city tentatively appear to have suffered from a shortage of absolute 
dollars committed, an ambiguous grounding in and responsiveness to developments 
in relevant economic theories and logistical issues of programme design, focus, 
implementation and evaluation. The next set of efforts to revitalise it may yet, 
however, locate the heretofore missing ignition key.  
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 
4.1: Omission impossible 
 
The ambiguity surrounding the effectiveness of economic development efforts in 
Detroit and South Wales owes something to longstanding uncertainties within the 
field itself and the general difficulty in assessing such programmes (Armstrong & 
Taylor, 2000:400). Whether such programmes can in fact yield measurable 
improvements in local and regional economies remains a point of academic and 
empirical contention (Imbroscio, 2004:77) (Anderson & Wassmer, 2000:1) (Peters & 
Fisher, 2004:32). This ambiguity has however been compounded by uneven and 
non-standardised approaches to record-keeping for individual programmes, 
inconsistent and variable evaluation of the initiatives in the case of Detroit, and often 
non-existent assessment in the case of Wales. Without comprehensive data at the 
necessary geographic levels and without regularised, itemised and publicly 
available programme data (Anderson et al, 2010:29) (LaFaive & Hohman, 2009:37), 
the risk of observers and policymakers making simplistic, at times reductionist and 
possibly wholly erroneous judgements based on headline statistics is increased. 
Frequent assertions that development programmes have failed due to the continued 
economic underperformance of targeted regions can be misleading or at least 
misplaced (Williamson, 2014) (Williams, 2012) (Hoban, 2013), yet they may 
represent an inevitable by-product of unpredictable approaches to monitoring and 
assessing them. 
 
Evaluations are considered essential to ensure the continued effectiveness of 
economic development and, indeed, many, if not all, policy interventions (Armstrong 
& Taylor, 2000:362). Their comparative absence in both regions is therefore a 
particular constraint not only from an academic standpoint, but from an operational 
one as well.  In the absence of robust evaluations conducted at the relevant levels 
and informed by adequate data, it becomes next to impossible to differentiate better 
practice from blind luck, and effective programmes unsuccessfully contending 
against overwhelming odds from those which may themselves enhance, rather than 
rectify the problem at hand. It is not possible to quantify whether the funds allocated 
were in excess of what was needed, or utterly insufficient for the scale of the 
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challenge or whether or not they represented adequate value for money. Any 
judgements on programme efficacy reached as a result of this project are therefore 
tentative and heavily qualified. They also, inevitably, are informed in substantial part 
by those of previous studies, audits and reports; many of which are now appreciably 
dated, while others remain tangentially applicable to the regions under 
consideration. 
 
Certain explanations for a general trend towards reduced transparency in more 
decentralised nations have been floated, ranging from the need to defend the status 
quo and the legitimacy of the regime to more short-term electoral imperatives, as 
well as the creation of further avenues for obfuscation and concealment (Rodriguez-
Pose & Gill, 2003:5;34). Some of the most prominent studies imputing a tendency 
towards misappropriation and a decline in transparency arising from devolved 
control are, however, constructed with reference to developing or less economically 
developed nations (Prud'homme, 1994:11): meaning that further research on this 
issue within a Welsh, U.S. and wider UK context may be necessary to pursue this 
hypothetical explanation. There are, from this project, no apparent grounds for 
ascribing this paucity of data and assessment to any necessary intent on the part of 
policymakers in either region - though these criticisms have been levelled by 
opposition parties and outside organisations (Henry, 2013) (Denholm-Hall, 2014) 
(LaFaive & Hohman, 2009:38-40). It is possible that this comparative lack of 
assessments results simply from the aforementioned complexity of policy 
evaluations coupled with the reticence of academic institutions to intervene within 
the policymaking process (Glasmeier, 2000:575).  
 
The paucity of evaluations in both Detroit and South Wales and the correlative 
constraints in data collection and programme monitoring can not be seen in 
isolation. They may reflect the insignificance of these initiatives relative not only to 
the challenges they were designed to address (Hill, 1986:117), but also relative to 
the resources committed to other functions of government. Economic development 
accounted for 3.1% of Detroit’s 2015 expenditure and 1.4% of Wales’ total managed 
2014-15 expenditure (Wales Governance Centre, 2016:60) (City of Detroit, 
2015:12). Governments prioritise voluminous challenges; it would not be 
unexpected for economic development to have been eclipsed by the maelstrom of 
demands and events they contend with. It is, however, detrimental for the regional 
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and local policymaking process when this funding is improperly accounted for, its 
impacts insufficiently scrutinised or when it is directed in inefficient or 
counterproductive directions which do little to measurably improve the economic 
standing of distressed regions. In the absence of sustained analysis of the 
objectives and operation of economic development programmes, the likelihood of 
policies “diverting attention from the deeper underlying bases of economic 
deprivation” (Glasmeier, 2000:575) is only enhanced. 
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4.2: Finishing the “unfinished business” 
 
While a robust assessment of the effectiveness of economic development initiatives 
within the city and across the Valleys may not be achievable under present 
constraints, it is possible to draw certain inferences regarding their operation, 
objectives and to identify specific trends both common to, as well as in contrast to 
the areas. The balance of redevelopment efforts in both has been towards supply-
side, at times prototypically “incentive-based” (Amin, 1999:365) schemes. 
Redevelopment initiatives in Detroit have largely bypassed the progression to the 
second, let alone third waves of development policy seen in other states, while 
Welsh policymakers have similarly retained a commitment to direct financial 
inducements; even as the Government's economic strategy signalled a definitive 
transition away from them and their assumptions. There have been more intuitive 
distinctions. The responses of Detroit’s policymakers have featured conventional 
tools of urban policy to a considerable extent, especially in its localised efforts to 
spur investment and employment through exemptions from city-wide taxes. The 
repeated deployment of policy instruments more appropriate for urban development 
efforts in the Valleys, however, appears somewhat less congruent with the region’s 
scale. 
  
Detroit’s political, civil and corporate leaders have attempted to restart the Motor 
City through a range of different incentives. These efforts have been undertaken 
with the, albeit variable, backing of state and Federal governments. The lack of 
clarity regarding their impact results, considerably from insufficient evaluation - with 
a particular deficit in programme assessments restricted to the city itself. While this 
analytical deficit persists, certain tentative judgements can be ventured regarding 
their overall record from the information which is available. Even superficially, it is 
not one of comprehensive failure. Many incentives and initiatives can point to 
notable successes in their outputs: from increased employment within the EZ, to the 
development of the city’s riverfront facilities. The largest state incentive did expand 
in response to the unprecedented decline of the auto industry, even if city and 
Federal efforts overall did not, or perhaps could not, move to fill the vacuum to a 
comparable extent. What has been more unequivocally unsuccessful has been their 
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ability to aggressively counteract, let alone reverse the city’s painful downward 
spiral (Glaeser, 2011:63). 
 
Initial Federal assistance may have been insufficiently coordinated; leading to a 
piecemeal, scattergun approach towards development projects without an 
overarching strategic vision or consistent adherence to (or recognition of evolution 
in) economic theory, beyond the general lineage of supply-side tax incentives to 
neoclassical assumptions. Many locally administered incentives and abatements 
were initially deployed indiscriminately in a frantic bid to avert an even greater 
haemorrhaging of employment and investment to the suburbs. The decision of the 
city’s political leaders to prioritise revitalisation almost at the expense of, rather than 
in tandem with public service and public safety enhancement may have been 
defensible judgements when made during the late 1970s and early 1980s, yet 
appear less so the hindsight of bankruptcy and pervasive struggles with public 
service provision. 
 
Ultimately, just as no one individual, organisation or government unit bears 
exclusively responsibility for the city’s decline, no one entity can bear sole 
responsibility for reversing it. While organisations dedicated to its redevelopment 
have been in existence for 40 years, they have in turn depended on the willingness 
of state and Federal governments to grant them adequate powers and distribute 
funding appropriate for the scale of the challenge. While both levels of government 
have acceded to the city’s needs, they do not appear to have done so to the levels 
necessary to combat one of the most pronounced cases of urban decay and 
industrial decline in American history. State and Federal programmes have featured 
many of the limitations encountered with locally-administered initiatives, although to 
a lesser extent. These have ranged from gaps in programme-level data to the 
concentration of funds on select projects and services, rather than into those such 
as public safety and education which may have generated greater long-term 
returns. Many initiatives or funds granted to the city have similarly been iterations of 
those allocated to others. Any specialisation would often come only in the final, on 
the ground delivery, rather than in the initial design; a trend which may have 
reinforced the channelling of these funds to ultimately less productive aims. It has 
often taken industrially or fiscally catastrophic events to prompt specific recognition 
of the city by Federal policy from the requirement that GM retain its Poletown 
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operations as a condition of the overall financial aid package to the U.S. auto 
industry, to the President’s commitment of funds to assist the city in enhancing its 
public services and removing blight (Calmes, 2013). Such actions have been 
undoubtedly welcomed in the Municipal Center and further afield, however they 
arrive late in the proverbial day and following decades of creeping urban decay and 
battering industrial decline. 
 
With greater data constraints and notably fewer evaluations than seen in the case of 
Detroit’s home state of Michigan, economic development efforts within the Valleys 
specifically and Wales generally have, to a certain extent, been operating within a 
statistical vacuum.  The impact of this evaluative deficit, only deepened by 
considerable gaps in the “economic intelligence” (Crawley, 2015:3) needed to model 
the impact of such initiatives, is that categorical judgements regarding their impact 
must be effectively withheld until such time as the requisite information is available. 
Researchers from Cardiff University’s Business School have recently sought to 
construct such a model, with the research component of the project having been 
scheduled for completion in May 2016 and further information regarding it currently 
pending (Cardiff Business School, 2013). 
 
As in the case of Detroit, some provisional conclusions can be reached regarding 
the administration of these programmes, their apparent effects upon the Valleys and 
the overall strategy pursued by UK and, ultimately, by Welsh Governments in 
contending with their sizeable challenges. This region precipitated the first regional 
aid programmes ever pursued by a British Government. These programmes yielded 
some demonstrable successes, however, as with Detroit, it would be the Second 
World War and its rapid and near total mobilisation of the manufacturing labour 
force which holds some claim to representing its  most successful development 
initiative; albeit one which can not be readily replicated without immense human and 
financial costs. Subsequent efforts during the post-war years were generally 
successful in creating or at least safeguarding employment within Wales itself, 
however they often suffered from an insufficiently long-term vision for economic 
development. 
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In later years, both Wales and the Valleys developed a dependence on FDI; 
bolstered by the availability of RSA and the marketing prowess of the newly 
established WDA (Hunt, 2011:7). This led to a regional case of “branch office 
syndrome” (Hunt, 2011:7). Branches of foreign firms employing disproportionately 
low-wage and entry level employment began to proliferate: resulting in transient 
effects on the region and at significant public expense (Hunt, 2011:7) (Wang & 
Eames, 2010). It was not until 1988, over half a century since the first regional aid 
programmes came into effect, that the UK government pursued an initiative clearly 
customised for the region itself. This programme was able to generate certain, 
tangible gains to the area’s population, though remained structurally divided 
between both supply and demand-side goals and between urban and regional 
policy. Despite its aspirations for cultivating and enhancing more indigenous 
investment, the programme continued, if not expanded the supply-side focus on 
attracting foreign investment (Stroud et al, 2015:23). 
 
Welsh devolution would, intuitively, have been expected to sharpen the focus on 
specialised Welsh approaches to redevelopment (Rawlings, 2003:37). Indeed, it 
was the apparent remoteness of Whitehall and Westminster to Welsh economic 
concerns which had contributed so much to the “democratic deficit” (Hunt, 2011:6) 
which gave rise to the formation of the National Assembly. Leading figures within 
the Welsh Government publicly prioritised the development of the Welsh economy 
and set elevated targets for progress during the inaugural decade of devolved 
government (Jones, 2012:3). While the Valleys featured within these objectives, this 
prioritisation was not, at least initially, translated into a distinctive, devolved 
development strategy for the area. 
 
It is here that the distinction between the powers afforded by Welsh devolution and 
U.S. Federalism, and its implications for the economies of both regions should be 
highlighted. The more limited degree of fiscal autonomy granted to subnational 
regions by British devolution since the 1990s, particularly relative to that held by 
Detroit and comparable U.S. municipalities, has, and is likely to continue to insulate 
the Valleys from some of the city’s most notable crises relating to municipal 
financing and public service provision. Despite its limitations, regional grant-
financing has provided Welsh governments with a safeguard against the incurrence 
of debts comparable to those of Detroit; confirming its status as an often “vital 
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accompaniment” (Armstrong & Taylor, 2000:358) to political devolution. Without this 
comparable fiscal shield, and faced with sustained depopulation and consequent 
revenue-depletion, Detroit saw an “externalisation” of its revenues to state sources 
and additional local taxes aimed at non-residents (Skidmore & Scorsone, 2015:22). 
These further funding routes, however, ultimately proved insufficient – as belied by 
the city’s eventual filing for municipal bankruptcy protection. With overall 
responsibility for its own public service provision, the city was required to meet the 
staffing costs and pension obligations involved – costs which, when aggregated, 
comprised a quarter of its pre-bankruptcy expenditure (Gallagher, 2013).The 
Valleys, while experiencing similar economic difficulties, have, nevertheless, been 
spared a comparable “exodus of residents, plummeting tax revenues and 
skyrocketing home abandonment” (Gallagher, 2013) to that of Detroit.  
 
Correlatively, economic development initiatives targeted towards the Valleys have 
not been tasked with counteracting the widespread depopulation of the region to the 
same extent as Detroit’s were. While population decline has been pronounced in the 
Valleys region over the past century, it has been neither as progressive nor as linear 
as it has been within the city; with inevitable, though significant, variation between 
UAs. Whereas Detroit’s population declined by -25% between 2000 and 2010 (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2016), the aggregate population of the seven-authority Valleys 
region increased by +3.5% during the decade between 2001 and 2011 (StatsWales, 
2016a). This did vary significantly between individual authorities, however, with an 
+8.3% rise in Bridgend’s population occurring alongside a -0.3% fall in Blaenau 
Gwent’s (StatsWales, 2016a). Had the Valleys experienced comparable reductions 
in their population and tax base, they would still have been spared from a Detroit-
level bankruptcy, simply by virtue of the UK’s comparatively centralised funding 
streams, and this comparative insulation from both systemic depopulation and 
municipal financial failure has impacted the responsibilities and aims of Welsh 
regional policy accordingly. 
 
With these distinctions between the challenges faced by the respective areas in 
mind, certain conclusions regarding the basic direction and orientation of devolved 
development programmes can be made. Welsh governments would initially 
continue to deploy the economic incentives they had inherited from Whitehall. In 
spite of this continuity, and with the receipt of enhanced European funding, 
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however, regional development funds were not allocated with a notable degree of 
discrimination. Significant pluralities would be directed towards the least distressed 
reaches of the Valleys: namely those most shielded from increased unemployment 
and declining populations. While the region as a whole began to receive a greater 
degree of recognition and customised policymaking with the advent of both 
regeneration initiatives, these, theoretically and operationally, resembled urban 
policies rather than regional policies with regional goals and commensurate funding. 
All initiatives can point to clear and, at least superficially, unambiguously positive 
results: from social interest projects enabled by European aid to the creation and 
retention of jobs throughout the region by business assistance. The real limitations 
which exist with regard to both national and regional economic data, intensified by 
gaps in programme level-information however make an overall gauge of their 
effectiveness close to impossible.  
 
Additionally, while both Wales and, by definition, the Valleys have been shielded 
from significant municipal liabilities by differences in regional financing 
arrangements between the U.S. and the UK, the devolution of further fiscal powers 
raises the spectre of a shift in this established trend. Defined income tax powers are 
to be devolved in 2019, permitting the Welsh Government to vary tax rates up to a 
maximum of 10% within each bracket, while the amount of funds it is permitted to 
borrow for infrastructure and other capital projects will be increased to £1 billion 
(Servini, 2016). While this is projected to increase the share of Welsh Government 
revenues directly controlled by Cathays Park to close to 20%, the majority will 
continue to be derived from a revised formula-based allocation (Servini, 2016). The 
Welsh Government's ongoing usage of Enterprise Zones, and proposals for further 
reductions in business rates and additional taxes for regional development purposes 
by multiple Welsh political parties prior to the 2016 Assembly elections are 
indicative of a growing focus on U.S-style tax incentives as policy instruments for 
economic development (Plaid Cymru, 2016:67;79) (Welsh Liberal Democrats, 
2016:17;77;81) (UKIP, 2016:3) (Welsh Conservatives, 2016: 10): policy options 
which would have been untenable within the parameters of earlier devolution 
settlements, or prior to devolution itself.  
 
While a number of opportunities and difficulties will be presented by fiscal 
devolution, progress towards the redevelopment of the Valleys has been 
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complicated by the uneven pace and the contested decisions of Welsh policymaking 
to date; making it imperative that future incentives and strategies are adequately 
calibrated, targeted and evaluated, particularly when the government’s own 
revenues may be involved. The wisdom of the “bonfire of the QUANGOs” remains a 
point of political contention between Welsh political parties more than a decade on 
(Henry, 2014) (Morgan, 2016). Major infrastructure projects remain incomplete 
(BBC Wales, 2016d). Having seemingly received the requisite regulatory and 
planning approval to proceed (BBC Wales, 2016a), the future of the Circuit of 
Wales, the flagship development initiative for the upper Valleys, appears more 
ambiguous than ever (Barry, 2016). The commitments to infrastructure development 
contained within the 2016 City Deal provide an opportunity for realising genuine 
progress, yet this is tempered by wider macroeconomic vulnerabilities including the 
continued uncertainty over Welsh steel production, future directions in UK public 
spending and the impact of British withdrawal from the EU. 
 
Grappling with the root causes of the by now firmly entrenched problems within both 
South Wales and Detroit may be a generational challenge. Quantifying the length of 
time necessary to do so unquestionably lies significantly outside of the remit, 
parameters or capacity of this work. However, the need for greater empiricism, more 
robust monitoring of any future undertakings, coupled with and complemented by 
rigorous data collection will not hinder these future public endeavours and should, 
conceivably, benefit them. So could a more sustained engagement with, 
extrapolation from, and incorporation of economic theories into programme 
objectives and metrics: particularly regarding the factors which these isolate and 
identify as necessary conditions for long-term economic growth.  
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4.3: The roads ahead 
 
The role played by regional and other sub-national governments with regards to 
economic development therefore produces a paradox. These units are closest to 
the challenges at hand - both in terms of geographic proximity and, at least 
theoretically, in terms of their accountability to those most affected by them 
(Rodriguez-Pose & Gill, 2003:25) (Oates, 1972:35). In spite of this, the level of 
resources and powers afforded to them in pursuit of regional and urban 
development may not always reflect the extent of the challenges they are called to 
alleviate. Reflecting the, by now, central role of institutions (Cole, 2006:6) in regional 
policymaking, the capability of programmes to affect positive economic 
developments can be similarly constrained by institutional agency. This can come in 
the form of initiatives with a comparatively tenuous link to applicable economic 
theory or a sufficiently empirical basis, or those which are strategically misdirected 
towards more ephemeral avenues and projects.  
 
Effective engagement with and resolution of chronic economic troubles may require 
more than more localised control in and of itself. It will likely involve concerted and 
coordinated efforts by multiple levels of government and by different sectors. It 
requires a commitment of resources commensurate to the scale of a region’s 
difficulties and, perhaps as necessary conditions for success, require that 
interventions are undertaken with the clearest empirical basis, are adjustable and 
adaptable to information gained through transparent metrics and targeted at the 
precise "bottleneck/[s]" (Pike et al, 2006:18) which may be impeding more robust 
progress. Identifying this balance is beyond the capacity of one dissertation, one 
individual, or even one level of government. The latter in particular can, however, be 
informed by the experiences of counterparts engaging with comparable challenges 
in similar regions and by pursuing instances of better, or at least averting replicating 
those of bad practice, rather than through the generic imitation of policies pursued in 
nearby regions (Pike et al, 2006:15). 
 
This project has sought to make a contribution to this process. Noting the parallels, 
as well as the differences which exist between the Motor City of Detroit and the 
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Valleys which were home to much of Wales’ near defunct heavy industry. The ways 
in which the city’s political leaders, and UK government officials, ultimately followed 
by Wales’ own devolved institutions sought to first create or safeguard employment, 
before proceeding towards more comprehensive redevelopment efforts as the scale 
of their emergent decline was recognised have been outlined. When possible, so 
too have been the positive, negative or ambiguous outcomes of these interventions 
(Rose, 1993:22). 
  
Something must still be done for both areas. It is the aspiration of this project that, 
drawing on the background and cases of two particularly distressed regions and 
critically evaluating the relevant literature that a somewhat clearer idea of the policy 
instruments which have been utilised, their assumptions, objectives and aspects of 
their implementation has been made. Development policies have been pursued, in 
varying forms and scales, for a minimum of 82 years in South Wales and 42 years 
in Detroit. Yet conditions in both regions remain significantly below the both Welsh, 
UK, Michigan and U.S. averages (Bouffard, 2015) (Foden et al, 2014:16;17;19;21). 
With both areas facing not only continuing, but further challenges, from the after-
effects of bankruptcy to the projected impact of government spending plans 
(Szczesny, 2015) (Beatty & Fothergill, 2014:3), it is time to ask what precisely 
“something” is. This project hopes to have at least begun to answer this question. 
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